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ABSTRACT 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) contribute significantly to economic 
growth and job creation. Given the importance of SMEs, this study examines the 
factors that may impact their outcomes (i.e., behaviours and performance). In 
particular, it examines the effects of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) regulatory 
focus and firms’ entrepreneurial orientation (EO) on SMEs. Regulatory focus theory 
suggests that people can pursue their goals via a promotion focus (associated with a 
concern for growth and a desire for gains) or a prevention focus (associated with a 
concern for safety and a desire to avoid losses). As an individual-level motivational 
characteristic, regulatory focus underlies the motives people are aiming to satisfy, 
the goals they pursue, and the strategic means they prefer to implement in striving 
for their goals. Since CEOs are the top decision makers, their decisions induced by 
regulatory focus should have an impact on firms they lead. Additionally, EO refers 
to a firm-level behavioural construct that involves three independent dimensions, 
namely, innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. Since organisations often 
rely on entrepreneurial activities to renew themselves, their levels of innovativeness, 
risk-taking, and proactiveness should have an impact on their performance. 
This study expands research on regulatory focus theory and entrepreneurial 
orientation through examining (a) the effects of CEO regulatory focus on SME 
performance and how the effects differ between firms operating in different 
industry environments (i.e., high-tech and low-tech industries); (b) the 
independent effects of firms’ levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness 
on SME performance and how the effects differ between firms operating in different 
industry environments; and (c) the influences of CEO regulatory focus on SMEs’ 
levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. In so doing, this study also 
contributes to entrepreneurship research in two ways. First, it provides insights 
about how the effects of regulatory focus and the dimensions of EO on SMEs are 
contingent on the industry environment in which firms operate. Second, it sheds 
light on how the individual-level characteristic and firm-level behaviours differ in 
explaining the variance in firm outcomes.  
I collected online survey data from 110 SMEs in the UK. The empirical results 
demonstrate that CEO regulatory focus is associated with SME performance. 
Specifically, CEO promotion focus is positively, and CEO prevention focus is 
negatively associated with SME performance. Industry environment moderates the 
relationship between CEO promotion focus and SME performance. That is, CEO 
promotion focus has stronger effects on SMEs in high-tech industries than those in 
 
 
low-tech ones. However, a moderating role of industry environment on the 
relationship between CEO prevention focus and SME performance is not observed. 
The findings also suggest that the three dimensions of EO have unique effects on 
SME performance. Specifically, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
innovativeness and SME performance, a U-shaped relationship between risk-taking 
and SME performance, and a positive linear relationship between proactiveness and 
SME performance. Industry environment moderates the performance effects of 
innovativeness and proactiveness on SMEs except for risk-taking. In particular, 
innovativeness has stronger effects on SMEs in low-tech industries, whereas 
proactiveness has stronger effects on SMEs in high-tech industries. Moreover, the 
empirical results demonstrate that CEO promotion focus positively impact SMEs’ 
levels of innovativeness and proactiveness except risk-taking, while CEO prevention 
focus negatively impact SMEs’ levels of risk-taking and proactiveness except 
innovativeness. 
The empirical results indicate that innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness 
together account for 14% of the variance in SME performance, whereas CEO 
promotion and prevention focus account for 6% of the variance in SME performance. 
As such, firm-level entrepreneurial behaviours regarding innovativeness, risk-
taking, and proactiveness are more robust predictors in explaining the variance in 
SME performance than individual-level CEO characteristic concerning promotion 
and prevention focus. Additionally, the results reveal that CEO promotion and 
prevention focus are the antecedents of SMEs’ entrepreneurial behaviours. While 
regulatory focus and EO refer to different natures of phenomenon and represent 
constructs at different levels, this study shows that both factors have substantial 
impacts on organisations. Therefore, to understand the organisational outcomes of 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a central role in economic 
development and job creation. They represent 99% of all businesses and account for 
two-thirds of all employment in the private sector in the EU (Muller et al., 2017). 
Indeed, SMEs are the driving force behind economic growth in many OECD 
economies (OECD, 2017). Despite their significance, SMEs face challenges such as 
liability of smallness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986) and lack of resources including 
financial resources, knowledge, and networks (Radas and Božić, 2009; Maes and 
Sels, 2014). Compared to large firms, for example, SMEs have disadvantages in 
raising financial resources and attracting talent (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). As a 
result, SMEs tend to have less experience and lower capabilities in innovation (Van 
de Vrande et al., 2009; Nicholas et al., 2011). It should be noted that the smallness 
of SMEs might allow them to respond quickly to changing market environments and 
achieve greater flexibility (Hoffman et al., 1998), suggesting that it might serve as a 
potential source for SMEs to gain competitive advantages over large firms. 
Given the importance of SMEs, this study aims to examine the factors that might 
influence the organisational outcomes (i.e., behaviours and performance) of SMEs. 
In particular, this study has three research objectives. The first objective is to assess 
the impacts of CEO regulatory focus, a motivational characteristic, on SME 
performance and examine how the impacts differ between SMEs operating in 
high-tech industries and those in low-tech industries. Regulatory focus theory is 
based on the premise that people are motivated to satisfy different types of needs 
(i.e., growth versus security). Specifically, it delineates how people regulate their 
behaviours to realise their goals through two distinct motivational systems: 
promotion focus and prevention focus (Higgins, 1997, 1998). A promotion focus is 
associated with a concern for growth and advancement, whereas a prevention focus 
is associated with a concern for safety and responsibility (Crowe and Higgins, 1997). 
Because promotion and prevention focused people are driven by different 
underlying needs, they differ in the strategic means they use for goal pursuit as well 
as the type of outcomes that are salient to them (Brockner et al., 2004). Researchers 
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have highlighted that regulatory focus is a motivation-based characteristic that 
underlies the motives people are trying to satisfy, the goals they pursue, and the 
strategic actions they prefer to implement in striving for their goals (Brockner et al., 
2004; Molden et al., 2008). 
To understand the organisational outcomes of SMEs, it is critical to consider the 
regulatory focus of CEOs. Regulatory focus induces people to pursue different types 
of goals using distinct strategic means (Higgins, 1997, 1998), suggesting that it has 
a profound impact on people’s decision making. Indeed, research in regulatory focus 
theory has shown that people’s regulatory focus shapes their decisions concerning 
risk-taking (Scholer et al., 2010; Hamstra et al., 2011) and pursuing changes 
(Liberman et al., 1999; Fuglestad et al., 2008). As such, regulatory focus has a 
significant impact on the decisions made by CEOs. Since CEOs are the top decision 
maker in their firms (Finkelstein et al., 2009), the decisions that are induced by 
regulatory focus should have an impact on the firms they lead. Indeed, empirical 
evidence has shown that the regulatory focus of CEOs or entrepreneurs is related to 
small firm performance (Wallace et al., 2010) and new venture performance 
(Hmieleski and Baron 2008). The authors also suggest that the performance effects 
of regulatory focus are more pronounced for firms operating in a dynamic than a 
stable environment. 
Although studies have shown that CEO regulatory focus influences small firm 
performance, it remains unclear how the influence of regulatory focus might differ 
between firms operating in different industry environments (i.e., high-tech versus 
low-tech industries). As Lomberg et al., ( 2016, p. 6) pointed out, “environmental 
factors such as dynamism, hostility, complexity, or munificence vary across 
industries”, suggesting that firms operating in different industry environments 
should face distinct challenges. To illustrate, compared to the low-tech industries, 
the high-tech industries are more uncertain, more competitive, and more complex 
(Moriarty and Kosnik, 1989; Qian and Li, 2003; Wu, 2012). Given that firms 
operating in high-tech industries tend to face different challenges than those 
operating in low-tech industries, there are reasons to expect that the performance 
effects of CEO regulatory focus are likely to differ between them. Consistent with 
extant research (Bierly and Daly, 2007; Rauch et al., 2009; Sarooghi et al., 2015), 
this study distinguishes the industry environment in which firms operate into high-
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tech and low-tech industries. Therefore, this study assesses how the performance 
effects of CEO regulatory focus differ between SMEs in high-tech industries and 
those in low-tech industries.  
The second objective is to assess the effects of firms’ entrepreneurial behaviours, 
including innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness, on SME performance 
and examine how their performance effects differ between SMEs operating in 
high-tech industries and those in low-tech industries. Entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO) refers to the “strategy-making practices, management philosophies, and firm-
level behaviors that are entrepreneurial in nature” (Anderson et al., 2009, p. 200). 
EO is an important factor to consider because theoretical work and empirical 
evidence have suggested that EO significantly impact the performance of 
organisations (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 2009; Wales, 2016). There 
are two diverging views about the nature of EO: unidimensional or 
multidimensional. The unidimensional EO refers to the shared variance among 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness (Miller, 1983; Covin and Slevin, 1989; 
Covin and Wales, 2012), whereas the multidimensional EO entails a set of 
independent dimensions (three or five dimensions depending on researchers’ 
conceptualisation), each of which are expected to have independent effects on 
organisations (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Kreiser et al., 2002). 
This study operationalises EO as a multidimensional construct and assesses the 
independent effects of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness on SME 
performance based on three reasons. Firstly, researchers have highlighted that the 
dimensions of EO are independent (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Kreiser et al., 2002), 
and that they are “more telling than the aggregate index” (Miller, 2011, p. 880). In 
other words, examining the dimensions of EO independently can help to reveal their 
unique effects on organisations. Secondly, recent research has shown that 
“aggregating the entrepreneurial orientation dimensions into one combined 
measure … can result in their independent influences being distorted or canceled 
out altogether” (Dai et al., 2014, p. 519). As such, it is critical to examine the 
dimensions of EO independently rather than combining them into one factor. 
Thirdly, while a number of studies have explored the relationship between the 
dimensions of EO and firm performance, the nature of their link remains 
inconclusive because results from the empirical evidence are mixed. Some 
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researchers have found a linear relationship between the dimensions of EO and firm 
performance (Hughes and Morgan, 2007; Swierczek and Ha, 2003) while others 
found a curvilinear relationship (Kreiser et al., 2013). The inconsistent findings may 
be due to the fact that existing studies are focusing on different industries and/or 
firm contexts, such as small High-tech firms (Hughes and Morgan, 2007), medium 
and large sized High-tech firms (Morgan and Strong, 2003), and SMEs (Kreiser et 
al., 2013).  
To contribute to EO literature, this study examines how the performance effect of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness differ between SMEs operating in 
different industry environments. Prior studies have revealed that external 
environmental factors such as dynamism and hostility moderate the relationship 
between EO and firm performance (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005; Covin and Slevin, 
1989). Additionally, researchers have suggested that these external environmental 
factors differ between the high-tech industries and the low-tech ones (Lomberg et 
al., 2016), implying that the industry environment in which firms operate is likely 
to influence the performance effects of EO dimensions on SMEs. As Rauch et al., 
(2009, p. 780) noted, “industry and task environment represent different 
conceptualizations of the firm’s environment, we believe both represent valuable 
moderators, and continued effort along these lines are valuable in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of the EO–performance relationship.” While researchers 
have suggested that firms operating in high-tech industries benefit more from EO 
than firms in nonhigh-tech industries (Rauch et al., 2009), it remains unclear 
whether such effects hold true when the dimensions of EO are examined 
independently. As such, examining the potential moderating effects of industry 
environment on the relationship between EO dimensions and SME performance 
could provide a more fine-grained understanding about the performance effects of 
EO dimensions on SMEs. 
While regulatory focus represents an individual-level construct  (Higgins, 1997, 
1998) and EO represents a firm-level construct (Covin and Wales, 2012), existing 
studies have shown that both constructs are useful in predicting the outcomes of 
organisations  (Johnson et al., 2015; Rauch et al., 2009; Wales, 2016). Through 
incorporating both constructs in this study, and separately assessing the 
performance effects of regulatory focus and the EO dimensions on SMEs, the results 
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generated from this study might shed light on how the two constructs differ in 
explaining variance in firm performance. For example, the results might provide 
insights as for whether the individual-level motivational characteristic, regarding 
regulatory focus, or the firm-level entrepreneurial behaviours regarding the three 
dimensions of EO are a more robust predictor of SME performance. 
Another reason to integrate CEO regulatory focus and the EO dimensions in this 
study is that it allows for the examination of the potential relationships between 
them. There are theoretical reasons to suspect that CEO regulatory focus might 
shape firms’ levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. Research in 
upper echelons theory suggests that the characteristics of top executives (e.g., CEOs) 
have profound impacts on organisational outcomes (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). Specifically, characteristics such as personality, values, and 
experience affect CEOs’ interpretation of the strategic situations they face that, in 
turn, shapes their decisions and actions. Since CEOs occupy the highest positions 
within organisations, their decisions and actions can thus significantly impact the 
behaviours of the organisations they lead. In line with this view, empirical evidence 
has demonstrated that a wide range of CEO characteristics are associated with the 
behaviours of organisations (Busenbark et al., 2016; Wales et al., 2013b; Simsek et 
al., 2010).  
Additionally, there is empirical evidence suggesting that CEO regulatory focus 
impacts organisational behaviours such as firms’ levels of business acquisition 
(Gamache et al., 2015), new product introduction (Greenbaum, 2015) and growth-
related strategic actions (Chen et al., 2017). Because organisations are an extension 
of the people who are in charge (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), the decisions and 
goals of CEOs can become manifested through the behaviours undertaken by the 
organisations they lead. Indeed, researchers have highlighted that firms’ strategic 
behaviour “is often determined by executives on the basis of their goals and 
temperament” (Miller and Friesen, 1982, p. 1). Given that regulatory focus 
determines the goals CEOs pursue, and the strategic means they prefer to use 
(Brockner et al., 2004; Molden et al., 2008), there are reasons to expect that CEO 
regulatory focus should have an impact on firm-level behaviours. Nevertheless, 
existing studies often focus on large firms (Gamache et al., 2015; Greenbaum, 2015; 
Chen et al., 2017) with limited attention devoted to the SME context 
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(Kammerlander et al., 2015). Consequently, we know little about the effects of CEO 
regulatory focus on the behaviours of SMEs. Given that CEOs have more managerial 
discretion in smaller firms (Finkelstein et al., 2009), the effects of CEO regulatory 
focus on organisational behaviours should be more salient in SMEs. 
Accordingly, a final objective of this study is to examine the effects of CEO 
regulatory focus on SMEs’ levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. 
Researchers have highlighted that “we know little about the antecedents of EO” 
(Rosenbusch et al., 2013, p. 634), and that “the literature is still scarce regarding the 
role of leaders’ characteristics in shaping the entrepreneurial posture of an 
organization” (Pittino et al., 2017, p. 224).  The current study addresses this research 
gap by drawing insights from regulatory focus theory and examines how CEO 
regulatory focus shapes the different entrepreneurial behaviours of SMEs. It is 
worth noting that examining the effects of regulatory focus on firms’ innovativeness, 
risk-taking, and proactiveness is consistent with the suggestion from Rauch et al., 
(2009, P.779) that “it may be more appropriate to study antecedences and 
consequences of EO at the level of the dimensions of EO”. Nevertheless, research on 
this area is largely unexplored as existing studies typically operationalise EO as a 
combined factor (Wales et al., 2013a). Since the dimensions of EO are distinct, 
examining the antecedents of EO at the level of individual dimensions should 
generate more nuanced insights that cannot be uncovered when they are combined 
as one factor. 
This study focuses on the context of SMEs based on three considerations. Firstly, 
CEOs have higher managerial discretion within small firms (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990a). This implies that CEOs should have an even stronger influence 
on SMEs than large firms, which are more likely to be managed by top management 
teams. Thus, SMEs represents an ideal context to examine the effects of CEO 
regulatory focus on the behaviours and performance of SMEs. Secondly, the 
implications of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness are likely to differ 
between SMEs and large firms. For example, since SMEs are resource constrained 
(Rosenbusch et al., 2013), they may have less experience of and lower capabilities 
for innovation than large firms. Also, given that SMEs tend to lack resources in 
buffering losses, potential failures in their entrepreneurial activities might 
significantly impact their performance or even endanger their survival. By contrast, 
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similar failures should have limited impacts on large firms, which tend to have more 
resources to buffer such losses. Finally, because SMEs contribute significantly to 
economic development and job creation (OECD, 2017), it is imperative to better our 
understanding of the factors that might influence the behaviours or performance of 
SMEs. An enhanced understanding might help SMEs to calibrate their activities to 
achieve better performance. 
In short, the purpose of this study is to investigate the factors that might impact the 
organisational outcomes of SMEs. This study examines two important factors: CEOs’ 
regulatory focus (i.e., promotion and prevention focus) and firms’ entrepreneurial 
behaviours (i.e., innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness). It is paramount to 
consider these two factors because studies have shown that they have profound 
influences on organisations (Johnson et al., 2015; Rauch et al., 2009; Wales, 2016). 
In particular, this study aims to address three research questions (RQ):  
RQ 1. How does the CEO’s regulatory focus affect the respective SME’s 
performance; and how does the effect differ between SMEs operating in high-tech 
industries and those in low-tech industries? 
RQ 2. How does an SME’s level of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness 
impact its performance; and how does the effect differ between SMEs operating in 
high-tech industries and those in low-tech industries? 
RQ 3. How does the CEO’s regulatory focus influence the respective SME’s levels of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness? 
Figure 1-1 presents the theoretical models used in relation to the three research 
questions and illustrates the proposed relationships of the key theoretical constructs 
examined in this study. As shown in the figure, I posture that CEO promotion and 
prevention focus are associated with SME performance and that their relationship 
might vary between SMEs operating in high-tech industries and those in low-tech 
industries. Additionally, I hypothesise that SMEs’ levels of innovativeness, risk-
taking, and proactiveness are related to SME performance, and that their 
relationship might vary between SMEs operating in high-tech industries and those 
in low-tech ones. Finally, I posit that CEO promotion and prevention focus are 




RQ 1. How does the CEO’s regulatory focus affect the respective SME’s 
performance and how does the effect differ between SMEs operating in 
high-tech industries and those in low-tech industries 
 
RQ 2. How does an SME’s level of innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness impact its performance and how does the effect differ 
between SMEs operating in high-tech industries and those in low-tech 
industries 
 
RQ 3. How does the CEO’s regulatory focus influence the respective 
SME’s levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness 
 
Figure 1-1: Theoretical framework of the study 
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1.2 Structure of the thesis 
This introductory chapter presents the rationale for conducting this study and 
outlines the three key research questions it aims to address. The remainder of this 
thesis is organised as follows.  
Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature on regulatory focus theory and 
entrepreneurial orientation in three sections. In the first section, I introduce the 
theoretical foundations of regulatory focus theory and outline the major differences 
between promotion and prevention focus as well as their distinct implications on 
people’s decision making. After that, I discuss how people’s regulatory focus is 
related to different organisational outcomes. This is followed by introducing the 
limitations of existing studies that examine the effect of regulatory focus within 
organisational contexts. In the second section, I introduce the historical roots and 
conceptual development of the EO concepts and outline the contributions of EO to 
entrepreneurship literature. I then introduce the shortcomings of existing EO 
studies on issues related to definitional inconsistency, dimensionality, and 
measurement. This is followed by a discussion of the performance implications of 
EO and its dimensions on organisations. This chapter concludes with section three 
discussing the major differences between regulatory focus and EO, as well as why 
there is a potential relationship between them.  
Chapter 3, the hypothesis development chapter, outlines the hypothesised 
relationships proposed in this study. It is divided into three sections with each 
section corresponding to one of the research questions outlined in the introductory 
chapter. Specifically, drawing on existing theoretical and empirical evidence, I first 
introduce the potential effects of CEO regulatory focus on SME performance and 
how they are moderated by the industry environment in which SMEs operate. As 
such, Hypotheses 1 to 4 are used to address research question one. After that, I 
outline the potential links between the dimensions of EO and SME performance and 
how they are moderated by the industry environment in which SMEs operate. 
Hence, Hypotheses 5 to 10 are developed to address research question two. Finally, 
I introduce the potential effects of CEO regulatory focus on SMEs’ levels of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. Therefore, Hypotheses 11 to 16 are 
developed to address research question three.   
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Chapter 4 presents the methodology used in this research. I first discuss the 
rationale for adopting a quantitative research design and using an online 
questionnaire for data collection. The sampling frame and the data collection 
processes, including questionnaire design, pilot testing, and formal data collection 
are then introduced. After that, I discuss the procedures used to scrutinise the 
quality of data collected. This is followed by introducing the measurement for all 
key variables. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the different tests that are 
used to examine the reliability and validity of the constructs used in this study.  
Chapter 5 presents the data analysis and results from this research. It includes five 
sections. In the first section, I discuss the descriptive statistics for all the key 
variables used in this study. In sections two to five, I first introduce the regression 
models used for hypothesis testing. This is followed by introducing the detailed 
results from regression analysis, as well as the different robustness or post-hoc tests 
used to scrutinise the results. All hypotheses and the results from hypothesis testing 
are summarised in section five.  
Chapter 6, the final chapter, presents a discussion of the findings generated from 
this study. I discuss how the empirical results generated from the present study are 
related to and also extend research on regulatory focus and EO. Since several 
hypotheses are not supported in this study, potential explanations for the non-
findings are introduced. Additionally, the theoretical contributions in relation to 
regulatory focus theory and EO, as well as their practical implications are 
highlighted. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the research limitations 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Regulatory Focus Theory 
People’s tendency to approach pleasure and avoid pain is recognised as the hedonic 
principle (Higgins, 1997). Psychologists often rely on this principle to explain 
people’s motivation to move toward desired end-states (pleasure) and move away 
from undesired end-states (pain). While the hedonic principle has contributed to 
our understanding of people’s motivation, it is not without limitations because it 
fails to account for how people approach desired end-states and avoid undesired 
ones. Indeed, as Higgins (1998, p. 2) pointed out, “how the hedonic principle 
operates might be as important in motivation as the fact that it does operate”. To 
move beyond the hedonic principle, Higgins (1997, 1998) proposed regulatory focus 
theory that delineates how people approach desired end-states and avoid undesired 
end-states in different strategic ways. 
2.1.1 Foundations of regulatory focus theory 
Regulatory focus theory is based on the premises that people are concerned with 
different needs and that “the hedonic principle should operate differently when 
serving fundamentally different needs” (Higgins, 1997, p. 1281). For example, 
researchers have differentiated the needs concerned with advancement and growth 
from those concerned with security and protection. Indeed, the needs for 
advancement and security are two of the most fundamental needs that people are 
motivated to fulfil (Molden et al., 2008). Building on the differentiation between 
different needs, regulatory focus theory distinguishes self-regulation, which refers 
to the processes by which people set goals and then regulate their cognition and 
behaviour to realise their goals (Bryant, 2009; Tumasjan and Braun, 2012), into two 
independent regulatory systems: a promotion focus for achieving advancement and 
a prevention focus for ensuring security. 
2.1.1.1 The difference between promotion and prevention focus 
One fundamental distinction between promotion and prevention focus is the 
different needs underlying the two systems. Specifically, promotion focus concerns 
advancement needs and prevention focus concerns security needs. Because of the 
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different underlying needs, promotion and prevention focus orient people to fulfil 
their needs in distinct ways. In particular, the two systems differ on several aspects: 
a) the preferred strategic means for goal pursuit (approach versus avoidance); b) 
the strategic tendencies people exhibited in pursuing goals (eagerness versus 
vigilance); and c) the type of outcomes that are salient to them (gain versus loss). 
Table 2-1 summarises the key differences between promotion and prevention focus, 
which are elaborated below.  
Table 2-1: The differences between promotion and prevention focus 
 Promotion focus Prevention focus 
Primary concerns / 





Concerned with security, 
safety, and responsibility 
Strategic preference  
for goal pursuit 
Prefer approach 
strategies (approaching 






mismatches to security 
and avoiding matches to 
threat) 
Strategic tendency 
Inclined to insure hits 
and insure against errors 
of omission (Eagerness) 
Inclined to insure correct 
rejections and insure 
against errors of 
commission (Vigilance) 
Salient outcomes 
Sensitive to the presence 
or absence of positive 
outcomes (gains) 
Sensitive to presence or 
absence of negative 
outcomes (losses) 
Sources: Adapted from Higgins (1997, 1998); Crowe and Higgins (1997); 
Molden et al.,  (2008). 
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Because promotion and prevention focus are concerned with distinct needs, both 
systems entail different strategic means for goal pursuit (Higgins, 1997). Before 
introducing how the strategic means differ, it is important to acknowledge that 
regulatory focus is orthogonal to approach/avoidance motivation. Specifically, both 
promotion and prevention focus include “both approaching desired end-states and 
avoiding undesired end-states” (Johnson et al., 2015, p. 1503). That is, a promotion 
focus includes striving for advancement and avoiding non-fulfilment and a 
prevention focus includes striving for security and avoiding threat, as illustrated in 
Figure 2-1.  
 
Figure 2-1: An illustration of the distinction between regulatory focus and the 
approach – avoidance motivations, adapted from Molden et al., (2008) 
Regulatory focus theory suggests that promotion and prevention focus differ in the 
preferred strategic means people use for goal pursuit. In particular, promotion 
focused people prefer to approach matches to advancement and approach 
mismatches to non-fulfilment, whereas prevention focused people prefer to avoid 
mismatches to safety and to avoid matches to threat. Hence, whether attaining 
desired end-states or preventing undesired one, a promotion focus favours 
approach means whereas a prevention focus favours avoidance means. An initial 
demonstration of the different strategic means preferred by promotion and 
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prevention focus comes from a study by Higgins et al., (1994). In the third study of 
this paper, participants were presented with six strategies that they might use to 
experience desired friendships. Three of the strategies were concerned about 
approaching matches to desired friendship (e.g., to be emotionally supportive) and 
the other three strategies were concerned with avoiding mismatches to friendship 
(e.g., not neglecting friends). Higgins et al., (1994) found that participants with a 
promotion focus concern select more approach strategies and those with a 
prevention focus concern select more avoidance strategies. 
Promotion and prevention focus also differ in the strategic tendencies people 
exhibited in pursuing goals. Specifically, regulatory focus theory proposes that 
promotion focused people are eager to attain advancement because they are 
inclined to approach matches to desired end-states; whereas prevention focused 
ones are vigilant to insure safety because they are inclined to avoid mismatches to 
desired end-states. As Higgins (1997, p. 1285) highlighted, “individuals in a state of 
eagerness from a promotion focus should want, especially, to accomplish hits and 
to avoid errors of omission or misses (i.e., a loss of accomplishment). In contrast, 
individuals in a state of vigilance from a prevention focus should want, especially, 
to attain correct rejections and to avoid errors of commission or false alarms (i.e., 
making a mistake).” Hence, promotion focused people should exhibit a tendency to 
“insure hits and insure against errors of omission” in pursuing goals, whereas 
prevention focused people should exhibit a tendency to “insure correct rejections 
and to insure against errors of commission” for goal pursuit. 
For example, Crowe and Higgins (1997) examined people’s different strategic 
tendencies using a recognition memory task. Participants first viewed a series of 
nonsensical words and then were given a set of words that included words from the 
original list (i.e., targets) but also new words (i.e., distractors). During the test, 
participants were required to indicate either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ based on whether or not 
they had seen the word. The four possible outcomes are: 1) saying ‘yes’ when the 
word was presented – a hit; 2) saying ‘no’ when the word was presented – a miss; 3) 
saying ‘yes’ when the word was absent – an error of commission; and 4) saying ‘no’ 
when the word was absent – a correct rejection. Crowe and Higgins (1997) found 
that promotion focused people exhibited a risky response bias to saying ‘yes’ (i.e., a 
propensity to ensure hits), whereas prevention focused people have a conservative 
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response bias to saying ‘no’ (a tendency to ensure correct rejections). Similar results 
were observed in another study examining regulatory focus in a team setting. 
Specifically, promotion focused teams are biased towards saying ‘yes’, whereas 
prevention focused teams are biased towards saying ‘no’ (Levine et al., 2000). 
Another major difference between promotion and prevention focus is their 
sensitivities to either gains or losses (Higgins, 1997, 1998). Because a promotion 
focus is concerned with the needs for advancement, promotion focused people are 
more sensitive to gain related outcomes. In other words, the presence or absence of 
positive outcomes is more salient to promotion focused people who are driven to 
strive for attaining gains. The presence of positive outcomes represents a success in 
their endeavour and the absence of such outcomes represents a failure (Collins, 
2016). By contrast, as a prevention focus is concerned with the needs for security, 
prevention focused people are more sensitive to loss related outcomes. That is, the 
absence and presence of negative outcomes are more salient to prevention focused 
people who are driven to protect themselves from loss. The absence of negative 
outcomes represents a success in their endeavour and the presence of such 
outcomes represents a failure (Collins, 2016).  
The difference in people’s sensitivity to gain and loss is demonstrated in an 
experimental study from Markman et al., (2005). Participants were invited to 
complete a learning task and were given performance incentives framed either in 
terms of gain or loss. For example, the gain related framing would emphasise 
gaining points and not gaining points based on their response, whereas the loss 
related framing would emphasise not losing points or losing points based on their 
response. Markman et al., (2005) found that people who were primed with a 
promotion focus achieved better task performance when the incentives or task 
payoffs were framed in terms of gain. On the other hand, people who were primed 
with a prevention focus accomplished better task performance when the incentives 
or task payoffs were framed in terms of loss. Their findings demonstrate that gain 
related outcomes are more salient to promotion focused people while loss related 
outcomes are more salient to prevention focused people. Their results also indicate 
that aligning the incentives with people’s regulatory focus have profound 
implications for task performance. 
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To illustrate how the different sensitivities shape people’s decision making, imagine 
the situation of evaluating potential business opportunities and deciding which one 
or ones to undertake. People are likely to consider a wide range of criteria such as 
the resources required, the feasibility of the opportunities, potential loss due to 
failure, and potential gain, among others. A promotion focus would orient people to 
weight more heavily the perceived potential gains because their underlying concern 
is for preferring opportunities that provide significant potential for advancement. 
On the other hand, a prevention focus would induce people to attach more 
significance to the perceived potential loss because their underlying concern is for 
avoiding opportunities that entail significant risk, which can lead to loss and 
endanger their security. Indeed, researchers have suggested that the different 
sensitivities to gains or losses partly explains why firms that are led by promotion 
focused CEOs undertake higher number and value of business acquisition than 
firms that are led by prevention focused CEOs (Gamache et al., 2015). 
It should be acknowledged that regulatory focus has been examined both as a 
chronic disposition and also as a response to situational cues (Lanaj et al., 2012). 
The chronic element of regulatory focus is a stable disposition developed through 
people’s developmental and achievement experiences. People’s childhood 
experiences of interacting with their primary caretakers shape their regulatory focus 
(Higgins and Silberman, 1998). For example, the caretaker-child interaction that 
emphasises attaining accomplishments can induce a promotion focus, while an 
interaction that emphasised insuring safety can induce a prevention focus. 
Additionally, people’s success or failure experiences in promotion and prevention 
related self-regulation affect their tendencies toward using that strategy for goal 
attainment (Higgins et al., 2001). On the other hand, the situational element of 
regulatory focus is more malleable (Wu et al., 2008; Gorman et al., 2012) and can 
be  influenced by different situational factors such as the framings of task payoffs in 
laboratory settings (Shah and Higgins, 1997) and the leadership style of supervisors 
(Kark and Van Dijk, 2007; Wallace et al., 2009). Following previous 
entrepreneurship research (Kammerlander et al., 2015; Bryant, 2009), this study 




2.1.1.2 Implications of promotion and prevention focus 
Having discussed the key differences between promotion and prevention focus, I 
now introduce the psychological and behavioural implications of the two systems, 
including how they affect people’s attitude toward change versus stability, relative 
emphasis on speed versus accuracy in decision making, and the propensity towards 
risk-taking versus risk aversion.  
One distinction between promotion and prevention focus is the sensitivity to gain 
versus loss. Researchers suggest that this difference impacts people’s attitude 
towards change versus stability. In general, attending to gain induces people more 
toward seeking change whereas attending to loss induces them more toward 
maintaining the status quo (Liberman et al., 1999; Molden et al., 2008; Collins, 
2016). People often engage in behavioural regulation to bring themselves into 
alignment with their preferred goal states (Scholer and Higgins, 2011). That is, they 
compare their current circumstance with desired end-states and act to reduce the 
discrepancy when they experience discrepancy between the two. Moving toward 
improved circumstances and away from the status quo is more desirable for people 
with a promotion focus, whereas maintaining satisfactory or adequate 
circumstances and avoiding the presence of problems is more critical for people 
with a prevention focus. Consequently, promotion focused people prefer change 
while prevention focused people prefer stability. 
The different attitudes toward change and status quo maintenance are illustrated 
within a study conducted by Liberman et al., (1999). In particular, the authors 
examined how promotion and prevention focus impacts people’s willingness to 
substitute an interrupted activity for another activity and to exchange an acquired 
object for a different one. They found that promotion focused people are more likely 
to switch to a new task when their previous one is interrupted than prevention 
focused people, who will typically resume the old task. Additionally, promotion 
focused people are more likely than prevention focused people to exchange an object 
they already possess for a new object. The findings highlight the important role of 




Similar findings have been observed with respect to other situations. Compared 
with promotion focused people, prevention focused ones have a stronger preference 
to maintain the status quo options - staying with the original choice of investment 
funds they have chosen rather than switching to potentially better ones (Chernev, 
2004). In another study examining consumers’ decision about the adoption of new 
products, Herzenstein et al., (2007) found that prevention focused consumers are 
less willing to try and use new products than promotion focused one. Additionally, 
in a longitudinal study, Fuglestad et al., (2008) found that a promotion focus is 
associated with a higher tendency to initiate behaviour changes (e.g., higher quit 
rates of smoking) whereas a prevention focus is related to a higher propensity to 
maintain behaviour change (e.g., remain smoke-free in the follow-up period). 
While both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that, compared with 
promotion focused people, prevention focused ones have a stronger preference for 
stability and are less willing to consider new possibilities and change, it is important 
to acknowledge that a preference for stability and the status quo does not imply 
prevention focused people would not practice change. In the situation of 
experiencing losses, for example, prevention focused people might activate changes 
that would allow them to regain adequate status quo (Collins, 2016). 
In addition to influencing people’s attitude toward change versus stability, 
promotion and prevention focus also have distinct impacts on people’s relative 
emphasis on speed versus accuracy in decision making. The gain related concerns 
associated with promotion focus induce a preference for eager judgement strategies, 
whereas the loss related concerns associated with prevention focus induce a 
preference for vigilant judgment strategies (Molden et al., 2008). As a result, 
promotion focused people tend to emphasise speed during goal pursuit while 
prevention focused people are likely to emphasise accuracy. Förster et al., (2003) 
examined such differences using simple drawing tasks. Participants were required 
to connect numbered dots to form pictures. Speed was measured by the numbers of 
dots participants connected within a given time, and accuracy was measured by the 
numbers of dots that they failed to connect. Prioritising speed represents an 
eagerness strategy to maximise potential gains, whereas prioritising accuracy 
represents a vigilance strategy to minimise potential losses. Consistent with their 
expectations, Förster et al., (2003) found that promotion focused participants 
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produced faster (i.e., higher quantity) outputs, whereas prevention focused 
participants produced more accurate (i.e., fewer mistakes) outputs.  
In another experimental study, Spanjol et al., (2011) examined how promotion and 
prevention focus affects teams’ decisions on new product introduction. Using 
simulation tasks that involve decisions concerning the number, types, and timing of 
new product introduction, the authors found that promotion focused teams (i.e., 
both members are promotion focused) introduced higher numbers of new products 
than prevention focused teams. Additionally, the speed of new product introduction 
as well as the novelty of products was higher for promotion focused teams than 
prevention focused teams. Their findings also demonstrate that promotion and 
prevention focus have distinct influences on people’s relative emphasis on decision 
making concerning speed versus accuracy with respect to introducing new products. 
These findings are consistent with the results from Förster et al., (2003) who 
suggested that promotion focused people emphasise speed (or quantity) while 
prevention focused people emphasise accuracy (or quality) during decision making.  
Additionally, promotion and prevention focus have differential effects on people’s 
tendency towards risk-taking. Research in regulatory focus theory suggests that 
promotion and prevention focus are related to people’s risk-taking propensity 
(Bryant and Dunford, 2008). Because promotion focus is associated with an 
eagerness inclination to insure hits and insure against errors of omission, 
promotion focused people are likely to have a higher tendency to engage in risk- 
taking. By contrast, because prevention focus is associated with a vigilant 
inclination to insure correct rejections and insure against errors of commission, 
prevention focused people tend to exhibit higher tendencies toward risk aversion. 
Florack and Hartmann (2007) examined such differences in an experiment 
involving financial investment decisions. They found that prevention focused teams 
are more risk averse than promotion focused teams in their investment decisions – 
represented by allocating investment to funds that have lower levels of volatility, 
which indicates the level of risks involved. In another study examining how 
promotion and prevention focus impacts people’s actual risky behaviour in the 
context of mobility, Hamstra et al., (2011) found that promotion focus was positively, 
and prevention focus was negatively associated with people’s actual risky behaviour 
in speeding.   
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While a prevention focus is typically supported by cautious means that entails lower 
risk, in the situation of experiencing losses, prevention focused people can also 
become more risk tolerant. For example, using a stock investment scenario, Scholer 
et al., (2010) examined people’s risk seeking behaviours under loss. Specifically, 
after participants had experienced a loss in a previous round of investment, they 
were then presented with two different investment options. One investment option 
entails higher risk with a payoff that may allow participants to recover their losses 
from the previous investment, whereas another investment option involved lower 
risk with a payoff that nevertheless could not eliminate their previous loss. Scholer 
et al., (2010) found that compared with promotion focused participants, the ones 
who are primed with a prevention focus exhibited higher risk seeking tendencies 
and were more willing to choose the risky option over the conservative option. As 
Collins (2016, p. 17) pointed out, “the concern with avoiding loss was so great that a 
prevention focus evoked a willingness to select the riskier option” that may allow 













2.1.2 Regulatory focus and firm outcomes 
While regulatory focus was originally developed as an individual-level construct to 
explain the differences in people’s behaviours and underlying motivations, 
researchers have applied it in the organisational context to understand how people’s 
regulatory focus may affect the behaviours and performance of organisations. For 
example, recent studies have shown that the regulatory focus of CEOs or 
entrepreneurs has profound impacts on the behaviours and performance of firms 
they lead (Kammerlander et al., 2015; Gamache et al., 2015; Greenbaum, 2015; 
Wallace et al., 2010; Hmieleski and Baron, 2008). Such findings are not surprising 
given that CEOs or entrepreneurs are the primary decision makers within their 
organisations (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). As such, their regulatory focus induced 
decisions should impact firms they lead. 
For example, Kammerlander et al., (2015) examined the effects of CEO regulatory 
focus on firms’ level of engagement in exploration and exploitation activities within 
an SME context. Using survey responses from CEOs in Switzerland, the authors 
found that CEOs’ level of promotion focus is positively related to firms’ level of 
exploration and exploitation; and that these correlations are also enhanced under 
conditions of intense competition. They also found that CEOs’ level of prevention 
focus negatively affects firms’ exploration but that there is no correlation with 
exploitation. Additionally, Kammerlander et al., (2015) observed that promotion 
focus positively impacts organisational ambidexterity but prevention focus does not 
have similar effects. Although the authors did not directly test the performance 
implications of promotion and prevention focus, their empirical results implicitly 
suggest that under intensive competition, firms that are led by promotion focused 
CEOs may achieve better outcomes than firms that are led by prevention focused 
CEOs. This is because the former firms are better positioned to balance competing 
activities (exploration versus exploitation), which in turn should contribute to better 
performance (Lubatkin et al., 2006; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2011). 
In addition to shaping firms’ exploration and exploitation behaviours, researchers 
have found that CEO regulatory focus is also associated with other organisational 
behaviours such as business acquisition and new product introduction (Gamache et 
al., 2015; Greenbaum, 2015). For example, Gamache et al., (2015) examined the 
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impact of CEO regulatory focus on firms’ acquisition behaviour measured by the 
number and value of acquisition. The authors captured CEO regulatory focus 
through a content analysis of letters to shareholders over a period of ten years. 
Consistent with their hypotheses, the authors found that CEO promotion focus 
positively, and CEO prevention focus negatively, impact firms’ level of acquisition. 
In another study within the context of the U.S. automobile industry, Greenbaum 
(2015) found that CEO promotion focus positively, and CEO prevention focus 
negatively, influence the number of new products introduced by firms they lead. 
While these two studies are focusing on the context of large firms (Gamache et al., 
2015; Greenbaum, 2015), it is likely that the findings should hold true within SMEs, 
and perhaps even more so, given that CEOs tend to play a more dominant role in 
such firms (Finkelstein et al., 2009). 
Moreover, a number of studies have suggested that the regulatory focus of CEOs or 
entrepreneurs are related to small firm performance (Wallace et al., 2010) and new 
venture growth (Hmieleski and Baron, 2008). For example, Wallace et al., (2010) 
examined the direct relationships between CEO regulatory focus and small firm 
performance, suggesting that both promotion and prevention focus positively 
impact firm performance, and that environmental dynamism will moderate these 
impacts. Using survey data collected from both CEOs and one of their top managers, 
Wallace et al., (2010) found that promotion focus positively impacts firm 
performance, and that this finding is consistent when using either the self-reported 
performance data from CEOs or top managers. They also found that prevention 
focus negatively impacts firm performance. Nevertheless, such results are only 
observed on the performance data from the top manager but not the CEO-reported 
performance data. As such, the nature of the link between CEO prevention focus 
and firm performance remains inconclusive. 
A related study from Hmieleski and Baron (2008) argues that regulatory focus can 
indirectly impact new venture growth through shaping firms’ tendencies to deviate 
from their original business concepts. Specifically, the authors propose that the 
impact of regulatory focus on new venture growth is mediated by firms’ deviation 
from original business concepts. As Hmieleski and Baron (2008, p. 287) noted, 
“entrepreneurs must deviate from their original business opportunity as the 
realities of an unpredictable future unfold” during the entrepreneurial process. They 
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found that, in dynamic environments, promotion focus relates positively, and 
prevention focus relates negatively, to new venture growth. Both relationships are 
fully mediated by firms’ deviation from their original business concepts. However, 
no significant relationship between regulatory focus and venture performance was 
observed under stable environments. Together, the empirical results from Wallace 
et al., (2010) and Hmieleski and Baron (2008) demonstrate that the performance 
effects of regulatory focus on organisations are context dependent. That is, the 
impacts of regulatory focus are contingent upon the environmental context (i.e., 

















2.1.3 The limitations of regulatory focus 
As illustrated in the previous discussions, researchers have used the individual 
difference regarding regulatory focus to explain the variance in firms’ behaviours or 
performance. While existing studies have generated useful insights about the effects 
of regulatory focus within organisational contexts, they are not without limitations. 
For example, existing studies have shown that CEO regulatory focus shapes the 
strategic behaviours of large firms (Gamache et al., 2015; Greenbaum, 2015). 
However, these studies only assessed the effects of CEO regulatory focus alone 
without considering the potential influence of other team members. This is 
problematic because large firms are likely to be managed by top management teams 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009), suggesting that other team members also play a 
significant role in shaping the behaviours of organisations. As such, there are 
reasons to expect that the variance in the behaviours of large firms is not only a 
function of individual CEOs alone but also shaped by other top management team 
members. Indeed, researchers have suggested that the regulatory focus of CEOs and 
CFOs are likely to interact and influence firms’ growth related activities (Chen et al., 
2017). Accordingly, it is possible that studies that examine CEO regulatory focus in 
large firm contexts may incorrectly attribute the variance in firms’ behaviours to 
CEO regulatory focus while part of the variance may be due to the influences from 
other team members.  
Additionally, existing studies on the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and 
firm behaviours mainly focus on the context of large firms with limited attention 
being devoted to SMEs (e.g., Kammerlander et al., 2015). The lack of studies on 
smaller firms may be because the use of regulatory focus theory within 
organisational contexts is still nascent (for a recent review see Johnson et al., 2015). 
Because the organisational structure and managerial systems often differ between 
large firms and SMEs (Aldrich and Auster, 1986), the results generated from large 
firms may not hold true within SMEs. For example, researchers have highlighted 
that the CEOs of small firms have higher levels of managerial discretion (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1990b; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Wangrow et al., 2015), suggesting 
that their influence on such firms should be more salient. Accordingly, while the 
findings generated from large firm contexts can shed light on the influence of CEO 
regulatory focus on organisations, more research is still needed to uncover the 
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nature and extent of the influence of CEO regulatory focus on the behaviours of 
SMEs.  
A third limitation of existing studies of regulatory focus within organisational 
contexts is that the potential interplays between promotion and prevention focus 
are largely ignored. Regulatory focus theory suggests that promotion and 
prevention focus represent two independent systems rather than opposite ends of a 
single continuum (Higgins, 1997, 1998). In support of this view, results from a meta-
analysis of studies on regulatory focus and work-related outcomes have shown that 
there is a relatively weak association between promotion and prevention focus 
(Lanaj et al., 2012), suggesting that people may have varying combinations of 
promotion and prevention focus. For example, people may be high or low in both 
promotion and prevention focus or they may be high in one attribute and low in 
another (Markovits, 2012). Nevertheless, the majority of existing studies that 
examine regulatory focus within organisational contexts did not consider the 
potential interplay between promotion and prevention focus, except one recent 
study from Kammerlander et al., (2015). Thus, in addition to assess the direct 
influence of promotion and prevention focus on the behaviours or performance of 
organisations, it would be paramount to consider how the varying combinations of 











2.2 Entrepreneurial Orientation 
Research on entrepreneurial orientation (EO) has attracted substantial attention in 
the past three decades. Indeed, EO has been considered as a central concept within 
entrepreneurship literature (Covin and Lumpkin, 2011). Nevertheless, debates 
remain on the nature of the EO construct, its dimensionality, and the measurement 
of the construct (Covin and Lumpkin, 2011; George and Marino, 2011; Covin and 
Wales, 2012). Additionally, the performance implications of EO remain 
inconclusive because the empirical evidence on the relationship between EO and 
firm performance has been mixed  (Rauch et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2008; Su et al., 
2011; Wales et al., 2013c). Before discussing the limitations of existing EO studies, 
I first introduce the development of the EO concept and how it contributes to the 
field of entrepreneurship research. 
2.2.1 The historical roots and conceptual development of EO 
The historical root of the EO concept can be traced to the strategy-making process 
literature (e.g., Mintzberg 1973). In particular, Mintzberg (1973) conceived three 
modes of strategy-making with one of them being the entrepreneurial mode. The 
author proposed that the entrepreneurial mode of strategy-making is characterised 
by the active search for new opportunities and undertaking bold decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty through which organisations may make dramatic gains. 
In a similar vein, Khandwalla (1976/77, p. 22) extended the concept of management 
style, which refers to the “operating set of beliefs and norms about management 
held by the organization’s key decision makers”. The author suggested that an 
entrepreneurial management style is characterised by “bold, risky, aggressive 
decision making” (Khandwalla, 1976/77, p. 25).  
Building on the work of Mintzberg (1973) and others, Miller and Friesen (1982) 
distinguished entrepreneurial firms from conservative firms based on the 
innovation strategies firms undertake. Specifically, entrepreneurial firms are “firms 
that innovate boldly and regularly while taking considerable risks in their product- 
market strategies” (Miller and Friesen, 1982, p. 5), whereas conservative firms are 
firms that undertake innovation mainly in response to the challenges they face. 
Hence, entrepreneurial firms tend to aggressively pursue innovation unless there is 
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evidence that resources are being exhausted by too much innovation. Conversely, 
conservative firms are likely to innovate in response to competitive attacks or 
changing customer needs in the market environment. As such, innovation in 
conservative firms tends to be reactive as it takes place only when necessary. 
In a subsequent seminal work, Miller (1983, p. 771) proposed that “[a]n 
entrepreneurial firm is one that engages in product-market innovation, undertakes 
somewhat risky ventures, and is first to come up with ‘proactive’ innovations, 
beating competitors to the punch.” While Miller never employed the term EO in this 
initial work (Miller, 2011), researchers often credit him with introducing the EO 
concept because this seminal work laid the foundation of EO, which was later 
adopted and extended by other researchers (e.g., Covin and Slevin, 1989; Lumpkin 
and Dess, 1996). In particular, Miller’s early work on EO is important in two ways. 
Firstly, Miller conceived the characteristics that are essential for a firm to be labelled 
as entrepreneurial. The characteristics have been widely used as the three core 
dimensions of the EO construct (i.e., innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness). Secondly, Miller’s work contributes to the changing focus of 
entrepreneurship from individual actors to the firm-level process. As Miller (1983, 
p. 770) noted, rather than focusing on the entrepreneurs who make the strategic 
decisions, “this paper shifts the emphasis somewhat, looking at the entrepreneurial 
activity of the firm.”   
Nevertheless, Miller’s work is not without limitations. While Miller (1983) 
suggested that a firm can be characterised as entrepreneurial when it exhibits 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness concurrently, whether such 
entrepreneurial behaviours should be sustained to some degree over time is 
unknown. In other words, the temporal element of EO is largely ignored in the early 
conceptualisation of the construct. To illustrate, it is possible that a firm may only 
exhibit singular entrepreneurial behaviour, or it may exhibit entrepreneurial 
behaviours occasionally or on a sustained basis. The temporal issue of EO was then 
addressed by subsequent scholars (e.g., Covin and Slevin 1991). 
Covin and Slevin (1991, p. 7) extended the EO concept by suggesting that 
“organizations with entrepreneurial postures, are those in which particular 
behavioral [sic] patterns are recurring”. The term entrepreneurial posture is 
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synonymous with the concept of EO because it represents firm-level behaviours 
concerning innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. Based on this extension, 
a firm can be classified as entrepreneurial only when it exhibited sustained 
entrepreneurial behaviours. Additionally, the authors are explicit in pointing out 
that the existence of EO requires the concurrent exhibition of all three dimensions 
that are expected to co-vary. It is worth noting that Covin and Slevin (1991) 
conceived EO as an independent variable that could be used to explain variation in 
firm performance. Their work differs from Miller’s original work that examines the 
factors and processes that lead to EO, which is operationalised as a dependent 
variable.   
A major shift in the conceptual development of EO comes from the work by 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996, p. 137), who conceived EO as “the processes, practices, 
and decision-making activities that lead to new entry”. The authors suggested that 
new entry is the result of launching new or existing products into new or established 
markets. Drawing on the difference between process and result, the authors 
proposed that EO refers to the process and entrepreneurship refers to the outcome 
of the process. More specifically, EO represents how the new entry is achieved 
through a range of entrepreneurial activities, whereas entrepreneurship represents 
the result of those activities. Lumpkin and Dess’s (1996) conceptualisation of EO 
differs from previous works in two important aspects. First, EO is viewed as a 
multidimensional construct comprised of dimensions that can vary independently. 
This differs from previous views (i.e., unidimensional) that the dimensions of EO 
should co-vary (Covin and Slevin, 1989). Second, the number of EO dimensions is 
increased from the original three dimensions (i.e., innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness) to five dimensions with the inclusion of autonomy and competitive 
aggressiveness. The dimensions of EO are elaborated later in this chapter (see 
section 2.2.2.2). 
In a subsequent development of EO, Kreiser et al., (2002) used a cross-cultural 
sample to validate the EO measure developed by Covin and Slevin (1989). The 
authors assessed the model fits when EO is operationalised as a one, two, or three 
dimensional constructs. They found that EO is best operationalised as a three 
dimensional construct. As Kreiser et al., (2002) highlighted, when the three 
dimensions are aggregated into one, the potential independent influence of each 
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dimension on firm performance will be ignored. Additionally, their empirical results 
demonstrated that the three dimensions of EO can vary independently. While the 
authors’ primary purpose was to validate the EO measure, their work leads to a 
unique variation in the development of EO. Specifically, EO is best operationalised 
as a multidimensional construct that consists of three independently varying 
dimensions: innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. This conceptualisation 
represents an integration of the multidimensional view of EO (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996) with the three dimensions proposed by Miller (1983) and Covin and Slevin’s  
(1989).  
The conceptual development of EO has contributed to our understanding of firm-
level entrepreneurship in three ways. Firstly, the early works of EO were among the 
pioneers to shift the focus of entrepreneurship research from the actor (i.e., 
entrepreneur) to the entrepreneurial activity of the firm (Zahra et al., 2013). As 
Miller (1983, p. 770) pointed out, “what is most important is not who is the critical 
actor, but the process of entrepreneurship itself and the organizational factors 
which foster and impede it”. As such, EO serves as one of the foundations for the 
development of entrepreneurship as a firm-level behavioural phenomenon (Covin 
and Slevin, 1991). The conceptualisation of EO also paves the way for researchers to 
investigate the antecedents and consequences of firm-level entrepreneurial 
behaviours. For example, theoretical and empirical works have explored the 
determinants of EO and how EO impacts the outcomes of organisations (Covin and 
Slevin, 1991; Zahra, 1993; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Wales et al., 2013a).  
Secondly, the EO construct allows researchers to make a distinction between the 
process (EO) and the results from the process (entrepreneurship). It delineates the 
essential factors that are required (Miller, 1983) or pertinent (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996) for firms to be classified as entrepreneurial. Specifically, it outlines the 
entrepreneurial behaviours (e.g., innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness) 
that firms can undertake to renew themselves. In an increasingly competitive 
market, it is imperative for firms to sustain their competitiveness through pursuing 
entrepreneurial activities. As Covin and Lumpkin (2011, p. 862) noted, the EO 
construct offers useful insights to understanding “why and how some firms are able 
to regularly renew themselves via new growth trajectories while others are not".  
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Thirdly, since EO is conceived as a firm-level attribute, all firms can be plotted based 
on their EO (Covin and Slevin, 1989). As such, it allows researchers to make 
meaningful comparisons on firms’ extent of entrepreneurial activities. Indeed, the 
EO scale offers a useful common metric that has been widely used by researchers to 
assess the entrepreneurial level of firms (Rauch et al., 2009; George and Marino, 
2011). This, in turn, has contributed to entrepreneurship literature as studies can 
thus assess how the different levels of entrepreneurial activities might result in 
variation in firm performance. 
In short, there are several different conceptualisations of EO (for a recent review see 
Randerson, 2016). Miller’s seminal work serves as the foundation of the EO concept. 
Building upon this, researchers have conceptualised EO in different ways. Some 
researchers conceive EO as a unidimensional construct comprised of three 
dimensions that should co-vary (Covin and Slevin, 1989), while others 
conceptualise EO as a multidimensional construct comprised of three or five 
dimensions that can vary independently (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Kreiser et al., 
2002). As a prominent theoretical construct in the entrepreneurship literature, EO 
has offered important contributions to the field of entrepreneurship research. 
Nevertheless, the different conceptualisations of EO have also resulted in several 










2.2.2 The limitations of EO 
Despite the popularity of EO, there are several limitations associated with EO 
research. In particular, debates remain on whether EO is a dispositional or 
behavioural phenomenon, a unidimensional or multidimensional construct, and 
how to operationalise the measurement of EO. Given these issues related to EO, 
Covin and Lumpkin (2011, p. 859) assert that EO is an “annoying construct” and 
“for every scholar who employs the construct of EO in his or her research, there is 
another scholar who simply wishes it would exit the scholarly conversation”. The 
issues in relation to the definitional inconsistencies, the dimensionality of EO, and 
the measurement of the construct are discussed in turn. 
2.2.2.1 Definitional inconsistency 
Since there is a lack of consensus on whether EO represents a dispositional or a 
behavioural phenomenon (Miller, 2011; Covin and Lumpkin, 2011), researchers 
have defined EO in different manners (George and Marino, 2011). For example, 
some researchers define EO as “a firm-level disposition to engage in behaviors [sic] 
that lead to change in the organization or marketplace” (Voss et al., 2005, p. 1134). 
Dispositions refer to the “tendencies to respond to situations, or classes of situations 
in a particular, predetermined manner” (House et al., 1996, p. 205). Accordingly, 
when EO is conceived as a dispositional phenomenon, it represents a firm’s 
tendency to act in an entrepreneurial manner. Conversely, other researchers 
conceptualise EO as “a set of distinct but related behaviors [sic]” that are 
entrepreneurial in nature (Pearce et al., 2010, p. 219). Researchers have highlighted 
that the definitional inconsistencies of EO have undermined the credibility of EO 
research and hindered the accumulation of knowledge in this area (George and 
Marino, 2011; Randerson, 2016).  
This study adopts the view that EO is better examined as a behavioural phenomenon 
rather than as a firm-level disposition based on three reasons. Firstly, it is a firm’s 
actions that make it entrepreneurial rather than its dispositions, which may or may 
not be manifested into entrepreneurial behaviours (Covin and Lumpkin, 2011). For 
instance, the presence of a disposition to pursue entrepreneurial endeavours may 
not translate into such behaviours. Hence, while the disposition toward 
entrepreneurial behaviours can be associated with EO, it is not a sufficient defining 
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factor of the concept. Indeed, researchers have highlighted that we know 
entrepreneurs through their actions (Gartner, 1989), and that “behaviour [sic] is the 
central and essential element in the entrepreneurial process”(Covin and Slevin, 1991, 
p. 8). Following the same line, the exhibition or absence of entrepreneurial 
behaviours should be a better indicator of whether a firm is entrepreneurial or not.  
Secondly, examining EO as a behavioural construct can offer benefits in relation to 
measuring and managing EO. As a behavioural construct, a firm’s level of EO can 
be better gauged because behaviours tend to be demonstrable (Covin and Slevin, 
1991). We can thus reliably distinguish entrepreneurial firms from conservative 
firms through measuring their demonstrable behaviours. Conceiving EO as a 
behavioural construct also allows potential intervention. That is, a firm may manage 
EO to stimulate or decrease its entrepreneurial activities. For example, a firm may 
cultivate an organisational environment (Fayolle et al., 2010) and strategies (Miller, 
1983) to foster or alleviate its level of EO. Finally, if EO is conceived as a 
dispositional construct, it becomes problematic to distinguish the concept of EO 
from related entrepreneurial attributes (e.g., entrepreneurial culture), that are also 
intangible in nature (Blumentritt et al., 2005).  
2.2.2.2 The dimensionality issue 
There are two predominant views about the dimensionality of EO: unidimensional 
and multidimensional. The unidimensional view is associated with the work of 
Miller (1983) and Covin and Slevin (1989) who suggested that EO is comprised of 
three dimensions, namely, innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. In 
particular, EO represents “the common or shared variance among risk-taking, 
innovativeness, and proactiveness” (Covin and Lumpkin, 2011, p. 862). Hence, the 
existence of EO requires the concurrent exhibition of all three dimensions. This 
implies that a firm cannot be classified as entrepreneurial if it exhibits only one or 
two of the dimensions (Miller, 1983). Innovativeness represents firms’ propensities 
to engage in and support new ideas and experimentation that may lead to new 
products, services and processes (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2005). Risk-taking refers to the willingness to make substantial resource 
commitments that have uncertain outcomes (Miller and Friesen, 1978; Rauch et al., 
2009). Proactiveness refers to the “forward-looking, first mover advantage-seeking 
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efforts to shape the environment by introducing new products or processes ahead 
of the competition” (Lyon et al., 2000, p. 1056). 
The multidimensional view of EO is associated with the work of Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) who suggested that EO consists of five dimensions that can vary 
independently. Lumpkin and Dess (1996, p. 137) explicitly assert that all of the 
dimensions “may be present when a firm engages in new entry. In contrast, 
successful new entry also may be achieved when only some of these factors are 
operating”. To illustrate, an entrepreneurial firm may exhibit high levels on all 
dimensions, or it may have high levels on some of the dimensions but low on others. 
In addition to the original three dimensions conceived by Miller (1983), Lumpkin 
and Dess (1996) proposed to include competitive aggressiveness and autonomy as 
two additional dimensions of EO. Competitive aggressiveness represents a firm's 
tendency to directly challenge its competitors to outperform them in the 
marketplace. As such, it differs to the proactiveness dimension that is more client-
oriented rather than competitor-focused (Miller, 2011). Autonomy refers to “the 
independent action of an individual or a team in bringing forth an idea or a vision 
and carrying it through to completion” (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, p. 140).  
Many studies have deviated from the original three or five-dimensions of EO and 
have used different dimensional combinations (Wales et al., 2013a). For example, 
some researchers operationalise EO as a construct comprising of only two 
dimensions: proactiveness and innovativeness (Merz and Sauber, 1995; Knight, 
1997) or proactiveness and risk-taking (Avlonitis and Salavou, 2007). Other 
researchers used three dimensions of EO by combining the work from Miller (1983) 
and Lumpkin and Dess (1996) (e.g., combining proactiveness, risk-taking, and 
competitive aggressiveness) (Wales et al., 2013a). The proliferation of EO through 
various dimensional combinations is likely to hinder the rigor of EO research (Basso 
et al., 2009; Wales, 2016). As George and Marino (2011) noted, defining the EO 
concept with only two dimensions will decrease the intension - the collection of 
encompassed properties - of EO and reduce the precision of the concept. For 
example, one firm may exhibit high levels of EO based on one study, but this not be 
the case according to another. Also, the lack of consistency in employing these EO 
dimensions makes it problematic to make meaningful comparisons of the results 
from differing studies. 
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This study examines EO as a multidimensional construct that involves three core 
dimensions including innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. Competitive 
aggressiveness is not included in this study because it may overlap with 
proactiveness (Basso et al., 2009). To illustrate, competitive aggressiveness entails 
a tendency to outperform competitors in the marketplace (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996), 
while proactiveness also involves a goal to beat “competitors to the punch” (Miller, 
1983, p. 771). As Basso et al., (2009, p. 318) pointed out, “trying to outrun or 
outperform one’s competitors is indeed a sign of proactiveness”. This implies that 
there may not be a clear-cut distinction between competitive aggressiveness and 
proactiveness. Also, autonomy, which is represented by the independent action of 
individuals or teams to conceive and realise new ideas, is not included in this study 
as it may not be accomplished and maintained at the firm level (Edmond and 
Wiklund, 2010). Examining the original three dimensions of EO is also consistent 
with the majority of existing EO studies (Rauch et al., 2009; Wales, 2016).  
While this study adopts the multidimensional view of EO, it is important to 
acknowledge that the unidimensional and multidimensional view are distinct, that 
neither view is necessarily superior to the other, and that both views have 
contributed significantly to the EO literature. Indeed, researchers have highlighted 
that “the two predominant conceptualizations can co-exist in the literature with 
each approach providing unique insights” (Wales, 2016). Nevertheless, recent 
studies have suggested that it is imperative to consider the differences between the 
dimensions of EO (Miller, 2011) because “aggregating the entrepreneurial 
orientation dimensions into one combined measure … can result in their 
independent influences being distorted or canceled [sic] out altogether” (Dai et al., 
2014, p. 519). As such, when the dimensions of EO are combined into one factor, the 
uniqueness of each dimension is ignored. Accordingly, this study operationalises EO 
as a multidimensional construct and examines the performance implications of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness independently.  
2.2.2.3 Measurement issues 
EO can be operationalised as a reflective or formative construct (Covin and Wales, 
2012). A major difference between reflective and formative constructs is the 
relationship between the latent construct and its measures (Covin and Wales, 2012; 
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George and Marino, 2011). As shown in Figure 2-2 (a), when EO is operationalised 
as a reflective second-order construct, the latent construct EO lead to changes in its 
measures. In other words, EO is manifested through innovativeness, risk-taking, 
and proactiveness, suggesting that “an increase in EO would be expected to increase 
the level of each of these dimensions” (George and Marino, 2011, p. 999). As such, 
the EO construct is measured by using the arithmetic average of the scores of its 
three dimensions. Conversely, as shown in Figure 2-2 (b), when EO is 
operationalised as a formative construct, it is formed by innovativeness, risk-taking, 
and proactiveness. In other words, “EO is created by its dimensions, rather than the 
dimensions being manifestations of EO” (George and Marino, 2011, p. 1000). The 
majority of existing studies operationalise EO as a reflective construct. Indeed, a 
recent review has revealed that 54 out of the 61 EO studies aggregated the 






Figure 2-2: (a) Reflective second-order model. (b) Formative second-order model 
(George, 2011) 
EO has been measured using different scale items (Covin and Wales, 2012; 
Randerson, 2016), which make the comparison of EO research problematic. In a 
recent review of empirical studies on EO, for example, Rauch et al., (2009) found 
that the number of items used to measure innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness varied from six to eleven items. While the nine-item scale developed 
by Covin and Slevin (1989) is the most widely used measure in existing EO research 
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(Rauch et al., 2009; George and Marino, 2011; Wales et al., 2013a), researchers have 
noted that it also has limitations because the scale includes both dispositional and 
behavioural items (Anderson et al., 2015). To illustrate, one of the items for 
innovativeness assesses the extent to which firms favour innovation related 
activities (disposition), and another measures firms’ actual innovation activities, 
represented by changes in their product line (behaviour). However, other 
researchers have argued that the presence of disposition-related items should not 
undermine the quality of the scale because “the inclusion of such [disposition-
focused] items helps assure that the behaviors [sic] assessed are likely being driven 
by stable response tendencies (as opposed to chance or other nonsystematic stimuli)” 
(Covin and Lumpkin, 2011, p. 859).  
This study operationalises innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness as unique 
variables rather than combining them as a single factor. This is consistent with the 
suggestion from Rauch et al., (2009, p. 779) that “it may be more appropriate to 
study antecedences and consequences of EO at the level of the dimensions of EO”.  
As Miller (2011, p. 880) concurs, “the components of EO are more telling than the 
aggregate index”. That is, combining innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness 
together will prevent us from gaining an understanding of the distinctiveness of the 
three EO dimensions. For example, it is possible that the effects of a low score in 
one of the dimensions may go unnoticed (Basso et al., 2009). Researchers have also 
suggested that studies following the combined approach might “hide or inaccurately 
attribute effects resulting from variations in only a single dimension of EO” 
(Lomberg et al., 2016, p. 2). Assessing the dimensions of EO as unique variables is 
also consistent with Covin and Wales’s (2012, p. 696) suggestion that “separately 
assessing EO’s sub-dimensions using individual reflective-type scales is a 
reasonable measurement approach”. This approach has been adopted in recent EO 
studies (Kreiser et al., 2013; Dai et al., 2014). Following the majority of EO research 
(Rauch et al., 2009; George and Marino, 2011; Wales et al., 2013a), this study uses 
the nine-item measurement scale developed by Covin and Slevin (1989) to measure 
the three dimensions of EO. 
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2.2.3 EO and firm performance 
The performance implications of EO has been a central focus in EO research (Rauch 
et al., 2009; Gupta and Wales, 2017). In general, there are two streams of research 
that examine the relationship between EO and firm performance. The first stream 
examines EO as a unidimensional construct and assesses how EO can have an 
impact on firm performance. Theoretical arguments suggest that EO contributes to 
better firm performance (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). In a fast changing business 
environment with shortened product lifecycles, the future profit streams from 
existing products are uncertain. For example, the sales of existing products and 
services may stagnate due to changes in consumer demands and the market 
environment. As such, firms should constantly seek out new product and market 
opportunities to renew themselves.  
Firms may benefit from adopting an EO because, through engagement in innovation 
and risk-taking efforts, and acting in anticipation of future market demand, they 
can capitalise on new product and market entry opportunities (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). The wider pool of new opportunities serves as 
a potential source for firms to develop competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 2009), 
thereby contribute to better performance. As such, entrepreneurial firms are likely 
to outperform their conservative counterparts. Consistent with this view, a wide 
range of empirical studies have proposed and demonstrated that the 
unidimensional EO is positively associated with firm performance (Zahra and Covin, 
1995; Wiklund, 1999; Lee and Tsang, 2001; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003, 2005). 
Indeed, a meta-analysis of the EO – firm performance relationship also revealed a  
positive link between them (Rauch et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, researchers have suggested that the potential negative effects of EO 
should not be ignored (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2011). From a theoretical 
perspective, there are reasons to expect that high levels of EO might also have 
detrimental effects on firm performance. For example, EO entails risk-taking and 
innovativeness. Increasing levels of risk-taking have been associated with higher 
probabilities of failure (Alvarez, 2007). Similarly, high levels of innovativeness 
require firms to deviate from existing practice and venture into areas that are 
beyond their current expertise (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). As such, increasing levels 
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of innovativeness are associated with higher uncertainty of outcomes. Indeed, 
research suggests that the range of possible performance outcomes tends to increase 
within EO firms because not all entrepreneurial activities will turn out successfully 
and lead to positive returns (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2011). Firms that engage in 
high levels of entrepreneurial activities are likely to produce a distribution of 
outcomes ranging from success (e.g., making profits) to failure (e.g., making losses) 
in their endeavours. As a result, a high level of EO should result in a greater extent 
of variation in firm performance. In line with this notion, recent empirical evidence 
has shown that EO is related to greater firm performance variance (Wales et al., 
2013b). 
Additionally, a number of empirical studies have revealed a curvilinear relationship 
between EO and firm performance, providing further evidence that increasing levels 
of EO may not lead to universally positive outcomes. Tang et al., (2008) found an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between EO and firm performance among Chinese 
firms. Su et al., (2011) observed an inverted U-shaped relationship between EO and 
firm performance among Chinese new ventures, and a positive relationship in 
established firms. Similarly, Wales et al.,  (2013c) found that, after a certain point, 
increasing levels of EO have diminishing effects on firm performance. The authors 
suggested that, on average, “a relatively low to moderate level of EO produces the 
highest growth in small firms” (Wales et al., 2013c, p. 112). Together, these findings 
suggest that increasing levels of EO provide benefits for organisations, but that 
when levels of EO are too high, it could have detrimental effects on organisations. 
The second stream of research disaggregates EO into its sub-dimensions and 
assesses the independent effects of each dimension of EO on firm performance. 
While this approach has the advantage of uncovering the unique effects of each EO 
dimension on firm performance, it has received less attention in existing studies 
(Rauch et al., 2009; George, 2011; Wales et al., 2013a). For studies that have 
explored the differential effects of individual EO dimensions on firm performance, 
the empirical results have been mixed. Some researchers have found that the 
relationship between the different EO dimensions (i.e., proactiveness, risk-taking, 
innovativeness) and firm performance is linear (Hughes and Morgan, 2007) while 
others have reported a curvilinear relationship  (Kreiser et al., 2013). For example, 
some researchers found a positive linear relationship between risk-taking and firm 
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performance (Swierczek and Ha, 2003), while others found a negative linear link 
(Hughes and Morgan, 2007), and a third group yet has suggested a curvilinear 
relationship (Kreiser et al., 2013). Similarly, empirical evidence on the relationship 
between proactiveness / innovativeness and firm performance has been 
inconsistent. Hence, the performance implications of innovativeness, risk-taking, 


















2.3 Regulatory focus versus entrepreneurial orientation 
The preceding discussions suggest that while both regulatory focus and EO 
represent promising predictors in explaining the variance in firm performance, the 
two factors differ significantly on two aspects. Firstly, regulatory focus and EO 
represent constructs at different levels. In particular, regulatory focus is an 
individual-level construct that was originally conceived to explain why individuals 
differ in their decision making and behaviours (Higgins, 1997, 1998; Brockner et al., 
2004). With the development of regulatory focus theory, researchers have extended 
it to organisational contexts and explored how individual differences in regulatory 
focus impacts the behaviours and performance of organisations (Johnson et al., 
2015). By contrast, EO is a firm-level construct that was conceptualised to delineate 
the types of behaviours that are typically associated with entrepreneurial firms 
(Miller, 1983, 2011). While the nature of the relationship between EO and firm 
performance remains inconclusive, it is generally recognised that there is a link 
between them, because the entrepreneurial activities firms pursue may allow them 
to develop new products for the market, capitalise on potential new opportunities, 
or establish first-mover advantage.   
Secondly, regulatory focus and EO refer to different natures of phenomenon. 
Regulatory focus represents a motivational characteristic associated with 
individuals (Molden et al., 2008; Gamache et al., 2015). As individual-level 
characteristic, the potential effects of people’s regulatory focus on organisations 
may or may not be materialised. To illustrate,  firms that are led by CEOs with high 
levels of promotion focus may be more risk-tolerant. However, it is possible that the 
lack of resources within such firms might hinder its capability to translate the risk-
taking tendencies into action. In other words, the behavioural tendency induced by 
regulatory focus may not always translate into action. Additionally, there should be 
some underlying mechanisms through which the performance effect of regulatory 
focus can occur. For example, through influencing people’s decision making, 
regulatory focus might influence the behaviours or capabilities of firms, which in 
turn results in the variance in firm performance. On the other hand, EO represents 
a set of entrepreneurial behaviours, including innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness that firms pursue (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Wales, 2016). It is fair to 
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argue that the entrepreneurial activities firms undertake should have an impact, 
which may be positive, neutral or negative, on the performance of organisation. 
Taken together, one may suspect that the performance effects of firm-level EO are 
likely to be more salient than the performance effects of individual-level regulatory 
focus. 
Despite the significant difference between regulatory focus and EO, it is important 
to note that a potential link may exist between these two constructs. Theoretical 
arguments suggest that organisational behaviours are often a function of the people 
who are in charge (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007), implying that 
CEOs should determine the activities firms undertake. In support of this view, a 
wide range of empirical evidence has demonstrated that CEOs’ characteristics 
significantly impact the behaviours of organisations (Busenbark et al., 2016). As 
Miller and Friesen (1982) pointed out, the “goals and temperament” of CEOs 
determines the strategic behaviours of firms they lead. Because regulatory focus 
underlies the goals people aim to achieve as well as the strategic means they prefer 
to use (Brockner et al., 2004), CEOs’ goals and strategic preferences might be 
manifested through the behaviours of organisations they lead. Indeed, a number of 
empirical studies have revealed that CEO regulatory focus shapes firm-level 
behaviours (Gamache et al., 2015; Kammerlander et al., 2015). This empirical 
evidence demonstrates that CEO regulatory focus is likely to have an impact on the 










Chapter 3 Hypothesis Development 
The literature review chapter has illustrated that both CEO regulatory focus and the 
dimensions of EO are likely to have an impact on organisations. This hypothesis 
development chapter outlines the potential relationships among the focal variables, 
including CEO regulatory focus, and the three dimensions of EO and firm 
performance examined in this study. It is divided into three sections with each 
section corresponding to one research question outlined in the introduction chapter. 
Specifically, the first section presents the potential effects of CEO regulatory focus 
on firm performance and how these effects vary between SMEs operating in high-
tech industries and those in low-tech industries, addressing research question one. 
In response to research question two, the second section outlines the potential links 
between the three dimensions of EO and firm performance as well as how their 
relationships differ between SMEs operating in high-tech industries and those in 
low-tech ones. The final section covers the potential relationships between CEO 













3.1 Regulatory focus and firm performance 
3.1.1 Promotion focus and firm performance 
I posit that CEO promotion focus will be associated with firm performance because 
it is likely to impact firms’ capabilities to (a) adapt quickly to fast changing 
environment; (b) perform and balance differing and competing activities 
(exploration and exploitation); and (c) identify and capitalise on new opportunities. 
First, promotion focus can enhance firms’ strategic flexibility (Aaker and 
Mascarenhas, 1984), which refers to the ability to adapt quickly to changes in the 
environment. Research in regulatory focus theory suggests that people with high 
levels of promotion focus are more open to change and new possibilities (Liberman 
et al., 1999), implying that promotion focused CEOs should have more positive 
attitudes towards change. As such, firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of 
promotion focus will likely have higher tendencies to adjust their activities in 
response to the changing environment. Consistent with this view, it has been found 
that firms that are led by promotion focused entrepreneurs are more likely to adapt 
their original business concept in a dynamic environment (Hmieleski and Baron, 
2008). This finding demonstrates that CEO promotion focus tends to enhance firms’ 
ability to respond quickly to environmental changes. As firms’ success depends on 
their ability to adapt quickly in the competitive environment (Hitt et al., 1998; 
Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010), it is thus expected that promotion focus should 
contributes to better performance.  
Second, promotion focus can influence firms’ capability to “perform differing and 
often competing, strategic acts at the same time”, which refers to organisational 
ambidexterity (Simsek et al., 2009, p. 865). Recent empirical evidence has shown 
that CEO promotion focus positively affects organisational ambidexterity. In 
particular, Kammerlander et al., (2015) found that firms that are led by promotion 
focused CEOs engage in high levels of exploration and exploitation activities. 
Exploration concerns activates such as “search[ing], experimentation and 
variation”, whereas exploitation entails activities involving “choice, implementation 
and variance reduction” (Lavie et al., 2010, p. 110). Theoretical arguments suggest 
that a balance between exploration and exploitation (organisational ambidexterity) 
is essential for firm success (March, 1991). Empirical studies have demonstrated 
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that firms that can balance exploration and exploitation activities are more likely to 
achieve better performance (He and Wong, 2004; Atuahene-Gima and Murray, 
2007; Cao et al., 2009). As promotion focus can help to induce organisational 
ambidexterity, firms that are led by promotion focused CEOs should achieve 
increased performance. 
Finally, promotion focus might also impact firms’ capability to identify and 
capitalise on new opportunities. People with high levels of promotion focus are more 
opportunity oriented as they are motivated to satisfy their needs for growth (Higgins, 
1997; Tumasjan and Braun, 2012). As a result, promotion focused CEOs should be 
more motivated to proactively seek new opportunities. As Johnson et al., (2015, p. 
1512) noted, “[i]ndividuals with a promotion focus would be more likely to search 
for and identify new opportunities than those with a prevention focus.” Indeed, it 
has been found that promotion focused entrepreneurs engage with a higher number 
of business contacts for new information (Pollack et al., 2015) and are more likely 
to identify higher quantity and quality of new opportunities (e.g., innovativeness) 
(Tumasjan and Braun, 2012). Furthermore, firms that are led by promotion focused 
CEOs introduce more new products  (Greenbaum, 2015) and pursue higher levels 
of business acquisition (Gamache et al., 2015). As promotion focus may stimulate 
firms to proactively seek and pursue new opportunities, which is a critical factor for 
business success (Hughes and Morgan, 2007), firms that are led by promotion 
focused CEOs should have the advantage to capitalise on new opportunities which 
may lead to better performance. In short, the above theoretical and empirical 
arguments suggest that promotion focus will likely enhance firm-level capabilities 
which, in turn, contribute to better firm performance. Therefore, it is hypothesised 
that:  
Hypothesis 1: CEO promotion focus will be positively associated with firm 
performance. 
3.1.2 Prevention focus and firm performance 
Similarly, there are reasons to expect that CEO prevention focus will be associated 
with firm performance. However, the effect of prevention focus on firm 
performance should be negative based on three reasons. Prevention focus can 
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undermine firms’ strategic flexibility, which in turn negatively affects firm 
performance. People with high levels of prevention focus prefer stability over 
change (Liberman et al., 1999). As prevention focused CEOs are prone to remain at 
status quo, firms that are led by such people should be less willing to change. Indeed, 
it has been found that firms that are led by prevention focused entrepreneurs are 
less likely to deviate from their original business concepts in dynamic environments 
(Hmieleski and Baron, 2008). This finding demonstrates that prevention focused 
CEOs will likely hinder firms’ ability to adapt quickly in a changing environment. 
Since firms’ strategic flexibility is a critical factor for firm success (Hitt et al., 1998; 
Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010), it is thus expected that prevention focus will be 
negatively associated with firm performance. 
Additionally, prevention focus can affect firm-level strategic activities that, in turn, 
impact firm performance. As firms’ exploration process involve experimenting with 
new alternatives that are beyond their existing areas of expertise, its returns are less 
certain and more remote in time (March, 1991; Lavie et al., 2010). In other words, 
the exploration process involves significant changes and uncertainties. Because 
prevention focused people are more likely to avoid change (Liberman et al., 1999), 
CEOs with high levels of promotion focus are less willing to pursue exploration 
activities. In support of this view, empirical evidence has shown that prevention 
focused CEOs induce firms to engage in low levels of exploration activities 
(Kammerlander et al., 2015). While the exploration process entails uncertainty, it is 
essential for firm success because it allows firms to avoid the trap of suboptimal 
stability (March, 1991). For example, stability may lock firm resources and activities 
into products and processes that are outdated, negatively affecting firm 
performance (Nerkar and Roberts, 2004).  
Finally, prevention focus can undermine firms’ ability to capitalise on new 
opportunities and hinder firm performance. As innovation requires firms to deviate 
from existing practices (Musteen et al., 2010), it represents change. Firms that are 
led by CEOs with favourable attitudes toward change are more likely to foster 
innovation through exploring new products and market opportunities  (Musteen et 
al., 2010). Because prevention focused people have higher preferences for stability 
over change, it can be expected that firms that are led by such people are less likely 
to foster innovation and pursue new opportunities. Indeed, recent empirical studies 
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have found that firms that are led by prevention focused CEOs introduce lower 
numbers of new products (Greenbaum, 2015) and undertake lower numbers and 
values of business acquisition (Gamache et al., 2015). Researchers have highlighted 
that firms with a lower tendency to undertake new opportunities and support 
innovation are less likely to capitalise on emerging opportunities that can result in 
lower performance (Hughes and Morgan, 2007). Given that prevention focus can 
hinder firms’ tendency to support innovation and undertake new opportunities, it 
should have negative effects on firm performance. Accordingly, it is hypothesised 
that: 
Hypothesis 2: CEO prevention focus will be negatively associated with firm 
performance. 
3.1.3 The moderating role of industry environment 
Researchers often categorise the industry environment in which firms operate into 
high-tech and low-tech industries (Bierly and Daly, 2007; Rauch et al., 2009; 
Sarooghi et al., 2015). Compared to the low-tech industries, high-tech industries 
entail higher levels of market and technological uncertainty (Moriarty and Kosnik, 
1989). Market uncertainty arises due to rapid changes in consumer preferences and 
the unpredictability of competitors’ behaviours (Khandwalla, 1972). Technological 
uncertainty occurs because of the rapid changes in technology (Rosenbusch et al., 
2013). Because of the high rate and magnitude of changes associated with high-tech 
industries (Wang et al., 2015; Fainshmidt et al., 2016), the span of product life cycles 
is shorter in high-tech than low-tech industries (Qian and Li, 2003). Given that 
high-tech industries are more uncertain and competitive than low-tech industries, 
it is expected that the performance implications of promotion and prevention focus 
will likely differ between firms that operate within these different industry 
environments. 
I propose that the positive relationship between promotion focus and firm 
performance will be more pronounced for firms in high-tech industries than those 
in low-tech industries. As pointed out earlier, promotion focus can enhance firms’ 
ability to adapt quickly in a rapid changing environment.  As such, firms that are led 
by CEOs with high levels of promotion focus should be more flexible in adapting 
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their activities (Hmieleski and Baron, 2008). While firms in any industry 
environment may benefit from flexibility, its advantages should be more 
pronounced for firms in high-tech industries because the extent of changes is higher 
in such industries (Moriarty and Kosnik, 1989). Indeed, researchers have 
highlighted that high levels of flexibility are required for firms to respond quickly to 
changes in uncertain environments (Aaker and Mascarenhas, 1984), which is often 
associated with the high-tech industries. As Halvorson and Higgins (2013, p. 4) 
noted, “[p]romotion-focused leaders tend to be most effective in dynamic industries, 
where it’s important to respond rapidly and innovatively to stay ahead”. In support 
of this notion, researchers have found that firms that are led by promotion focused 
entrepreneurs can achieve higher growth in dynamic environments (Hmieleski and 
Baron, 2008).  
Additionally, promotion focus is related to firms’ ability to perform and balance 
exploration and exploitation activities (Kammerlander et al., 2015). Such a 
capability is particularly important for firms that operate in the high-tech industries 
because the rapid technological changes can erode the value of firms’ existing 
capabilities and advantages (Collis, 1994). As noted by Wu (2012, p. 492), “high-
tech industries are characterized by [a] rapid rate of technological change, which 
makes existing technological advantage quickly obsolete.” As a result, firms that 
operate in the high-tech industries are required to “exploit existing competences for 
short-term commercial benefits and simultaneously explore new competences for 
long-term success” (Wang et al., 2015, p. 26). Furthermore, a shorter product life 
cycle associated with the high-tech environment implies that firms’ existing 
products are likely to become obsolete quickly in the marketplace (Qian and Li, 
2003). That is, firms’ competitive advantages are more likely to be short-lived in 
high-tech industries. Hence, the capability to identify and capitalise on new market 
opportunities, which can be stimulated by promotion focus, should be more critical 
for firms that operate in the high-tech industries. Therefore, it is hypothesised that:  
Hypothesis 3:  The positive relationship between promotion focus and firm 




Similarly, I posit that the negative relationship between prevention focus and firm 
performance will be stronger for firms in high-tech industries than those in low-tech 
ones. As prevention focus is likely to undermine firms’ ability to adapt quickly to 
environmental changes (Hmieleski and Baron, 2008), firms that are led by 
prevention focused CEOs should have a higher tendency towards rigidity rather 
than flexibility. Researchers have highlighted that rigidities have substantial 
detrimental effects on firms operating in an uncertain environment (Leonard-
Barton, 1992). Compared to the low-tech industries, the high-tech industries are 
less stable. As such, the potential negative impacts that may arise due to rigidities 
should be stronger for firms that operate within the high-tech industries. As 
Hmieleski and Baron (2008, p. 295) pointed out, “a focus on preventing losses and 
being rigid toward change (prevention focus) significantly reduces performance”.  
Additionally, prevention focus undermines firms’ tendencies to engage in 
exploration activities (Kammerlander et al., 2015). As the development of new 
capabilities and knowledge requires exploration (March, 1991; McGrath, 2001), 
firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of prevention focus will have less 
opportunity to develop and extend new competences. Because the low-tech 
industries are less competitive than the high-tech industries (Bierly and Daly, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2015), firms that operate within the low-tech industry environment 
should have lower needs to enhance their capabilities. Conversely, developing new 
competences are more important for firms that operate in high-tech environments 
as the value of their existing capabilities declines quickly due to environmental 
changes (Collis, 1994). Furthermore, prevention focus is likely to hinder firms’ 
tendency to pursue new opportunities. Due to the different spans of product life-
cycles, firms that operate in low-tech industries face lower pressures to introduce 
new products or services through exploiting new opportunities, whereas the 
opposite is true for firms that operate in a high-tech environment. Because the 
products in high-tech industries become obsolete more quickly, the absence of new 
product offerings should make firms in the high-tech industries more vulnerable 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992). Hence, it is hypothesised that:  
Hypothesis 4: The negative relationship between prevention focus and firm 




3.2 Entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance 
3.2.1 The independent effects of innovativeness on firm 
performance 
Innovation is a critical factor for firms to survive and thrive in a dynamic business 
environment (Cheng et al., 2013). For example, innovation allows firms to adapt 
and respond to changing customer demands, shrinking product life cycles and 
growing market competition (Howell et al., 2005). It also provides firms with the 
opportunity to foster business growth and generate higher profits (Wiklund et al., 
2009). Researchers have highlighted that facilitating firms’ levels of innovativeness 
may lead to the development of new products that address customers’ changing 
needs (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). As such, innovative firms can differentiate 
themselves from competitors through new product offerings and generate better 
profits (Qian and Li, 2003). Indeed, innovation underlies firms’ differentiation 
strategy that allows them to develop competitive advantage and achieve better 
performance (Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997; Linton and Kask, 2017). Additionally, 
innovative firms are more R&D-oriented (Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997) and are more 
supportive of new ideas and experimentations (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). The R&D 
and experimenting activities represent a major source for firms to generate and 
sustain innovative outputs. As a result, innovative firms are more likely to 
continuously introduce new and/or refined products to meet the changing market 
conditions and achieve better performance. Consistent with this view, prior 
research has shown a positive relationship between innovativeness and firm 
performance (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001; Hughes and Morgan, 2007).  
Nevertheless, innovation is associated with substantial costs and uncertain 
outcomes, which should also have an impact on firm performance. First, substantial 
resources are required for firms to invest in innovation projects, undertake research 
and development (R&D), and develop capabilities required for innovation (van de 
Ven, 1986; Kreiser et al., 2013). Researchers have highlighted that high levels of 
innovativeness requires firms to commit considerable resources and has the 
potential to “compromise the ability of SMEs to meet short-term financial 
obligations”(Kreiser et al., 2013, p. 276). In other words, high levels of 
innovativeness may drain resources from other value-creating activities that are 
critical for SMEs (Rosenbusch et al., 2011), which tend to be resource constrained. 
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Second, the outcomes of firms’ innovative efforts tend to be uncertain because 
innovation requires firms to depart from established practices and experiment with 
new alternatives (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). This implies that while engaging in 
experimentation might generate innovative outcomes, some of these efforts might 
not yield positive results (March, 1991; Lavie et al., 2010). Accordingly, high levels 
of innovativeness might have detrimental effects on SME performance because 
SMEs tend to lack slack resources to buffer potential loss in the innovation process.   
The preceding discussions suggest that innovativeness allows firms to address 
changing customer demands with new products. At low levels of innovativeness, 
firms are less likely to support new ideas and engage in experimentation (Lumpkin 
and Dess, 1996), which in turn might hinder the development of new products. As a 
result, firms with low levels of innovativeness are less likely to reap the benefits of 
differentiation through offering new or refined products to the market place (Linton 
and Kask, 2017). With the increase of innovativeness from low to moderate, firms’ 
performance should increase because firms are likely to generate better profits from 
their innovative new products. Nevertheless, at high levels of innovativeness, the 
potential costs and uncertain outcomes associated with innovative efforts might 
outweigh the potential benefits. Together, these arguments imply that moderate 
levels of innovativeness will likely allow SMEs to register better performance. As 
such, the relationship between innovativeness and SME performance should be 
curvilinear. In particular, up to a point, increasing innovativeness should lead to 
enhanced firm performance, but beyond that point, further increases in 
innovativeness will be associated with diminishing or even negative returns in firm 
performance. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between innovativeness and firm performance is 
an inverted U-shaped. 
3.2.2 The independent effects of risk-taking on firm performance 
Risk-taking is an essential element in the entrepreneurial process (Covin and Slevin, 
1989; Miller, 1983). As Frishammar and Hörte (2007, p. 769) noted, “if no risks are 
taken, no new products will ever be produced and launched”. Hence, for firms to 
compete in a fast changing market environment, they are required to engage in risk-
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taking. Indeed, researchers have highlighted that firms that are risk tolerant are 
more likely to capitalise on emerging market opportunities that, in turn, contribute 
to better firm performance (Hughes and Morgan, 2007). Theoretical arguments 
underlying entrepreneurial learning also implicitly suggest that firms can benefit 
from risk-taking (McGrath, 2001; Dess et al., 2003). For example, the willingness 
to engage in initiatives with uncertain outcomes can foster the development of new 
knowledge, routines, and capabilities that are distinctive to organisations (McGrath, 
2001; Matusik, 2002). Given that firm-specific knowledge and capabilities are 
valuable and difficult to imitate (Dess et al., 2003; Barney, 1991), they may serve as 
a source of competitive advantage, thereby contributing to better firm performance.  
While risk-taking is necessary for firms to capitalise on new opportunities and 
compete in the market place, it also has potential negative effects on organisations.  
For example, risk-taking is associated with a chance of failure (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003), suggesting that the resources committed to 
risk-taking activities might not bear fruit. As the levels of risk increases, the 
probability of failure should also increase (Alvarez, 2007). Hence, at high levels of 
risk-taking, firms should face significant chances of failure. In other words, it is 
possible that the investments may fail to generate desirable outcomes. Because 
SMEs are resource constrained (Muller et al., 2017), the potential failure in their 
risk-taking activities may result in considerable business disruptions or even 
threaten firms’ survival in a competitive market place. Accordingly, high levels of 
risk-taking may negatively impact firm performance. Additionally, prior research 
has found that people who are risk tolerant tend to focus on the opportunities for 
potential positive outcomes, while people who are risk averse tend to emphasise the 
threats from potential failure (Schneider and Lopes, 1986). In the same vein, firms 
with high levels of risk-taking tendencies might be over optimistic with the 
opportunity presented, which can lead them to over-commit resources to projects 
that are unpromising (Dai et al., 2014).  
Firms with low levels of risk-taking tendencies are less willing to pursue 
opportunities that involve high risks with potential high returns (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996). While the risk-averse tendency allows firms to prevent potential loss, it can 
also limit firms’ chance to benefit from projects that have high returns. On the other 
hand, high levels of risk-taking also have its limitations because it might endanger 
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the performance of organisations due to the higher chance of failure involved. 
Accordingly, it is expected that moderate levels of risk-taking should allow firms to 
achieve better firm performance. In line with this notion, prior research has found 
that the relationship between risk-taking and firms’ return on assets (ROA) is 
curvilinear in entrepreneurial firms. Specifically, Begley and Boyd (1987, p. 89) 
found that “risk-taking has a positive effect on ROA up to a point. Beyond that point, 
increases in risk-taking begin to exert a negative effect on ROA.” This empirical 
evidence supports the view that moderate risk-taking should contribute to better 
firm performance. Thus, it is hypothesised that:  
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between risk-taking and firm performance is an 
inverted U-shaped.  
3.2.3 The independent effects of proactiveness on firm 
performance 
Proactiveness represents a tendency to introduce new products or services ahead of 
competitors (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Keh et al., 2007). Researchers have 
highlighted that proactive firms are more likely to engage in external environmental 
scanning to acquire information about the changing market environment and 
customer needs (Wang, 2008; Kreiser, 2011). The enhanced understanding of the 
market and customer needs, in turn, allows proactive firms to satisfy unmet market 
demands (Smith and Cao, 2007; Hughes and Morgan, 2007). Through developing 
and launching new products ahead of the competition, proactive firms can thus 
establish first-mover advantages (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; Zahra and Covin, 
1995) and extract higher profits (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). As a result, 
proactiveness provides opportunities for firms to establish a leadership position 
within their industry (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001), which subsequently contributes to 
better firm performance. 
Nevertheless, time and resources are required for firms to be proactive in acquiring 
new market insights (Dai et al., 2014). Also, potential up-front costs may be 
necessary for firms to develop the requisite capabilities for new market entry 
(Kreiser et al., 2013). Because proactive firms act in anticipation of future market 
demands (Keh et al., 2007), it is possible that their proactive efforts might not 
always lead to positive outcomes. For example, firms’ assumptions about the future 
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market demands might prove to be incorrect. Additionally, while proactive firms 
might introduce new products ahead of their competitors, the new products are not 
guaranteed to be a success in a competitive market place. Given the potential costs 
involved for firms to be proactive, high levels of proactiveness might have negative 
effects on organisations in the situation that firms’ proactive efforts failed to 
generate desirable outcomes.   
Proactive firms are better placed to establish themselves as leaders rather than 
followers (Venkatraman, 1989; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) because they can establish 
first-mover advantages through offering new products in the market place before 
their competitors. Firms with low levels of proactiveness might have to catch up in 
the market competition and continuously respond to the actions of proactive firms. 
This implies that increasing levels of proactiveness should contribute to better 
performance. As Dess et al., (2003, p. 370) noted, “proactively seeking new 
opportunities may make a more lasting contribution to value creation than an 
occasional attempt to innovate, introduce or adopt entrepreneurial ideas.” 
Nevertheless, resources and efforts are required for firms to be proactive. It can thus 
be expected that some of the firms’ proactive endeavours might not yield positive 
results, suggesting that high levels of proactiveness might have potentially negative 
effects on organisations. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 7: The relationship between proactiveness and firm performance is an 
inverted U-shaped. 
3.2.4 The moderating effects of industry environment 
I posit that the relationship between the three dimensions of EO and firm 
performance will be contingent on the industry environment (i.e., high-tech and 
low-tech industries) in which firms operate. Prior studies have revealed that 
environmental factors such as dynamism and hostility moderate the EO - firm 
performance relationship (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; Covin and Slevin, 1989), 
suggesting that the performance effects of EO are more pronounced in an 
environment with higher levels of change and competition. Because environmental 
factors such as dynamism, hostility, and complexity differ between the high-tech 
and low-tech industries (Lomberg et al., 2016), it is likely that the industry 
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environment in which firms operate can also moderate the effects of the dimensions 
of EO on firm performance. Empirical evidence has shown that industry 
environment moderates the effects of EO on firm performance (Rauch et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, there are reasons to expect that the performance effect of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness may also differ between SMEs 
operate in high-tech industries and those in low-tech industries. 
I propose that the effects of innovativeness on firm performance should be stronger 
in low-tech than high-tech industries for two reasons. First, new products tend to 
emerge less frequently in low-tech industries than in high-tech ones (Qian and Li, 
2003; Szymanski et al., 2007), suggesting that innovation is less common in low-
tech industries. As such, firms in low-tech industries may derive more benefits from 
innovation than firms in high-tech industries. For example, the new products 
offered by firms in low-tech industries can be better differentiated from existing 
market offerings. In other words, such firms are more likely to establish the 
positional advantage through differentiating their products from competitors 
(Porter, 1980; Linton and Kask, 2017). Secondly, the new products developed 
through innovative effects should become obsolete more slowly within low-tech 
industries because such industries are associated with longer product life cycles 
than high-tech ones (Qian and Li, 2003; Szymanski et al., 2007). Conversely, the 
fast changing market environment associated with high-tech industries should 
make existing products become obsolete quickly. This implies that the products 
resulting from innovation efforts may generate more benefits for firms in low-tech 
industries than those in high-tech ones. Therefore, the benefits from innovativeness 
are perhaps more prominent for firms in low-tech industries than low-tech 
industries.   
Additionally, I expect that the potential detrimental effects of innovativeness on 
firm performance will be stronger in low-tech than high-tech industries. Firms in 
low-tech industries face lower pressure in modifying their products because 
consumers’ preferences are less likely to change substantially (Moriarty and Kosnik, 
1989; Qian and Li, 2003), suggesting that such firms should have less experience in 
innovation. Because learning is best achieved through repeated efforts (March et al., 
1991), the limited experience in innovation may thus hinder firms’ development of 
innovation capabilities. By contrast, researchers have highlighted that “high-tech 
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firms seem to devote greater attention to the innovativeness of their products” 
(Kirner et al., 2009). Accordingly, such firms should have more experience in 
innovation than firms that operate in low-tech industries. The accumulated 
experience should enhance their innovation capabilities, which is critical for firms 
to achieve better performance. Innovation requires firms to deviate from their 
established practice (Musteen et al., 2010). As such, firms with high levels of 
innovativeness will likely venture into areas that are beyond their existing areas of 
expertise. As firms operating within low-tech industries have lower levels of 
innovation capabilities than the high-tech firms, it is thus expected that the low-tech 
firms are more likely to face setbacks when their levels of innovativeness are high. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that:  
Hypothesis 8:  The inverted U-shaped relationship between innovativeness and 
firm performance will be stronger for firms in low-tech industries than those in 
high-tech industries. 
With regards to risk-taking, I posit that the relationship between risk-taking and 
firm performance will be stronger in high-tech industries than in low-tech 
industries. Firms in high-tech industries face higher uncertainties and competition 
due to rapid changes in technology and market demand (Moriarty and Kosnik, 1989; 
Qian and Li, 2003). For example, changes in technology might posit new challenges 
for firms that operate in high-tech industries because they need to experiment with 
new technologies. Similarly, changes in market demand imply that firms’ 
advantages obtained through their market offerings can be short-lived. Accordingly, 
firms in high-tech industries should experience considerable risks. Conversely, 
firms that operate in low-tech industries face an environment that is more certain 
and less competitive because the technology and market demand are more stable. 
Hence, such firms should experience a lower level of risks than those in high-tech 
industries. 
Firms that operate in either high-tech or low-tech industries should engage in risk-
taking to avoid missing potentially valuable opportunities (Frishammar and Hörte, 
2007). Nevertheless, high levels of risk-taking activities might have negative effects 
on organisations because the resources committed to risky initiatives may fail to 
bear fruit due to an increased level of uncertainty involved (Alvarez, 2007). 
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Compared to the low-tech industries, the high-tech industries entail greater risks 
(Szymanski et al., 2007). For example, high-tech industries are more uncertain and 
more competitive than the low-tech one (Moriarty and Kosnik, 1989). Accordingly, 
it is likely that firms’ risk-taking efforts are less likely to yield positive outcomes in 
the competitive industry environment (i.e., high-tech industries). Conversely, the 
opposite may be true for firms in low-tech industries because the industry 
environment is more stable and less competitive. Therefore, risk-taking should have 
higher impacts for firms operate in high-tech than low-tech industries. It is thus 
hypothesised that:   
Hypothesis 9: The inverted U-shaped relationship between risk-taking and firm 
performance will be stronger for firms in high-tech industries than those in low-tech 
industries. 
I also hypothesise that the relationship between proactiveness and firm 
performance will be stronger in high-tech industries than in low-tech industries. 
Proactiveness allows firms to establish first-mover advantage (Lyon et al., 2000; 
Keh et al., 2007), which should be beneficial for firms that operate in either high-
tech or low-tech industries. Consistent with this notion, researchers have 
highlighted that “the ability to frequently challenge the status quo with new, 
breakthrough ideas is critical for firm success” (Bierly and Daly, 2007, p. 499). 
Nevertheless, the significance of proactiveness should differ between high-tech and 
low-tech industries due to the different levels of changes involved. High-tech 
industries have been characterised as highly competitive and uncertain (Moriarty 
and Kosnik, 1989). High competition and uncertainty imply that firms operating in 
such an environment should experience significant changes. By contrast, low-tech 
industries are less competitive and more stable (Szymanski et al., 2007). As such, 
the extent of changes in low-tech environments is likely to be low.  
Indeed, compared to the low-tech industries, the rate and magnitude of changes are 
greater within high-tech industries (Wang et al., 2015). Firms operating in fast 
changing environment (i.e., high-tech industries) should have a greater need to be 
proactive to develop their competitive advantage. For example, firms’ existing 
competitive advantages are likely to be short-lived as their existing products will 
turn obsolete quickly in a marketplace where product life cycles are short (Wu, 
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2012). While proactiveness is also beneficial for firms operating in low-tech 
industries, its importance should be less prominent given that the market 
environment is more stable and the product life cycles are longer. As such, fostering 
high levels of proactiveness should be more critical for firms in high-tech industries 
than those in low-tech ones. In other words, the potential performance effects of 
proactiveness should be more salient in high-tech industries than those in low-tech 
industries. Hence, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 10:  The inverted U-shaped relationship between proactiveness and 
















3.3 Regulatory focus and entrepreneurial orientation 
3.3.1 The effects of promotion focus on the three dimensions of EO 
I posit that CEO promotion focus will be associated with firms’ levels of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. In particular, I propose that CEO 
promotion focus will be positively related to firms’ engagement in innovativeness 
because promotion focused CEOs tend to favour innovation and are more likely to 
foster innovative efforts within firms they lead. A promotion focus is known to be 
associated with a preference for change (Liberman et al., 1999; Chernev, 2004). 
Promotion focused people are motivated to seek changes because the changes they 
initiate might allow them to move toward growth and advancement. In other words, 
changes represent an opportunity for promotion focused people to attain potential 
gains that are salient to them. Indeed, researchers have found that promotion 
focused people are more likely to initiate behaviour changes (Fuglestad et al., 2008). 
Similarly, empirical evidence has shown that promotion focused managers are more 
willing to “experiment with a wide range of alternatives and to deviate from existing 
best practices” (Ahmadi et al., 2017, p. 209). Researchers have highlighted that 
experimenting with alternatives and deviating from existing practices are the 
essences of innovation (Musteen et al., 2010). Accordingly, CEOs with high levels of 
promotion focus should have more positive attitudes toward innovation. 
Researchers have found that top managers’ favourable attitudes toward innovation 
positively impact the initiation, adoption decision and implementation of 
innovation within their firms (Damanpour and Schneider, 2006). Given that 
promotion focused CEOs tend to favour innovation, firms that are led by such 
people should have a higher tendency to pursue innovation, which in turn might 
generate potential gains to satisfy their needs for growth (Brockner et al., 2004). In 
support of this notion, recent empirical evidence has shown that firms led by CEOs 
with high levels of promotion focus engage in higher levels of exploration activities 
(Kammerlander et al., 2015). The exploration process entails experimenting with 
new alternatives that may lead to new products or services (March, 1991), 
suggesting that it might result in innovation related outcomes. Taken together, the 
theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that promotion focused CEOs should 
have a favourable attitude toward innovation. As a result, they are more likely to 
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foster such activities within firms they lead because the potential gains that may be 
generated from innovation can satisfy their needs for growth. Accordingly, firms 
that are led by CEOs with high levels of promotion focus should exhibit higher levels 
of innovativeness. Hence, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 11: CEO promotion focus will be positively associated with firms’ 
levels of innovativeness.  
I also posit that promotion focus will be positively related to firms’ pursuit of risk-
taking. Promotion focused CEOs are more risk tolerant as they tend to prefer 
eagerness means in striving for gains (Crowe and Higgins, 1997). Specifically, 
promotion focused people are eager to achieve advancement through maximising 
the chance for gains (hits) and minimising the chance for non-gains (misses). The 
eagerness inclination in striving for potential gains often induces promotion focused 
people towards risk-taking. Indeed, researchers have highlighted that the 
motivation to attain gains “generally translates into a more eager form of 
exploration and greater risk taking” (Zhou and Pham, 2004, p. 127). Consistent with 
this notion, empirical evidence has shown that promotion focused people exhibited 
a risky response bias in completing different tasks (Crowe and Higgins, 1997). 
Additionally, researchers have suggested that a promotion focus leads to people’s 
risk-seeking behaviours, indicated by that such people have higher tendency to 
overstate their task performance (Gino and Margolis, 2011). Together, these 
empirical findings support the idea that promotion focused people have a higher 
risk-taking propensity (Bryant and Dunford, 2008).  
Given that promotion focused CEOs tend to be risk tolerant, firms that are led by 
CEOs with high levels of promotion focus should have a higher tendency to engage 
in risk-taking. Prior researchers have suggested that promotion focused leaders are 
more likely to develop an organisational culture that encourages risk-taking and 
tolerates mistakes (Kark and Van Dijk, 2007). Recent empirical evidence has 
revealed that firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of promotion focus engage 
in higher levels of risky activities (Kammerlander et al., 2015). Additionally, 
empirical evidence has shown that promotion focused teams (i.e., both members 
are promotion focused individuals) make investment decisions that involve higher 
risks (Florack and Hartmann, 2007). These empirical findings provide support that 
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promotion focused CEOs are more likely to induce risk-taking within their firms to 
maximise potential gains. Taken together, firms that are led by CEOs with high 
levels of promotion focus should exhibit higher levels of risk-taking. Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 12: CEO promotion focus will be positively associated with firms’ 
levels of risk-taking.  
Additionally, I propose that promotion focus will be positively related to firms’ 
pursuit of proactiveness. This is because promotion focused CEOs are more 
opportunity oriented and are more likely to induce firms they lead to be proactive 
in seeking and undertaking new product opportunities. Promotion focused people 
are driven to approach matches to advancement and approach mismatches to non-
fulfilment (Higgins et al., 1994). Advancement represents gains, whereas non-
fulfilment represents non-gains. To attain potential gains, promotion focused 
people are more likely to deviate from their status quo to approach their desired 
end-states. In other words, they are more proactive to initiate or engage in activities 
that may lead to gains. As Johnson et al., (2015, p. 1512) pointed out, people with a 
promotion focus “would be more likely to search for and identify new opportunities”. 
Indeed, empirical evidence has shown that promotion focused people have a higher 
tendency to pursue new courses of actions (Liberman et al., 1999). Promotion 
focused entrepreneurs are also more proactive in networking, indicated by a higher 
number of business contacts they interact with for information (Pollack et al., 2015). 
Also, prior research has suggested that promotion focus positively influences 
people’s frequency to engage in proactive behaviour (Waterwall, 2017), which 
“involves challenging the status quo rather than passively adapting to present 
conditions” (Crant, 2000, p. 436).  
Promotion focused people’s tendency to approach gains through proactively seeking 
new opportunities is likely to significantly impact the firms they lead. For example, 
empirical evidence has shown that firms that are led by promotion focused CEOs 
are more proactive in business acquisitions as indicated by higher numbers and 
values of business acquisition firms undertake (Gamache et al., 2015). Researchers 
have also found that promotion focused teams are more proactive in new product 
introduction captured by higher number and faster speed of new products 
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introduced under experimental settings (Spanjol et al., 2011). Additionally, a recent 
empirical study has revealed that firms that are led by promotion focused CEOs are 
more proactive in new product introduction (Greenbaum, 2015). Together, these 
theoretical and empirical findings suggest that promotion focused CEOs’ 
opportunity seeking tendencies should orient firms they lead to pursue proactive 
efforts for potential gains, which can satisfy their needs for advancement. As such, 
firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of promotion focus should exhibit higher 
levels of proactiveness. Thus, it is hypothesised that:  
Hypothesis 13: CEO promotion focus will be positively associated with firms’ 
levels of proactiveness. 
3.3.2 The effects of prevention focus on the three dimensions of EO 
Similarly, there are reasons to expect that CEO prevention focus will be associated 
with firms’ levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. I posit that CEO 
prevention focus will be negatively related to firms’ pursue of innovativeness 
because prevention focused CEOs tend to prefer maintaining status quo. A 
prevention focus entails a preference for stability (Liberman et al., 1999). 
Prevention focused people are driven by stability because maintaining satisfactory 
status quo allows them to ensure safety. Indeed, researchers have found that 
prevention focused people are less likely to activate behaviour changes (Fuglestad 
et al., 2008). Prevention focused managers have a lower tendency to explore new 
alternatives (Ahmadi et al., 2017). However, it should be acknowledged that a 
preference for stability does not imply that prevention focused people will not seek 
changes. In the situation of experiencing losses, for example, prevention focused 
people may initiate changes to restore adequate status quo (Collins, 2016). 
Because innovation requires firms to experiment with new alternatives and deviate 
from their existing practices (March, 1991; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996), the 
innovation process should involve substantial changes and uncertain outcomes. 
Given that prevention focused CEOs are driven to ensure their safety needs through 
maintaining satisfactory status quo, CEOs with high levels of prevention focus 
should have lower motivation to foster innovation within firms they lead. In line 
with this view, researchers have found that prevention focused teams introduced 
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new products that are less novel than those introduced by promotion focused teams 
(Spanjol et al., 2011). Recent empirical evidence has also shown that firms that are 
led by CEOs with high levels of prevention focused are less likely to engage in 
exploration activities (Kammerlander et al., 2015), which may lead to innovation. 
Together, this theoretical and empirical evidence supports the idea that firms that 
are led by CEOs with high levels of prevention focus should exhibit lower levels of 
innovativeness. Accordingly, it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 14: CEO prevention focus will be negatively associated with firms’ 
levels of innovativeness. 
I also propose that CEO prevention focus will be negatively related to firms’ 
engagement in risk-taking because prevention focused CEOs tend to be risk-averse. 
Researchers suggest that prevention focused people are more sensitive to the 
presence or absence of negative outcomes (Brockner et al., 2004). The sensitivity to 
potential losses has implications on prevention focused people’s risk-taking 
tendencies because, when evaluating new information or opportunities, they tend 
to weight more heavily on the potential losses involved (Markman et al., 2005; 
Molden et al., 2008). Indeed, prevention focused people’s motivation to protect 
against mistakes “generally translates into a more vigilant form of exploration and 
greater risk aversion” (Zhou and Pham, 2004). As a result, prevention focused 
people are more risk-averse. Indeed, empirical evidence has shown that prevention 
focused people exhibited a conservative response bias in completing different tasks 
(Crowe and Higgins, 1997). Also, they are prone to engage in risk avoidance 
behaviours (Gino and Margolis, 2011; Hamstra et al., 2011). 
Given that a prevention focus is associated with a risk avoidance tendency, CEOs 
with high levels of prevention focus should orient their firms to pursue activities 
that involve outcomes that are more certain. In other words, they are less likely to 
encourage risk-taking because such activities entail outcomes that are uncertain. 
Indeed, researchers have found that the investments made by prevention focused 
teams are less risky than those made by promotion focused teams (Florack and 
Hartmann, 2007). Additionally, recent empirical evidence has demonstrated that 
prevention focused CEOs negatively impact firms’ tendencies to engage in 
exploration activities that are risky (Kammerlander et al., 2015). Taken together, 
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prevention focused CEOs are more risk-averse because they are driven to ensure 
their need for safety. As a result, firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of 
prevention focus should exhibit lower extent of risk-taking. Thus, it is hypothesised 
that: 
Hypothesis 15: CEO prevention focus will be negatively associated with firms’ 
levels of risk-taking. 
I also hypothesise that CEO prevention focus will be negatively related to firms’ 
pursue of proactiveness because prevention focused CEOs tend to be reactive in 
their endeavours. Prevention focused people are driven to avoid mismatches to 
safety and avoid matches to threat (Higgins et al., 1994). Maintaining safety 
represents non-loss while falling into threat represents a loss. Because prevention 
focused people are motivated to ensure safety and avoid losses, they are oriented to 
maintain satisfactory status quo rather than deviate from current states. Indeed, 
researchers have found that prevention focused people are more likely to engage in 
behaviours that are intended to sustain the status quo (Shin et al., 2017). In other 
words, prevention focused people are less proactive to engage in behaviours that 
lead to changes. As Crant (2000, p. 439) pointed out, “[l]ess proactive individuals 
are passive and reactive, preferring to adapt to circumstances rather than change 
them”, suggesting that prevention focused people tend to be more passive as they 
prefer stability over change (Liberman et al., 1999).  
Proactiveness requires firms to act in anticipation of future demand and introduce 
new products or services ahead of their competitors (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). 
Given that a prevention focus is associated with a propensity to ensure safety 
through maintaining status quo, firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of 
prevention focus should have a lower tendency to be proactive and act in 
anticipation of market demands. In other words, such firms are less likely to develop 
new products or services ahead of the competition, implying lower extents of 
proactiveness. Indeed, researchers have found that prevention focused teams 
introduced a lower number of new products than those introduced by promotion 
focused teams (Spanjol et al., 2011). Additionally, firms that are led by prevention 
focused CEOs engage in lower numbers and values of business acquisitions 
(Gamache et al., 2015), and introduce a lower number of new products (Greenbaum, 
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2015). Together, these findings suggest that firms that are led by CEOs with high 
levels of prevention focus should exhibit lower levels of proactiveness. Accordingly, 
it is hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 16: CEO prevention focus will be negatively associated with firms’ 


















Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
4.1 Research design 
Research design should be guided by the type of questions the researcher intends to 
answer (Bono and McNamara, 2011). As outlined in the introduction chapter, this 
study aims to address three research questions. Firstly, to examine how the CEO’s 
regulatory focus affects the respective SME’s performance, and how this effect 
differs between SMEs in high-tech industries and those in low-tech industries. 
Secondly, to assess how an SME’s levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness impact its performance and how does the effect differ between SMEs 
in high-tech industries and those in low-tech industries. Thirdly, to evaluate how 
the CEO’s regulatory focus influences the respective SME’s levels of innovativeness, 
risk-taking, and proactiveness.  
Since the primary purpose of this study is to assess the potential relationships 
between different variables, a quantitative approach is considered more appropriate 
for this study (Creswell, 2009; Antonakis et al., 2010). A quantitative research 
design allows researchers to collect quantifiable and measurable data. Such data, in 
turn, can be used in statistical analysis to test the hypotheses proposed in the 
preceding hypothesis development chapter. Accordingly, quantitative research 
design is adopted for this study because it fits the purpose of this research. 
Researchers have highlighted that, with representative samples, the generalisability 
of research findings may be achieved from a quantitative study (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012). However, it should be acknowledged that a quantitative approach is not 
without limitations. For example, an in-depth and rich understanding of the 
research phenomenon is unlikely to be achieved through the quantitative approach 
(Jack, 2010).  
Additionally, this study employed an online survey for data collection. Compared 
with a paper-based survey, the online questionnaire has advantages in both cost and 
flexibility (Brace, 2004). The cost involved in an online survey is relatively lower 
than surveys administrated using the post, the telephone, or in person. Also, the 
turnaround time of an online approach tends to be quick (Ilieva et al., 2002). Such 
an approach also saves the time and effort required for respondents to return the 
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completed survey. Accordingly, it might help to encourage participation from 
potential respondents. The questionnaire was operationalised through the online 
platform Qualtrics. I incorporated two features of the online survey to make it more 
convenient for respondents to fill in. Firstly, respondents were allowed to save the 
unfinished questionnaire and then continue it later. This is based on the 
consideration that CEOs tend to have a tight business schedule. Secondly, a 
progression bar showing the percentage of the survey that has been filled was 
featured at the end of each screen to minimise potential drop out issues due to a lack 
of awareness of the progress made thus far, or a misconception that the survey is 



















To test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, I chose to examine SMEs operating 
in England, UK. SMEs contribute significantly to the job creation and economic 
development in the UK. In all private sectors in the UK, for example, 99.3% of firms 
are SMEs, which account for 60% of all employment (Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016). I used the Financial Analysis Made Easy 
(FAME) database, a widely used source of information on UK firms (e.g., Dada and 
Fogg, 2016), as the sampling frame. FAME contains information (e.g., names, 
addresses, and employee numbers) of firms operating in the UK, as well as the 
contact details of these firms’ top managements such as Chief Executive Officer, 
Managing Director, Business Owner, or Company Director. I employed three 
criteria in selecting firms from the database: 1) firms with a primary trading address 
in England, UK; 2) active firms that are not in receivership or dormant; 3) firms 
with less than 250 employees in the last trading year. Based on the three criteria, 
52,568 firms were identified of which 5,000 SMEs were randomly selected for this 
study. However, a close examination of the data extracted from the FAME database 
revealed that a significant number of firms lack contact details for CEOs. The firms 
which lacked contacts details for their CEOs were then removed from the dataset. 









4.3 Data collection 
In the following, I present the processes involved in data collection. In particular, 
the processes of questionnaire design, pilot testing, and data collection are 
introduced in turn. The ethical issues about data collection are also highlighted.  
QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN In designing the survey instrument, I conducted an 
extensive literature review to identify established measures for constructs used in 
this study (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2006). Using existing measures can help to 
ensure the construct reliability and validity (Bono and McNamara, 2011). I also 
invited two CEOs and three academics to comment upon the drafts of the 
questionnaire. One CEO was from the service industry, and the other was from the 
manufacturing industry. They were selected because both of them have extensive 
experience in their industry, 18 and 38 years respectively. Their different 
backgrounds can also help to ensure that the questionnaire is examined from 
different perspectives. The three academics were invited to give feedback on the 
survey design, as they all have experience in conducting quantitative research. 
Based on the feedback from the CEOs and academic staff, I further refined the 
questionnaire with regards to the sequence of questions and survey instruction. For 
example, the section about the background information of participants and 
organisations was originally placed at the end of the questionnaire. Following the 
suggestion of one academic, the background information section was moved to the 
beginning of the survey, based on the idea that starting the survey with easy 
questions might help to encourage participation. One CEO pointed out that the third 
question about regulatory focus was not very clear (i.e., How often have you 
accomplished things that got you "psyched'' to work even harder?). The CEO 
indicated that the wording “psyched” seems unfamiliar. But based on the context of 
the question, he suggested that the question was still understandable. As the 
regulatory focus questionnaire has been employed in several others studies, I 
decided to keep the wording.  
PILOT TESTING I pre-tested the survey with a convenience sample of 12 CEOs to 
avoid any potential issues that were not identified during the initial stage of the 
questionnaire design process. I established connections with those CEOs through 
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the Lancaster University’s programmes, such as Entrepreneurs in Residences, and 
Masterclasses. I introduced the purpose of the research project to the CEOs first and 
then invited them to complete the survey and comment on any issues with regards 
to the clarity of instructions, the wording of questions, the sequence of questions 
and the overall survey design (Malhotra, 2006). The pilot testing revealed that on 
average it took around 10 to 15 minutes to complete the online survey, except one 
CEO who took around 25 minutes. During a conversation with the CEO afterwards, 
he explained that he wanted to think about the survey questions carefully before 
providing feedback. One sample response from the questionnaire pilot testing is 
provided in Appendix 1. 
The profile of CEOs who participated in the pilot testing is summarised in Table 4-
1.  The CEOs were from different industry backgrounds including manufacturing, 
service, and others (e.g., retailing, wholesaling, construction, and agriculture, 
among others). The majority of them had served more than five years in their 
organisations, with a minimum tenure of 3 years and a maximum of 35. Both male 
and female CEOs were used in the pilot testing. Although the sample size was small, 
the respondents and their organisation’s size were quite diverse. Hence, the sample 
size used for pilot testing was considered sufficient (Grichnik et al., 2014). Since 
only one minor issue was identified from the pilot testing, I then employed the 
refined questionnaire for subsequent data collection. The final questionnaire is 











Table 4-1: Profile of participants for pilot testing 
Number Gender Age Tenure Industry 
Number of  
employees 
1 Female 57 20 Manufacturing < 50 
2 Male 49 12 Others < 50 
3 Male 66 18 Others < 250 
4 Male 31 6 Service < 10 
5 Male 59 35 Manufacturing < 50 
6 Male 45 7 Manufacturing < 250 
7 Male 41 14 Service < 250 
8 Male 45 3 Service < 10 
9 Male 53 4 Service < 10 
10 Male 61 8 Service < 250 
11 Female 43 15 Service < 50 
12 Male 53 8 Service < 250 
COLLECTING DATA I invited CEOs to participate in the study through an invitation 
email, which is included in Appendix 3. The research purpose was introduced in the 
email and CEOs were invited to follow the embedded link to complete the online 
survey. I contacted 1542 firms, but a significant number of emails bounced back to 
the researcher due to reasons such as invalid email addresses, and executive has 
retired or moved to another company. Some automated responses indicated that 
some CEOs were out of office or on annual leave. Several respondents replied to the 
invitation email and indicated that they were unable to participate in the study 
because their firms were not SMEs or not located in England, UK. In total, 1,388 
emails reached the target while the remaining 154 emails failed to deliver.   
To encourage participation, CEOs were assured that their answers would remain 
confidential and be used for academic purposes only. Also, they were informed that 
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an Executive Summary of the research findings would be provided at the end of this 
study. After the initial invitation email, three rounds of follow up emails were used 
to encourage participation. The emails were scheduled for two weeks, four weeks, 
and five weeks after the initial invitation email. In total, 157 responses, of the initial 
1,388 e-mailed, were collected within the period. The response rate is 11.3 percent, 
which is comparable to similar studies using senior executives as a primary data 
source (Brettel and Rottenberger, 2013; Xu, 2011). Through examining the data set, 
it was found that some cases were not valid due to missing data on key variables. 
These were then removed. Additionally, one response was removed due to being an 
outlier. The procedures in examining outliers are discussed in the next section. In 
total, 110 valid responses were used in statistical analysis for hypothesis testing.  
The characteristics of all respondents were as follows. The average age of CEOs was 
50.67 years, and the average tenure was 14.41 years. The sample was dominated by 
male CEOs who accounted for 81.2% of all respondents. This is in line with the 
findings from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) that male business 
ownership is significantly higher than female business ownership in the UK (Hart 
et al., 2014). Results from the UK 2014 Small Business Survey indicate that only 18% 
of SMEs are led by women (BIS, 2015). Thus, the gender ratio of this study is 
representative of the intended population. The average firm age was 30.4 years. The 
firms varied in size with 20% of the firms having fewer than ten employees. The 
percentage of firms with 11-50 employees and 51-250 employees are 32.7% and 47.3% 
respectively. The firms were from different industries: 28.2% were in 
manufacturing, 48.2% were in service, and 23.6% were from other sectors. The 
characteristics of the samples are summarised in Table 4-2. A more detailed, 








Table 4-2: Sample characteristics 
Age  50.67 years 
Tenure 14.41 years 
Gender   
     Male (%) 81.2% 
     Female (%) 18.8% 
  
Firm age 30.4  years 
Firm size  
     1–10 employees 20% 
     11–50 employees 32.7% 
     51–250 employees 47.3% 
  
Industry  
     Manufacturing (%) 28.2% 
     Services (%) 48.2% 
     Others (%) 23.6% 
 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS Ethical issues concerning informed consent and 
confidentiality were taken into consideration during the data collection process. 
First, informed consent was achieved through two steps. Respondents were invited 
to click the link embedded within the invitation email to complete the online survey. 
Given that the research purpose was introduced within the email, following the link 
indicated that respondents were interested and were agreeing to participate in the 
study. Furthermore, following the suggestion from a member of the University 
Research Ethics Committee, a statement “Completion and return of the 
questionnaire will be taken as informed consent and the questionnaires cannot then 
be withdrawn” was included on the first page of the online survey. This approach 
was adopted because the survey was operationalised online, and so it may be 
unrealistic to require respondents to sign and return a physical consent form. It was 
anticipated that such a process might heavily discourage potential respondents from 
participation in the study.  
Second, participants were assured the confidentiality of their response to the online 
survey, which collects data in relation to the personal information of CEOs as well 
as the strategic behaviours and performance of organisations. Specifically, 
participants were assured that the information they provided would remain 
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confidential and that neither they and/nor their organisations would be named in 
any work arising from the research. Through ensuring confidentiality in the data 
collected, this might enhance respondent’s interest and participation in the study. 
The contact details of the researcher and two supervisors were provided at the 
beginning of the online questionnaire. This allowed potential respondents to raise 
any potential issues that they might have about the project. 
Finally, it is worth noting that as the contact details of CEOs were obtained from the 
FAME database, some CEOs might not be interested in participating in this research 
due to their tight business schedule or lack of interest. During the data collection 
process, nine respondents contacted the researcher and indicated that they would 
like to be removed from the emailing list. Their contact details were then removed 




4.4 Data screening 
 
MISSING DATA I used SPSS, the statistical analysis software, to examine missing 
data before data analysis. The data concerning the risk-taking dimension of EO was 
missing in two cases. Given that only two data points were missing, it was 
considered appropriate to keep the two cases. I replaced the missing values by using 
the mean value of the variable from all other valid responses. Although the mean 
substitution method may reduce the variance of the variable, it is unlikely to be a 
problem for this study as the level of missing data is relatively low in this study (Hair 
et al., 2014). 
OUTLIER The key independent and dependent variables were measured using five-
point Likert-scale. This implies that outliers are not an issue for these variables. To 
illustrate, answering the survey questions at the extreme values of 1 or 5 is not 
representative of an outlier. I examined the standardised scores for CEO age and 
tenure to identify potential outliers. It was observed that the highest standardised 
score was 2.13 for CEO age and 2.90 for CEO tenure. This implies that there were 
no outliers in the two variables because their standardised scores were lower than 
the threshold value of 3.29 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). In addition to examining 
the standardised scores, I also visually inspected the boxplots for CEO age and 
tenure. The boxplots also demonstrated that there was no outlier, measured by 
visibly far distance from the box. This further confirmed that outliers were not an 
issue with respect to CEO age and tenure. 
I also examined the standardised score for firm age. The results revealed that the 
highest standardised score was 8.30, which is much higher than the second value of 
3.01. The extreme value of 8.30 indicated that this case was an outlier as the value 
is much higher than the threshold value of 3.29. Through examining the dataset, it 
was found that the firm age for this case was 472 years. This case was then removed 
from further data analysis to avoid potential distortion of the results. This leads to 
a final sample size of 110 cases for further data analysis.  
NORMALITY I then assessed the data normality of all variables based on the 
skewness and kurtosis z- values, which are calculated by dividing the statistical 
values of skewness and kurtosis by their respective standard errors. The z-values for 
76 
 
most variables were within the recommended range of +/-1.96 (Hair et al., 2014) 
except for firm performance, CEO tenure, and firm age. In other words, the data for 
firm performance, CEO tenure, and firm age was not normally distributed. Given 
that the z-value of firm performance is -2.07, which is close to the recommended 
threshold value, this variable remained unchanged. Following the suggestion from 
Hair et al., (2014), I then transformed the data of CEO tenure and firm age by taking 
the square root of each variable. The transformed data for CEO tenure became 
normally distributed, but the transformed data on firm age still deviated from a 
normal distribution. A logarithmic transformation was then applied to firm age to 
overcome strong skewness (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). The skewness and 
kurtosis z-values for CEO tenure and firm age after data transformation were within 
the recommended range of +/-1.96, suggesting that the data would be acceptable 
for further analysis. The detailed statistic values, standard errors, as well as z-values 




REGULATORY FOCUS While various measures have been developed to assess 
people’s regulatory focus (Scholer and Higgins, 2011), the Regulatory Focus 
Questionnaire (RFQ) and the General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM) are the 
measures that have been commonly used in extant studies. Specifically, RFQ 
captures people’s histories of success in achieving promotion and prevention related 
goals (Higgins et al., 2001). It consists of 11 items, with six items for promotion focus 
and five items for prevention focus. The GRFM captures people’s regulatory focus 
by measuring the extent to which they concern promotion and prevention related 
goals (Lockwood et al., 2002). It consists of 18 questions to measure promotion and 
prevention focus. Consistent with prior empirical studies within the 
entrepreneurship context (e.g. Bryant 2009; Kammerlander et al., 2015), I used the 
RFQ to measure promotion and prevention focus as the RFQ is considered as the 
“most widely appropriate of the existing measures” to capture people’s regulatory 
focus (Haws et al., 2010, p. 980). CEOs were asked to provide their responses to 
each item using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5. Specific items of the 
RFQ are provided in section 2 of Appendix 2. It is worth noting that several items 
were reverse coded and the scores for these items were first adjusted before creating 
the measures for promotion and prevention focus (i.e., taking the average of 
respective items). 
I assessed the measure of promotion and prevention focus using principal 
component analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation technique. The results revealed an 
inconsistent loading of one item on promotion focus (Item 1: “Compared to most 
people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life?”). This item was 
then removed from further analysis. Removing the item was considered appropriate 
because similar issues were also observed in another study which examined the 
impact of CEO regulatory focus on the behaviours of organisations (i.e., 
Kammerlander et al., 2015). I then re-conducted PCA on the remaining ten items. 
It was found that one item which was originally designed to measure promotion 
focus was loaded on a separate factor (Item 11: “I have found very few hobbies or 
activities in my life that capture my interest or motivate me to put effort into them.”). 
Because a single item is insufficient to represent one factor (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2013), this item was excluded from analysis. Further PCA analysis on the remaining 
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items revealed that one item on prevention focus (Item 8: “Not being careful enough 
has gotten you into trouble at times”) had to be removed because the communalities 
value of 0.46 was lower than the recommended value 0.5.  
The final PCA results indicated that two factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s 
criterion of 1 and 59.5% of the variance can be explained by the two factors derived 
from PCA. The factor loadings for all items range from 0.66 to 0.86, which are all 
sufficient (Hair et al., 2014). The detailed results from PCA are presented in 
Appendix 6. The four items for promotion focus and four items for prevention focus 
were all loaded on the respective factors. The Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.64 for 
promotion focus and 0.83 for prevention focus, indicating acceptable internal 
reliability of the measures (Bryant, 2009; Hair et al., 2014). The results were 
consistent with the study from Kammerlander et al.,  (2015) which also found that 
promotion focus (α = 0.77) has higher internal reliability than prevention focus (α 
= 0.60). 
INNOVATIVENESS, RISK-TAKING, AND PROACTIVENESS Following prior 
studies (Covin and Slevin, 1989; Covin and Wales, 2012; Dada and Fogg, 2016), I 
employed the widely adopted nine-item scale to measure the three dimensions of 
EO. In particular, each dimension of EO was measured by three items using a five-
point Likert scale. Sample items include: ‘We favour a strong emphasis on R&D, 
technological leadership, and innovations’ (innovativeness); ‘When there is 
uncertainty, we typically adopt a bold, aggressive posture in order to maximise the 
probability of exploiting potential opportunities’ (risk-taking); and ‘We are very 
often the first business to introduce new products, administrative techniques, 
operating technologies, etc.’ (proactiveness). The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.77 for 
innovativeness, 0.79 for risk-taking, and 0.84 for proactiveness, all well above the 
recommended value of 0.7, indicating good scale reliability.  
FIRM PERFORMANCE I employed four items to measure firm performance. CEOs 
were required to evaluate their firms’ performance in comparison with major 
competitors over the past three years on profitability, market share, return on 
investments, and sales growth. This approach is considered appropriate because 
prior empirical evidence has demonstrated that the performance relative to 
competitors measured shows good relevance, internal consistency, and external 
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validity (Chandler and Hanks, 1993). The performance measure captures both 
financial (profitability and return on investments) and non-financial performance 
(market share and sales growth) (Richard et al., 2009). This is also consistent with 
existing EO studies that use perceived financial and non-financial performance as 
the performance indicator (Rauch et al., 2009). The items were measured by using 
a five-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). 
The average of these four items was used as the performance measure. The 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.77, indicating high scale reliability.  
INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENT Following prior research, industry environment was 
measured by assessing CEOs’ perceptions of the industry in which their firms 
operate. For example, Bierly and Daly (2007) asked respondents to indicate whether 
their industry would be characterised as a high-tech industry. I extended Bierly and 
Daly’s (2007) one-item measure and used a two-item measure by asking 
respondents to indicate: 1) the extent to which their primary product is high-tech or 
low-tech; and 2) the extent to which their primary product is high knowledge 
intensive or low knowledge intensive, based on a scale of one to five. Including one 
more item to capture knowledge intensity is based on the consideration that high-
tech industries are generally more knowledge intensive than the low-tech ones 
(Thornhill, 2006; Bolland and Hofer, 1998). Also, the item can better capture the 
nature of the product, which refers to both goods and services, offered by firms from 
the service sector. The average of the two items was used to represent the industry 
environment in which firms operate. While the Cronbach’s alpha 0.55 is slightly 
lower than the recommended value of 0.6, it was considered acceptable because 
researchers have highlighted that a lower alpha is expected for scales that are 
measured with few items (Dai et al., 2014; Morris and Pavett, 1992). 
CONTROLS Several control variables were used in this study: CEO age, CEO tenure, 
firm age, firm size, industry, and environmental turbulence. CEO age and tenure are 
controlled because they allow CEOs to accumulate more experience, which may 
influence the behaviours of firms they lead. For example, it is possible that CEOs 
with more experience in innovation may have higher a tendency to foster such 
activities within their firms. Also, one could argue that older CEOs might be less 
motivated to pursue new opportunities because researchers have highlighted that 
age is negatively associated with entrepreneurs’ focus on new opportunities (Gielnik 
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et al., 2012). Additionally, it is possible that CEOs with more experience, which 
result from higher age and/or longer tenure, are more likely to have the skills in 
managing their respective firms, which could have an impact on the outcome of 
firms they lead. For example, researchers have highlighted that entrepreneurs’ 
experience is positively related to venture growth (Lee and Tsang, 2001), suggesting 
that it is important to control the age and tenure of CEOs. 
Firm age was calculated by the number of years the business was established 
(Lubatkin et al., 2006). Older firms should have more experience in entrepreneurial 
activities than younger firms. As such, firm age may influence the outcomes of firms’ 
different entrepreneurial activities. Firm size was measured by using the range of 
full-time employees working within the business. It was controlled because firms’ 
capability to engage in entrepreneurial activities depends on their resources and 
competencies (Covin and Slevin, 1991), which are associated with the size of 
organisations. Firm size was included as dummy variables with three categories: 
less than 10 employees, which served as the reference group in the model, 11-50 
employees, and 51-250 employees. Consistent with previous research (Lubatkin et 
al., 2006; Kammerlander et al., 2015), industry was controlled to account for 
potential influences from the industry. Industry dummies include manufacturing, 
service, and other businesses, which served as the reference group in the model.  
Finally, environmental turbulence was controlled because changes in the 
environment provides new opportunities but also entails risks (Su et al., 2011). As 
such, environmental turbulence may have an impact on firm behaviours or 
performance. Environmental turbulence was measured by using a six-item, five-
point scale adapted from Jaworski and Kohli (1993). The scale contained items 
measuring the market and technological changes within the environment in which 
firms operate. Sample items include: “Customers’ product preferences change quite 
a bit over time” and “The technology in our industry is changing rapidly”. The 
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.76, indicating high scale reliability.   
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4.6 Reliability and validity test 
NON-RESPONSE BIAS I tested non-response bias for early and late responses 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977) on CEO age, tenure, and firm age. The underlying 
assumption is that late responses might be similar to non-responses (Kanuk and 
Berenson, 1975). I categorised the data into two groups based on the time of 
response. The early response group has 56 cases, while the late response group has 
54 cases. The results from T-test showed that all p-value > 0.10 (see Appendix 7), 
suggesting that there is no significant differences between the two groups. Thus, 
non-response bias was not a problem to this study.  
COMMON METHOD BIAS As the survey data was self-reported by individual CEOs, 
several approaches were employed to minimise the potential issue of common 
method bias (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Firstly, 
participants were assured the anonymity and confidentiality of their responses to 
reduce the effect of social desirability in answering the survey (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Specifically, they were assured that the information they provided would 
remain confidential in that their answers would not be shared with anybody and 
they would not be named in any work arising from the research. Secondly, the 
questions concerning the different constructs were placed in different sections of 
the survey. This separation of constructs with different sets of section instructions 
can help to minimise participants' perception of any direct relationship between the 
constructs in the study (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Finally, I employed Harman’s one-factor test to examine common method bias.  
According to Podsakoff and Organ (1986, p. 536), when a substantial amount of 
common method variance is present, “either (a) a single factor will emerge from the 
factor analysis, or (b) one ‘general’ factor will account for the majority of the 
covariance” among the measured variables. The results from factor analysis 
indicated that six factors account for 70 per cent of the variance extracted 
(eigenvalue > 1), with the first factor accounting for only 25.42 per cent of the 
variance (see Appendix 8). Hence, no single factor was dominant from the factor 
analysis, and no single factor represented the majority of the variance. Accordingly, 
the risk of common method bias is low in this study.  
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CONSTRUCT VALIDITY I examined the construct validity of the three dimensions 
of EO as well as promotion and prevention focus through conducting confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) and calculating the square root of the average variance 
extracted (AVE) for each variable (Baron and Tang, 2011; Chen et al., 2014). I first 
examined a two-factor CFA model that includes promotion and prevention focus. 
The chi-square for the two-factor model was non-significant (χ2 = 26.03, p > 0.10). 
The fit indices demonstrate that the model provided a good fit to the data: χ2/d.f. = 
1.37, CFI = 0.97, TLI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.06. I then compared the two-factor model 
with an alternative one-factor model, which combines all items into one factor. As 
shown in Table 4-3, the two-factor model provided a much better fit to the data than 
the one-factor model. Accordingly, the promotion and prevention focus scales are 
measuring distinct constructs.  
Table 4-3: Confirmatory factor analysis for regulatory focus 
 
Model χ2 d.f. Δχ2 CFI TLI RMSEA 
Recommended values χ2 / d.f. ≤ 3   ≥ 0.90 ≥ 0.90 ≤ 0.08 
Two-factor model 26.03 19  0.97 0.95 0.06 
One-factor model 69.19 20 43.16 0.78 0.69 0.15 
CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker–Lewis Index; 
RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. 
I also examined a three-factor CFA model that includes innovativeness, risk-taking, 
and proactiveness. Although the chi-square for the three-factor model was 
significant (χ2 = 42.17, p < 0.05), the fit indices indicate that the three-factor model 
provided a good fit to the data. Specifically, the ratio of χ2/d.f. (1.76) was below the 
threshold value of 3. The comparative fit index (CFI = 0.96) and Tucker Lewis index 
(TLI = 0.95) were above the acceptable criterion level of 0.9. The root-mean-square 
error of approximation (RMSEA = 0.08) was not higher than the threshold value of 
0.08. Additionally, all individual items significantly loaded on their respective latent 
variables. I then compared the three-factor model with an alternative one-factor 
model, which combines all items into one factor. As shown in Table 4-4, the three-
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factor model provided a much better fit to the data than the one-factor model. 
Together, the results suggest that the innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness 
scales are measuring distinct constructs.  
Table 4-4: Confirmatory factor analysis for the three dimensions of EO 
 
Model χ2 d.f. Δχ2 CFI TLI RMSEA 
Recommended values χ2 / d.f. ≤ 3   ≥ 0.90 ≥ 0.90 ≤ 0.08 
Three-factor model 42.17 24  0.96 0.95 0.08 
One-factor model 183.22 27 141.05 0.68 0.58 0.23 
CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker–Lewis Index; 
RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. 
Additionally, I calculated the square root of the average variance extracted for 
promotion focus, prevention focus, innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. 
Results indicated that the square root of the AVE values were adequate (see 
Appendix 9 for a summary). The AVE 0.483 for promotion focus is considered 
acceptable although it is slightly lower than the recommended value of 0.5 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). Taken together, the CFA and AVE results provide 











Chapter 5 Data Analysis and Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5-1 presents the means, standard deviation, and correlations for the variables 
used in this study. The correlation between promotion and prevention focus is low 
in magnitude (ρ = 0.168, p > 0.1), which is consistent with previous studies 
(Kammerlander et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2001). The correlations between 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness range from 0.47 to 0.52, suggesting 
that while there is shared variance among the three dimensions of EO, substantial 
independent variance also exist for each dimension. The existence of independent 
variance provide further support that examining the three dimensions of EO 
independently may generate useful insights that cannot be revealed when the three 
dimensions are combined into one factor. The magnitudes of their correlations are 
comparable to those reported by Lomberg et al., (2016) ranging from 0.44 to 0.49 
and by Kreiser et al., (2013) ranging from 0.36 to 0.47. I then assessed 
multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics. The lowest value 
was 1.19 and the highest value was 3.01. All VIFs were substantially below the critical 
value of 10 (Neter et al., 1985), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern for 




Table 5-1: Means, Standard Deviations (SD), and Correlations of Variables                 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. CEO age 50.67 10.49                     
2. CEO tenure 14.41 9.57 .406**                   
3. Firm age 30.40 32.11 0.172 .344**                 
4. Environmental turbulence 3.71 .64 0.002 -0.165 -.189*               
5. Industry environment 3.57 .99 0.071 -0.124 -0.099 .327**             
6. Promotion focus 3.93 .49 -0.065 -0.011 -0.017 0.177 0.150           
7. Prevention focus 3.35 .89 0.156 .219* .200* -0.097 0.082 0.168        
8. Innovativeness 
3.33 .85 0.183 0.059 0.007 .446** .238* .251** -0.087      
9. Risk-taking 
2.86 .97 0.000 -0.036 -0.109 .321** .194* 0.069 -.238* .492**    
10. Proactiveness 
3.21 .92 0.028 -0.065 -0.100 .265** 0.099 .295** -.223* .515** .468**   
11. Firm performance 3.53 .80 0.042 0.088 0.105 -0.059 0.146 0.180 -0.065 0.098 0.056 .297** 
N=110 firms; *p < .05; ** < .01 (two-tailed).                       
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5.2 Regulatory focus and firm performance 
5.2.1 Regression Models 
The results for testing Hypotheses 1 to 4 are provided in Table 5-2. The regression 
analysis used three models. Model 1 contains only the control variables and the 
moderating variable. In Model 2, I added the independent variables: promotion and 
prevention focus. The interaction terms were included in Model 3. Consistent with 
prior research (Kammerlander et al., 2015; Aiken et al., 1991), all independent 
variables were mean centred before creating the interaction terms to prevent 





Table 5-2: Regressing promotion and prevention focus onto firm performance   
  Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: 
Constant 3.06*** 2.82*** 2.73*** 
Controls       
CEO age -0.01 0.00 0.00 
CEO tenure 0.04 0.03 0.01 
Firm age 0.07 0.16 0.18 
Firm size (11-50) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 
Firm size (51-250) 0.16 0.11 0.09 
Manufacturing 0.29 0.30 0.24 
Service -0.04 0.08 0.03 
Environmental turbulence -0.12 -0.16 -0.18 
Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry) 0.19* 0.18* 0.20* 
Direct effects       
Promotion focus   0.33* 0.25 
Prevention focus   -0.18* -0.18+ 
Interactions       
Promotion focus x Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry)     0.42* 
Prevention focus x Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry)     0.01 
        
        
R² 0.11 0.16 0.22 
Adjusted R² 0.03 0.07 0.12 
ΔR²   0.06 0.06 
F 1.36 1.75+ 2.12* 
ΔF   3.23* 3.63* 
†p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001; unstandardized regression coefficients (two-tailed tests) 
88 
 
5.2.2 Regression Results 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 tested the relationship between regulatory focus and firm 
performance. Hypothesis 1 predicted that promotion focus would be positively 
associated with firm performance. As shown in Model 2, promotion focus was 
positively and significantly (β= 0.33, p < 0.05) related to firm performance, 
providing support for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 posited that prevention focus 
would be negatively related to firm performance. As also shown in Model 2, 
prevention focus was negatively and significantly (β= -0.18, p < 0.05) related to firm 
performance. Hence, Hypothesis 2 was supported. Compared with Model 1, Model 
2, which includes promotion and prevention focus as predictors, explained an 
additional 6% of the variance in firm performance. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 assessed the moderating effect of industry environment on the 
relationship between regulatory focus and firm performance. Hypothesis 3 
predicted that industry environment would moderate the positive relationship 
between promotion focus and firm performance. As shown in Model 3, the 
interaction term of promotion focus was positive and significant (β= 0.42, p < 0.05), 
providing support for Hypothesis 3. The interaction term explained an additional 6% 
of the variance in firm performance beyond that explained by controls, promotion 
and prevention focus. Hypothesis 4 posited that the industry environment would 
moderate the negative relationship between prevention focus and firm performance. 
As shown in Model 3, the interaction term of prevention focus was non-significant 
(β= 0.01, n.s.). As such, Hypothesis 4 was not supported.  
The moderating effect of industry environment is illustrated in Figure 5-1. As shown 
in the figure, the relationship between promotion focus and firm performance is 
stronger for firms in high-tech industries than those in low-tech industries. The 
figure also revealed a downward trend on the promotion focus – firm performance 
relationship for firms in low-tech industries, implying that promotion focus might 
not have a universally positive effect on firm performance. Specifically, the positive 
performance effects of promotion focus might hold true only in high-tech industries 
rather than in low-tech industries. The performance effects of prevention focus is 




Figure 5-1: Plot of industry environment as moderator 
 
5.2.3 Robustness checks 
As robustness checks, I ran additional regression models to scrutinise the results 
from the current study. I split the sample into high-tech and low-tech group based 
on the median of the industry environment variable and then re-ran the analyses 
separately for each group. The high-tech group includes 56 firms, while the low-tech 
group includes 54 firms. As expected, the magnitude of the relationship between 
regulatory focus and firm performance varies between firms in the high-tech group 
and those in the low-tech groups. The results from sub-group analyses 
demonstrated that the promotion focus – firm performance relationship was 
significant in high-tech group (β= 0.52, p < 0.05) but non-significant in low-tech 
group (β= -0.06, n.s.). These results support the assumption that promotion focus 
has stronger effects for firms in high-tech industries than those in low-tech ones. 
The negative sign of the regression coefficient between promotion focus and the 
performance of firms in low-tech industries suggest that high levels of promotion 
focus might have detrimental effects for firms in low-tech industries. Additionally, 
the sub-group analysis indicated that the prevention focus – firm performance 
relationship was non-significant for firms in either the high-tech group (β= -0.06, 
n.s.) or in the low-tech group (β= -0.18, n.s.). This is in line with the non-findings 
that lead to the rejection of H4. The negative sign of the regression coefficient is 




5.2.4 Post-hoc test 
Because promotion and prevention focus represent two independent systems rather 
than opposite ends of a single continuum (Higgins, 1997, 1998), researchers have 
highlighted that people might have varying combinations of promotion and 
prevention focus (Lanaj et al., 2012).  Accordingly, I conducted post-hoc tests to 
examine how firm performance might differ when firms are led by CEOs with 
varying combinations of promotion and prevention focus. Consistent with prior 
studies (Kammerlander et al., 2015; Markovits, 2012; Idson et al., 2000), I used the 
median value of promotion and prevention focus to split the sample into four groups: 
(a) high promotion focus and high prevention focus; (b) high promotion focus and 
low prevention focus; (c) low promotion focus and high prevention focus; and (d) 
low promotion focus and low prevention focus. Following the taxonomy provided 
by Markovits (2012), I labelled the four groups as rationalists (34 cases), achievers 
(23 cases), conservatives (29 cases), and indifferents (24 cases), as shown in Table 
5-3. 
Table 5-3: CEOs with varying combinations of promotion and prevention focus 
  Promotion focus 





















(b) Achievers (d) Indifferents 
 
I calculated the mean values of firm performance for each of the four groups. As 
illustrated in Figure 5-2, the rationalists group achieved the highest levels of firm 
performance (3.65), whereas the conservatives group achieved the lowest levels of 
firm performance (3.34). The indifferents group (3.63) achieved higher 
performance than the group of achievers (3.48). While the four groups differ in the 
mean value of firm performance, results from ANOVA analysis suggested that the 
between groups difference is not-significant. The Partial eta squared is 0.03, 
suggesting that 3% of the variance in firm performance is accounted for by the 
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membership of different groups with varying combinations of promotion and 
prevention focus.  
 














5.3 Entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance 
 
5.3.1 Regression Models 
The results for testing Hypotheses 5 to 10 are provided in Table 5-4. The regression 
analysis used six models. Model 1 contains the control variables and the moderating 
variable. For the dummy variable of firm size and industry, I used the group of fewer 
than 10 employees and ‘other industry’ as the reference group. In Model 2, I added 
the linear terms for innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. A positive 
relationship is observed when the coefficient of the linear term is positive and 
significant, whereas a negative relationship is observed when it is negative and 
significant (Aiken et al., 1991). In Model 3, I included the squared terms for 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness to test for their nonlinear effects on 
firm performance. A U-shaped relationship is concluded when the coefficient of the 
squared term is positive and significant, whereas an inverted U-shaped relationship 
is concluded when the coefficient of the squared term is negative and significant 
(Aiken et al., 1991). I then included three separate models to test for the 
hypothesised moderating impact of industry environment. The linear and quadratic 
interaction terms for innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness were included 
in Model 4 to Model 6. In line with prior research (Kreiser et al., 2013; Aiken et al., 
1991), all independent variables were mean-centred before creating the interaction 










Table 5-4: Regressing innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness onto firm performance  
  
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: 
Model 
6: 
Constant 3.54*** 3.38*** 3.51*** 3.68*** 3.48*** 3.71*** 
Controls             
Firm age 0.10 0.21* 0.20* 0.18+ 0.21* 0.18+ 
Firm size (11-50) 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.04 
Firm size (51-250) 0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 
Manufacturing 0.31 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.31 
Service -0.01 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.26 
Environmental turbulence -0.12 -0.15 -0.20 -0.23 -0.20 -0.26+ 
Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry) 0.18* 0.16+ 0.14 -0.02 0.12 0.07 
Direct effects             
Innovativeness   -0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 
Risk-taking   -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
Proactiveness   0.35** 0.32** 0.31** 0.32** 0.22+ 
Nonlinear effects             
(Innovativeness)2     -0.19+ -0.27** -0.19+ -0.20* 
(Risk-taking)2     0.14+ 0.10 0.13 0.13+ 
(Proactiveness)2     0.05 0.07 0.05 0.01 
Interactions             
Innovativeness x Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry)     0.13     
(Innovativeness)2 x Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry)   0.27*     
Risk-taking x Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry)        0.02   
(Risk-taking)2 x Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry)        0.02   
Proactiveness x Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry)          0.25* 
(Proactiveness)2 x Industry environment (High/Low-tech industry)          0.05 
              
R² 0.10 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.28 
Adjusted R² 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.12 0.17 
ΔR²   0.09 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 
F 1.70 2.39* 2.39** 2.62** 2.04* 2.48** 
ΔF   3.69* 2.12 3.34* 0.05 2.58+ 
†p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001; unstandardized regression coefficients (two-tailed tests)     
94 
 
5.3.2 Regression Results 
Hypotheses 5 to 7 examined the independent effects of innovativeness, risk-taking, 
and proactiveness on firm performance. Hypothesis 5 predicted an inverted U-
shaped relationship between innovativeness and firm performance. As shown in 
Model 3, while the linear term of innovativeness was non-significant (β= -0.04, n.s.), 
its squared term was negatively and marginally significant (β= -0.19, p < 0.10) 
related to firm performance, providing support for Hypothesis 5. As illustrated in 
Figure 5-3a, innovativeness was initially positively associated with firm 
performance, but the benefits start to diminish when the levels of innovativeness 
shift from moderate to high levels.  
Hypothesis 6 posited an inverted U-shaped relationship between risk-taking and 
firm performance. As also shown in Model 3, while the linear term of risk-taking 
was non-significant (β= -0.02, n.s.), its squared term was positively and marginally 
significant (β= 0.14, p < 0.10) related to firm performance. The results suggest that 
the relationship between risk-taking and firm performance was in the opposite 
direction. Hence, Hypothesis 6 was not supported. As Figure 5-3b shows, firm 
performance decreases slightly for firms with increasing levels of risk-taking, before 
increasing again when the levels of risk-taking shift from moderate to high levels. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted an inverted U-shaped relationship between proactiveness 
and firm performance. As shown in Model 3, the linear term of proactiveness was 
positive and significant (β= 0.32, p < 0.01), while its squared term was non-
significant (β= 0.05, n.s.), suggesting that the relationship between proactiveness 
and firm performance is linear rather than the proposed inverted-U shaped.  As 
such, Hypothesis 7 was not supported. Figure 5-3c illustrates that increasing levels 
of proactiveness lead to better performance. The linear term of proactiveness 
explained an additional 9% (Model 2) of the variance in firm performance beyond 
that explained by controls (Model 1). The curvilinear teams of innovativeness and 
risk-taking together explained an additional 5% of the variance in firm performance 
(Model 3). Together, the three dimensions of EO account for 14% of the total 
variance in the performance of SMEs. 
95 
 
Hypotheses 8 to 10 tested the moderating effect of industry environment on the 
relationship between the individual dimensions of EO and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 8 proposed that the independent effects of innovativeness will be 
stronger for firms in low-tech industries than those in high-tech ones. As shown in 
Model 4, the linear innovativeness - industry environment interaction term was 
non-significant (β= 0.13, n.s.), while the squared interaction term was significant 
(β= 0.27, p < 0.05), providing support for Hypothesis 8. Figure 5-4a illustrated the 
moderating effect of industry environment on the innovativeness – firm 
performance relationship between high-tech and low-tech industries. As shown in 
the figure, the effect of innovativeness on firm performance is more pronounced 
within low-tech industries.  
Hypothesis 9 hypothesised that the independent effects of risk-taking will be 
stronger for firms in high-tech industries than those in low-tech ones. As shown in 
Model 5, neither the linear (β= 0.02, n.s.) innovativeness and industry environment 
interaction term nor the squared (β= 0.02, n.s.) interaction term was non-
significant. As such, Hypothesis 9 was not supported. As shown in Figure 5-4b, risk-
taking has similar effects for SMEs in high-tech industries and those in low-tech 
industries.  
Hypothesis 10 posited that the independent effects of proactiveness will be stronger 
for firms in high-tech than those in low-tech industries. As shown in Model 6, the 
linear proactiveness – industry environment interaction term was significant (β= 
0.25, p < 0.05), while the squared interaction was non-significant (β= 0.05, n.s.). 
This result implies that industry environment only moderates the linear 
relationship between proactiveness and firm performance without playing a 
moderating role on the proposed inverted U-shaped relationship. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 10 was not supported. As Figure 5-4c shows, the relationship between 
proactiveness and firm performance is stronger for firms in high-tech industries 
than those in low-tech industries. Together, the results demonstrate that the 
explanatory power of innovativeness and proactiveness, with the exception of risk-
taking, was enhanced when industry environment was included as the moderator. 
In particular, compared to Model 3, the moderation model of innovativeness (i.e., 
Model 4) and proactiveness (i.e., Model 6) explained an extra 5% and 4% of the 





Figure 5-3a-c: Plot of the effects of the dimensions of EO on firm performance 
 
Figure 5-4a-c: Plot of industry environment as moderator  
 
5.2.3 Robustness checks 
I ran additional regression models as robustness checks to scrutinise the results 
from the current study. The regression results demonstrated that the relationship 
between risk-taking and firm performance was U-shaped rather than the proposed 
inverted U-shaped relationship. Because researchers have highlighted that there is 
a “potential for an S-shape or a series of inverse-U relationships between EO and 
performance” (Tang et al., 2008, p. 232), I suspect that the risk-taking and firm 
performance relationship may be more complex than originally anticipated. To 
further probe the performance effects of risk-taking and to identify potential causes 
for the non-findings, I first created a cubed risk-taking term. I then entered the 
cubed term into a new regression model after the inclusion of the linear and squared 
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terms to test for a potential S-shaped relationship between risk-taking and firm 
performance. The regression results for the cubed risk-taking term was non-
significant (β= 0.01, n.s.), suggesting the risk-taking and firm performance 
relationship is quadratic rather than cubic.  
I then split the sample into high-tech and low-tech groups based on the median of 
the industry environment variable and then re-ran the analyses separately for each 
group. The high-tech group includes 56 firms, while the low-tech group includes 54 
firms. As expected, the magnitude of the relationship between the individual EO 
dimensions and firm performance vary between high-tech and low-tech group. 
Firstly, the results from sub-group analysis reveal that the relationship between the 
squared innovativeness term and firm performance was insignificant within high-
tech group (β= -0.09, n.s.) but significant within low-tech group (β= -0.48, p < 0.05). 
This finding provides further support that innovativeness has more pronounced 
effects on firms in low-tech than those in high-tech industries.  
Secondly, the relationship between the squared risk-taking term and firm 
performance was marginally significant within the high-tech group (β= 0.22, p < 
0.1) but insignificant within the low-tech group (β= 0.10, n.s.). While this result 
from the sub-group analysis suggests that risk-taking has more pronounced effects 
on firms in high-tech than low-tech industries, a significant result was not observed 
from the full sample. Accordingly, the moderating effect of industry environment 
on the relationship between risk-taking and firm performance remains inconclusive.   
Thirdly, the linear relationship between proactiveness and firm performance was 
significant within the high-tech group (β= 0.39, p < 0.05) but insignificant within 
the low-tech group (β= 0.29, n.s.). The relationship between the squared 
proactiveness term and firm performance was neither significant in the high-tech 
(β= 0.02, n.s.) nor in the low-tech groups (β= 0.01, n.s.). Together, these results 
suggest that the proactiveness - firm performance relationship is linear rather than 
the proposed inverted U-shaped. Also, the performance effect of proactiveness is 
greater on firms in high-tech than those in low-tech industries. 
Given the debate about whether EO represents a unidimensional or 
multidimensional construct, I performed an ad-hoc analysis to assess the effect of 
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the unidimensional EO on firm performance. The EO construct was measured by 
taking the average of its three dimensions. It was then mean centred before creating 
the squared term of EO and the interaction term with industry environment. I then 
ran three additional models. The first model includes the controls (same as in Model 
1 in Table 5-2) and the linear EO term. The squared EO term was added in the 
second model, while the linear and squared interaction terms of EO and industry 
environment were included in the third model.  
The results demonstrate that the overall effect of EO on firm performance was 
positive and marginally significant (β= 0.23, p < 0.10). In the second model that 
includes both the linear and squared EO term. While the linear term was positive 
and marginally significant (β= 0.24, p < 0.10), the squared term was not significant 
(β= 0.05, n.s.), suggesting that the EO – firm performance relationship is linear 
rather than curvilinear. In the final model that includes both the linear and squared 
interaction terms, the linear interaction term was marginally significant (β= 0.24, p 
< 0.10), while the squared term was not significant (β= 0.17, n.s.), suggesting that 
EO has stronger performance effects on firms in high-tech than those in low-tech 
industries. Together, these results demonstrated that the performance implications 
of EO differ substantially, depending upon whether EO is conceptualised as a 










5.4 Regulatory focus and entrepreneurial orientation 
5.4.1 Regression models 
The results for testing Hypotheses 11 to 16 are provided in Table 5-5. The regression 
analysis used six models. In Models 1-2, the dependent variable is innovativeness, 
whereas in Models 3-4, the dependent variable is risk-taking. In Models 5-6, the 
dependent variable is proactiveness. Models 1, 3, and 5 contain only the control 
variables. The predicting variables promotion and prevention focus were added in 


















Table 5-5: Regressing innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness onto promotion and prevention focus   
  Innovativeness   Risk-taking     Proactiveness 
  Model 1: Model 2:   Model 3: Model 4:   Model 5: Model 6: 
Constant 0.49 -0.59   2.55** 2.94**   3.12*** 1.96* 
Controls                 
CEO age 0.01 0.01   -0.01 0.00   -0.01 0.00 
CEO tenure 0.05 0.04   0.14+ 0.14+   0.07 0.05 
Firm age (log) -0.06 0.01   -0.38** -0.33*   -0.38** -0.28* 
Firm size (11-50) 0.26 0.24   -0.11 -0.13   0.42+ 0.39 
Firm size (51-250) 0.49* 0.44+   0.35 0.34   0.83** 0.77** 
Manufacturing 0.04 0.04   -0.23 -0.20   0.25 0.26 
Service -0.14 -0.04   -0.53* -0.46+   -0.62** -0.49* 
Environmental turbulence 0.61* 0.57*   0.38** 0.38**   0.27* 0.22+ 
Direct effects                 
Promotion focus   0.34*     -0.01     0.40* 
Prevention focus   -0.14     -0.18+     -0.22* 
                  
R² 0.29 0.33   0.21 0.23   0.33 0.39 
Adjusted R² 0.23 0.26   0.15 0.16   0.27 0.33 
ΔR²   0.04     0.03     0.06 
F 5.12*** 4.88***   3.32** 3.01**   6.16*** 6.29*** 
ΔF   3.07+     1.62     4.91** 
†p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001; unstandardized regression coefficients (two-tailed tests)   
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5.4.2 Regression results 
Hypotheses 11 to 13 examined the effects of promotion focus on firms’ levels of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. Hypothesis 11 stated that 
promotion focus would be positively associated with innovativeness. As shown 
in Model 2, there is a significant positive relationship between promotion focus 
and innovativeness (β= 0.34, p < 0.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 11 is supported. 
Hypothesis 12 proposed that promotion focus would be positively associated 
with risk-taking. However, results do not provide support for Hypothesis 12. As 
shown in Model 4, the relationship between promotion focus and risk-taking is 
non-significant (β= -0.01, n.s.). Hypothesis 13 predicted that promotion focus 
would be positively associated with proactiveness. Results in Model 6 indicate a 
significant positive relationship between promotion focus and proactiveness (β= 
0.40, p < 0.05), providing support for Hypothesis 13.  
Hypotheses 14 to 16 assessed the influences of prevention focus on firms’ levels 
of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. Hypothesis 14 stated that 
prevention focus would be negatively associated with innovativeness. Results in 
Model 2 demonstrate that while there is a negative relationship between 
prevention focus and innovativeness as predicted, the relationship is non-
significant (β= -0.14, n.s.). Hence, Hypothesis 14 is not supported. Hypothesis 15 
proposed that prevention focus would be negatively associated with risk-taking. 
Results in Model 4 demonstrate a marginally significant negative relationship 
between prevention focus and risk-taking (β= -0.18, p < 0.10), providing support 
for Hypothesis 15. Hypothesis 16 predicted that prevention focus would be 
negatively associated with proactiveness. Results in Model 6 revealed a 
significant negative relationship between prevention focus and proactiveness 
(β= -0.22, p < 0.05), providing support for Hypothesis 16. 
Compared to the baseline models (i.e., Models 1, 3, and 5), which contain only 
the control variables, the models that include promotion and prevention focus as 
predictors (i.e., 2, 4, and 6) have a higher explanatory power in elucidating the 
variance in firms’ levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. In 
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particular, promotion focus explained an additional 4% of the variance in firms’ 
levels of innovativeness (Model 2) while prevention focus explained an 
additional 3% of the variance in firms’ levels of risk-taking (Model 4). 
Additionally, promotion and prevention together explained an additional 6% of 
the variance in firms’ levels of proactiveness (Model 6).  
5.4.3 Post-hoc test 
Similar to the regulatory focus – firm performance relationship, I also conducted 
post-hoc test to examine how firms’ level of innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness might differ when they are led by CEOs with varying combinations 
of promotion and prevention focus. I first calculated the mean values of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness for each of the four groups. The 
results are shown in Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6: Comparing the means of innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness 
Group Innovativeness Risk-taking Proactiveness 
Rationalists  
(High promotion focus /  
high prevention focus) 
3.51 2.78 3.39 
Achievers 
(High promotion focus /  
low prevention focus)  
3.65 3.30 3.57 
Conservatives  
(Low promotion focus /  
high prevention focus)  
3.11 2.56 2.71 
Indifferents  
(Low promotion focus /  
low prevention focus) 
3.03 2.90 3.19 
Group total mean 3.33 2.86 3.21 
To examine whether groups with high promotion focus will exhibit higher levels 
of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness than groups with low 
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promotion focus, I compared the groups between rationalists and conservatives, 
as well as the groups between achievers and indifferents. As shown in Table 5-6 
and illustrated in Figure 5-5, the rationalists group exhibited higher levels of 
innovativeness, risk-taking and proactiveness than the conservatives group. 
Similar results are also observed when comparing the achievers group with the 
indifferents group. Together, these results are consistent with the assumption 
that CEOs with high levels of promotion focus should positively affect firms’ 
levels of innovativeness, risk-taking and proactiveness (Hypothesis 11 to 13). 
While H12 was non-significant, based on the regression results reported in 
section 5.4.2, the results from mean comparisons provide some support that 
promotion focus should have a positive impact on firms’ levels of risk-taking.  
To examine whether groups with high prevention focus would exhibit lower 
levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness than groups with low 
prevention focus, I compare the groups between rationalists and achievers, as 
well as the groups between conservatives and indifferents. As illustrated in 
Figure 5-5, the rationalists group exhibited lower levels of risk-taking and 
proactiveness than the achivers group. Similar findings were also observed when 
comparing the conservatives group with the indifferents group. Together, these 
results are in line with the assumption that CEOs with high levels of prevention 
focus should negatively impacts firms’ levels of risk-taking and proactiveness 
(Hypothesis 15 and 16). The innovativeness of rationalists group (3.51) is lower 
than the achievers group (3.65), which is consistent with arguments leading to 
Hypothesis 14. Nevertheless, the opposite result is observed when comparing the 
innovativeness between the conservatives group (3.11) and the indifferents group 
(3.03). This inconsistent result might underlie the non-significant findings that 
led to the rejection of H14, as reported in section 5.4.2. 
Results from ANOVA analysis suggest the between groups difference for 
innovativeness (p < 0.05), risk-taking (p < 0.10), and proactiveness (p < 0.05) 
are all significant, suggesting that firms that are led by CEOs with varying 
combinations of promotion and prevention focus differ significantly in their 
levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. The Partial eta squared 
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is 0.09 for innovativeness, 0.07 for risk-taking, and 0.12 for proactiveness. In 
other words, 9% of the variance in innovativeness, 7% of the variance in risk-
taking, and 12% of the variance in proactiveness is accounted for by the 
membership of different groups with varying combinations of promotion and 
prevention focus.   
 
 









The results from hypothesis testing are summarised in Table 5-7. Hypotheses 1-
4 examined the performance effects of promotion and prevention focus and 
tested how they differ between firms in high-tech industries and those in low-
tech industries. The empirical results provide some support for the effects of 
promotion and prevention focus on firm performance. Whilst industry 
environment moderates the promotion focus – firm performance relationship, a 
similar moderation effect was not observed for the prevention focus – firm 
performance relationship. 
Hypotheses 5 to 10 examined the performance effects of innovativeness, risk-
taking, and proactiveness on firm performance and tested how they differ 
between firms in high-tech industries and those in low-tech industries. While the 
empirical results provide some support for the hypothesised relationships, the 
nature of the performance effects of risk-taking and proactiveness differs from 
the predictions offered in the current study. Also, the proposed moderating 
effects of industry environment on the relationships between risk-taking and 
firm performance as well as the relationship between proactiveness and firm 
performance are not supported by this study.   
Hypotheses 11 to 16 assessed the effects of promotion and prevention focus on 
firms’ levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. Promotion focus 
positively impacts firms’ levels of innovativeness and proactiveness, excepting 
risk-taking. By contrast, prevention focus negatively impacts firms’ levels of risk-
taking and proactiveness, excepting innovativeness. In the next chapter, I discuss 
the implications of these results, the potential explanations for the non-findings, 
and how these results are related to and also contribute to existing literature in 
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Regulatory focus  Innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness 
Hypothesis 11 Promotion focus  Innovativeness + Yes 
Hypothesis 12 Promotion focus  Risk-taking + No 
Hypothesis 13 Promotion focus  Proactiveness + Yes 
Hypothesis 14 Prevention focus Innovativeness - No 
Hypothesis 15 Prevention focus Risk-taking - Yes 
Hypothesis 16 Prevention focus Proactiveness - Yes 
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Chapter 6 Discussions and Conclusions 
This study aimed to enhance our understanding of how CEO regulatory focus and 
firms’ entrepreneurial orientation (i.e., innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness) impacts SMEs. To understand the organisational outcomes of 
SMEs, the regulatory focus of CEOs is an important factor to consider. This is 
because regulatory focus impacts people’s decision making (Higgins 1997, 1998). 
As firms’ top decision makers, CEOs’ decisions, induced by regulatory focus, 
should have an impact on firms they lead. While studies have suggested that the 
regulatory focus of CEOs or entrepreneurs is associated with the performance of 
small firms (Hmieleski and Baron, 2008; Wallace et al., 2010), how their links 
differ between firms operating in different industry environments (i.e., high-tech 
versus low-tech industries) remained unclear. Additionally, although empirical 
evidence has shown that CEO regulatory focus impacts the behaviours of large 
firms (Gamache et al., 2015; Greenbaum, 2015; Chen et al., 2017), little is known 
about the influences of regulatory focus on the entrepreneurial behaviours of 
SMEs. Therefore, the current study examined the performance effects of CEO 
regulatory focus on SMEs that operate in different industry environments as well 
as how CEO regulatory focus shapes the entrepreneurial behaviours of SMEs. 
This study also examined EO because it has been found that EO has profound 
impacts on firm performance (Rauch et al., 2009). Although a number of studies 
have revealed that the individual dimensions of EO are associated with firm 
performance (Hughes and Morgan, 2007; Kreiser et al., 2013), the nature of their 
links remain unclear because the empirical evidence has been mixed. 
Additionally, while researchers have suggested that EO is more beneficial for 
firms in high-tech industries (Rauch et al., 2009), it is less clear whether the 
three dimensions of EO will share similar effects when they are examined 
independently. Hence, the current study examined the performance effects of the 




6.1 Discussions and contributions 
 
6.1.1 Regulatory focus and firm performance  
The first research question was about how CEO regulatory focus impacts the 
performance of SMEs and how the effects vary between SMEs in high-tech 
industries and those in low-tech industries (Hypotheses 1 to 4). This study found 
that CEO regulatory focus is associated with the performance of SMEs. In 
particular, the empirical results indicate that CEO promotion focus positively 
(Hypothesis 1) and CEO prevention focus negatively (Hypothesis 2) impact SME 
performance. These results are in line with the findings of Wallace et al., (2010), 
who showed that CEO promotion focus is positively, and CEO prevention focus 
negatively associated with small firm performance. 
Additionally, the results demonstrate that the performance effect of CEO 
promotion focus differs between SMEs operating in different industry 
environments. Specifically, the performance effect of CEO promotion focus is 
stronger for SMEs in high-tech industries than those in low-tech industries 
(Hypothesis 3). CEOs with high levels of promotion focus should induce their 
firms to embrace changes and seek new opportunities (Liberman et al., 1999; 
Chernev, 2004; Fuglestad et al., 2008), implying that such firms have higher 
levels of flexibility. Because the high-tech industries are associated with high 
rates and magnitudes of changes (Wang et al., 2015; Fainshmidt et al., 2016), the 
flexibility induced by promotion focus is thus more beneficial for firms that 
operate in the high-tech industries. The results from the present study are 
consistent with previous  empirical evidence from Hmieleski and Baron (2008), 
who showed that within a dynamic environment, promotion focus has positive 
effects on new venture performance, whereas in a stable environment, 
promotion focus has no significant effects on new venture performance.  
However, the performance effects of CEO prevention focus do not differ between 
SMEs in high-tech and those in low-tech industries (Hypothesis 4). CEOs with 
high levels of prevention focus should orient their firms to maintain status quo 
(Liberman et al., 1999; Chernev, 2004; Fuglestad et al., 2008), which may lead 
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to rigidity and hinder firm performance. Indeed, researchers have highlighted 
that “being rigid toward change (prevention focus) significantly reduces 
performance” (Hmieleski and Baron 2008, p. 295). Because the high-tech 
industries are more dynamic than the low-tech ones, the suggestion is that being 
rigid to change might be more harmful to firms that operate in the high-tech 
industries. As such, I suspected that the effects of CEO prevention focus would 
be stronger for firms in high-tech industries than those in low-tech ones. The 
non-findings might be partly because people can have varying combinations of 
promotion and prevention focus (Lanaj et al., 2012; Markovits, 2012; 
Kammerlander et al., 2015), implying that the effect of prevention focus might 
be attenuated by respective CEOs’ levels of promotion focus. 
While results from the full sample suggested an overall positive impact of CEO 
promotion focus and overall negative impact of CEO prevention focus on SME 
performance, the supplement sub-group analysis (i.e., separating firms in high-
tech and those in low-tech industries into two groups) revealed a slightly 
different picture. In particular, the results suggest that for SMEs in high-tech 
industries, high levels of CEO promotion focus positively impact firm 
performance. This is consistent with the prediction offered in the current study. 
While the relationship between CEO prevention focus and SME performance is 
not significant in the sub-group analysis, the negative sign of the coefficient is 
also consistent with the hypothesis, which suggests that high levels of CEO 
prevention focus should negatively impact firm performance.  
On the other hand, for SMEs in low-tech industries, the negative sign of the 
coefficient between CEO promotion focus and firm performance is quite 
surprising because it implies that high levels of CEO promotion focus may have 
detrimental effects on SMEs, although their relationship is not significant. The 
negative performance effect of CEO promotion focus is in contrast to prior 
research findings suggesting that CEO promotion focus positively impacts small 
firm performance (Wallace et al., 2010). Moreover, although the CEO prevention 
focus - SME performance is not significant, the negative sign of the coefficient is 
in line with the hypothesis, which suggests a negative effect of CEO prevention 
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focus on SME performance. Taken together, the results from the sub-group 
analysis have two important implications. Firstly, the performance effect of CEO 
promotion focus differs between firms that operate in different industry 
environments. Secondly, increasing levels of promotion focus might not generate 
universally positive effects on organisations, as suggested by prior studies (e.g., 
Wallace et al., 2010). As such, further research is still needed to probe the 
performance effects of CEO regulatory focus on organisations.  
This study also assessed how CEOs with varying combinations of promotion 
focus and prevention focus impact firm performance (see the post-hoc test). 
Following previous studies (Markovits, 2012; Kammerlander et al., 2015), CEOs 
were categorised into four groups: high promotion and high prevention focus 
(rationalists), high promotion and low prevention focus (achievers), low 
promotion and high prevention focus (conservatives), and low promotion and 
low prevention focus (indifferents). The results from the post-hoc test revealed 
that firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of both promotion and prevention 
focus achieved the best performance (rationalists group: 3.65). This is followed 
by the group with low levels of both promotion and prevention focus (indifferents 
group: 3.63), and then the group with high promotion and low prevention 
(achievers group: 3.48). Firms that are led by CEOs with low promotion focus 
and high prevention focus achieved the lowest performance (conservatives group: 
3.34). Since the rationalists group achieved better performance than the 
remaining three groups, such results implicitly suggest that both promotion and 
prevention focus might be necessary for the success of organisations. This is 
because high promotion focus might induce firms to explore new opportunities, 
whereas high prevention focus might orient firms to conduct the due diligence 
that can enhance their chance of success in exploiting identified opportunities 
(Brockner et al., 2004). 
Together, the above results generated from this study have several important 
contributions to research on regulatory focus theory. Firstly, in contrast to 
previous research suggesting that high levels of promotion focus have universally 
positive impact on firm performance (Wallace et al., 2010), the current study 
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reveals that the positive performance effect of promotion focus is contingent on 
the industry environment in which firms operate. Specifically, the results from 
sub-group analysis demonstrate that the positive effects of promotion focus 
might hold true only for SMEs in high-tech industries. As such, this study 
extends previous works by showing that, in addition to environmental dynamism 
(Hmieleski and Baron, 2008; Wallace et al., 2010), the industry environment 
(e.g., high-tech versus low-tech industries) in which firms operate also interacted 
with promotion focus in affecting SME performance. For example, firms in high-
tech industries might achieve better performance when they are aligned with 
CEOs with high levels of promotion focus.   
Secondly, in contrast to previous held views that high levels of prevention focus 
only have negative impacts on firm performance (Hmieleski and Baron, 2008; 
Wallace et al., 2010), the results from post-hoc tests suggest that the negative 
effects of prevention focus might only occur when the respective CEOs’ levels of 
promotion focus are low. In other words, high levels of prevention focus might 
be beneficial for organisations when it is accompanied by high levels of 
promotion focus. This also implies that to realise the positive potential of high 
promotion focus, it is paramount that the respective CEOs’ prevention focus is 
high. The current study represents one of the first works to provide empirical 
evidence supporting the suggestion that “both promotion and prevention foci are 
necessary for entrepreneurial success” (Brockner et al., 2004, p. 204).  
Thirdly, through examining how SME performance differs between firms that 
are led by CEOs with varying combinations of promotion and prevention, the 
current study addressed the call from Lanaj et al., (2012) to consider the potential 
interplay between promotion and prevention focus. Indeed, the results from the 
current study demonstrated that examining the performance effects of 
promotion and prevention focus separately might not reveal their real impacts 
on SMEs. For example, the regression results suggested that promotion focus 
positively and prevention focus negatively influences firm performance. 
Nevertheless, the post-hoc test uncovered that firms that are led by CEOs with 
high levels of promotion and prevention focus achieved the best performance. 
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Accordingly, future studies that examine the effects of regulatory focus are 
encouraged to consider how promotion and prevention focus interplay in 
affecting firm outcomes rather than examining them separately. 
6.1.2 Entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance  
The second research question was about how SMEs’ levels of innovativeness, 
risk-taking, and proactiveness affect firm performance and how the effects differ 
between SMEs in high-tech industries and those in low-tech ones (Hypotheses 5 
to 10). A number of empirical studies have shown an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the unidimensional EO and firm performance (Tang et al., 
2008; Su et al., 2011; Wales et al., 2013c), suggesting that moderate levels of EO 
will lead to better performance. Because the unidimensional EO represents the 
shared variance among innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness, I thus 
suspected that when the three dimensions of EO are examined separately, they 
may share a similar inverted U-shaped relationship with SME performance. The 
results of this study, however, demonstrate that each EO dimension has unique 
effects on SME performance.  
As predicted (Hypothesis 5), the empirical results indicate that there is an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between innovativeness and firm performance. 
That is, that up to a certain point increasing levels of innovativeness can enhance 
firm performance, but that beyond that point further increases in innovativeness 
are associated with diminishing returns. This result suggests that SMEs are more 
likely to obtain better performance when their innovativeness is at moderate 
levels than at either high or low levels. In contrast to the hypothesised inverted 
U-shaped relationship between risk-taking and firm performance (Hypothesis 6), 
the findings revealed a U-shaped relationship. It appears that when shifting from 
low to moderate levels of risk-taking, firm performance decreases slightly; and 
that it starts to increase again when shifting from moderate to high levels of risk-
taking. Additionally, the empirical results displayed a positive linear relationship 
between proactiveness and firm performance rather than the proposed inverted 
U-shaped relationship (Hypothesis 7). Together, the results indicate that the 
three dimensions of EO have non-uniform relationships with firm performance. 
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Without assessing innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness independently, 
their unique effects are unlikely to be uncovered. 
While the proposed inverted U-shaped relationship between risk-taking and firm 
performance is not supported in this study, similar non-findings have been 
observed in prior research. Specifically, Kreiser et al., (2013) proposed an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between risk-taking and SMEs’ perceived sales 
growth. However, their results revealed that risk-taking exhibited a negative U-
shaped relationship with the perceived sales growth. As Kreiser et al., (2013, p. 
287) pointed out, “risk-taking behaviors frequently do not represent a 
worthwhile endeavour for smaller firms; rather, SMEs exhibiting very low levels 
of risk-taking may be able to enjoy high levels of performance”. Likewise, while 
the proposed inverted U-shaped relationship between proactiveness and SME 
performance is not supported, the linear result is consistent with those found in 
Hughes and Morgan (2007), who showed that within young High-tech firms, 
proactiveness displayed a positive linear relationship with firm performance. I 
proposed an inverted U-shaped relationship between proactiveness and SME 
performance because although being highly proactive allows firms to capitalise 
on new product opportunities, potential costs are associated with such efforts. 
The positive linear relationship identified in this study implies that the potential 
benefits and advantages that might be generated through being proactive should 
outweigh the potential costs involved.  
Furthermore, the empirical results demonstrated that the performance effects of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness differ between SMEs in high-tech 
industries and those in low-tech industries. This finding is consistent with 
Lumpkin and Dess’s (1996, p. 140) assertion that the importance of EO 
dimensions “may vary independently in a given context”. In particular, this study 
found that, as expected, innovativeness has stronger performance effects on 
SMEs in low-tech than those in high-tech industries (Hypothesis 8). Prior 
research has shown that the levels of EO are higher in small firms in high-tech 
industries than those in low-tech ones (Covin et al., 1990), implicitly suggesting 
that innovativeness, one dimension of EO, should also be higher for firms in 
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high-tech industries. As such, innovativeness is less of a differentiator for SMEs 
in high-tech industries (Linton and Kask, 2017) because such firms are already 
associated with high levels of innovativeness. In other words, SMEs in high-tech 
industries are less likely to reap significant benefits from increasing levels of 
innovativeness. By contrast, the opposite is true for firms in low-tech industries, 
which is often associated with low level of innovativeness. Accordingly, 
increasing levels of innovativeness will have more pronounced performance 
effects on such high-tech firms. 
While industry environment does not moderate the risk-taking and SME 
performance relationship in the full sample (Hypothesis 9), the results from sub-
group analysis revealed that, as predicted, risk-taking has stronger performance 
effects for firms within high-tech industries than those in low-tech industries. 
Hence, further study is still required to examine whether the performance effects 
of risk-taking vary between firms in different industry environments. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that proactiveness has stronger performance 
effects on SMEs in high-tech industries than those in low-tech ones (Hypothesis 
10). Since the high-tech industries are associated with high rates of market and 
technological changes (Moriarty and Kosnik, 1989; Qian and Li, 2003; 
Szymanski et al., 2007), firms’ existing products should become obsolete more 
quickly in such industries. The opposite is true for firms in low-tech industries, 
which are more stable. Accordingly, being highly proactive is more important for 
SMEs in high-tech industries than those in low-tech ones. As a result, increasing 
levels of proactiveness have more pronounced effects for SMEs in high-tech than 
those in low-tech industries. 
Together, the empirical findings generated from this study above have three 
important contributions to EO research. Firstly, this study extends prior work by 
demonstrating that innovativeness (inverted U-shaped), risk-taking (U-shaped), 
and proactiveness (positive linear) have unique performance effects on SMEs. As 
such, the empirical results demonstrate a non-uniform relationship between the 
dimensions of EO and SME performance. These findings are in contrast with to 
those found in prior studies which suggest a uniform linear relationship between 
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EO dimensions and firm performance (Swierczek and Ha, 2003; Hughes and 
Morgan, 2007) or a uniform curvilinear relationship between them (Kreiser et 
al., 2013). 
Secondly, this study uncovers that the performance effects of innovativeness, 
risk-taking, and proactiveness differ between SMEs in high-tech and those in 
low-tech industries. While researchers have suggested that EO “pays off more” 
in high-tech than nonhigh-tech industries (Rauch et al., 2009), this study 
provides empirical evidence showing that this might not hold true when 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness are examined independently. 
Specifically, this study revealed that innovativeness has stronger performance 
effects for SMEs in low-tech industries. By contrast, proactiveness has stronger 
performance effects for SMEs in high-tech industries. The results from sub-
group analysis also provide some support that the performance effects of risk-
taking are more salient for SMEs in high-tech industries, although significant 
findings were not observed in the full sample. By examining the moderating 
effect of industry environment on the relationships between EO dimensions and 
SME performance, this study addresses the call by Rauch et al. (2009) to 
investigate how the performance effects of EO are contingent on the industry 
environment in which firms operate.  
Thirdly, this study contributes to EO research by demonstrating that the 
performance implications of EO vary significantly depending on whether EO is 
conceptualised as a unidimensional or a multidimensional construct. This study 
examined EO as a multidimensional construct and found that each dimension of 
EO has unique effects on SME performance. Also, the significance of each 
dimension is dependent on the industry environment in which firms operate. 
Results from the post-hoc analyses revealed that the unidimensional EO is 
positively related to SME performance. Also, it is more beneficial for SMEs in 
high-tech industries. Accordingly, without examining innovativeness, risk-
taking, and proactiveness independently, insights about their unique 
performance effects and how they differ between firms in different industry 
environments cannot be uncovered. As Dai et al.,, (2014) noted, when the 
 116 
 
individual dimensions of EO are combined, their independent influences are 
likely to be distorted or concealed.  
6.1.3 Regulatory focus and entrepreneurial orientation 
The final research question was about how CEO regulatory focus affects SMEs’ 
levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. This study found that 
CEO regulatory focus has substantial effects on the three dimensions of EO. The 
empirical results are largely in line with the upper echelons theory, which 
suggests that CEO characteristics significantly influence the outcomes of 
organisations (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Such findings are 
not surprising given that CEOs are the primary decision makers within their 
organisations, and that CEOs’ decisions induced by regulatory focus should have 
an impact on organisations they lead (Finkelstein et al., 2009). For example, 
CEOs’ decisions and motivations might manifest themselves through the 
entrepreneurial activities undertaken by the firms they lead. 
This study revealed that CEO promotion focus positively impacts firms’ levels of 
innovativeness (Hypothesis 11) and proactiveness (Hypothesis 13). The findings 
are largely in line with the regulatory focus theory that suggests that promotion 
focused people are more willing to consider alternatives and initiate changes 
(Brockner et al., 2004; Liberman et al., 1999), which tend to be the prerequisite 
for firms to innovate and be proactive (Musteen et al., 2010). These findings 
extend previous studies that have shown that promotion focus is positively 
associated with the innovativeness of opportunities identified by entrepreneurs 
(Tumasjan and Braun, 2012). In particular, the results uncover that high levels 
of CEO promotion focus induce firms to support new ideas and experimentation 
that are the essence of innovation. Additionally, the findings go beyond prior 
research by demonstrating that for firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of 
promotion focus, in addition to introducing more new products (Greenbaum, 
2015), such firms also have higher tendencies to introduce products ahead of the 
competition as indicated by higher levels of proactiveness. 
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Contrary to expectations, CEO promotion focus did not significantly impact 
firms’ levels of risk-taking (Hypothesis 12). This is surprising given that prior 
studies have shown that promotion focused people are more risk tolerant in their 
financial investment decisions under experimental settings (Florack and 
Hartmann, 2007); and that firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of 
promotion focus engage in more exploration activities that involve higher risks 
(Kammerlander et al., 2015). One potential explanation for the non-finding 
might be due to the resource constrains faced by SMEs. Specifically, risk-taking 
requires firms to venture into the unknown and commit significant resources to 
initiatives with uncertain outcomes (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Wiklund and 
Shepherd, 2003; Rauch et al., 2009).  
Indeed, researchers have highlighted that firms that have high levels of excess 
resources can afford to engage in projects that involve more risk as the slack 
resources can buffer potential failure in their risk-taking efforts (Wiseman and 
Bromiley, 1996). Rosenbusch et al., (2013, p. 649) concur that “firms are more 
likely to take risks if they possess the resources to absorb potential losses”. 
Empirical evidence has shown that firms’ level of excess resources is positively 
associated with firms’ risk-taking (Singh, 1986). Among SMEs, however, it is 
likely that few of them will have excess resources because they tend to be resource 
short. Prior research has highlighted that “resource constraints often lead to 
SMEs to be more risk-averse and less willing to invest in new technologies than 
larger firms” (OECD, 2017, p. 8). As a result, although SMEs that are led by CEOs 
with high levels of promotion focus are more risk tolerant, it is possible that 
resource constraints can hinder their capabilities to commit resources to risk-
taking. In other words, the lack of resources might attenuate the effect of CEO 
promotion focus on SMEs’ levels of risk-taking.  
This study also revealed that CEO prevention focus negatively impacts firms’ 
levels of risk-taking (Hypothesis 15) and proactiveness (Hypothesis 16). The 
empirical findings are consistent with regulatory focus theory that suggests that 
a prevention focus is associated with risk-aversion and a tendency to retain 
stability (Liberman et al., 1999; Florack and Hartmann, 2007; Hamstra et al., 
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2011), because the underlying need for prevention focused people is to ensure 
safety (Higgins, 1997, 1998). The findings demonstrate that firms that are led by 
CEOs with high levels of prevention focus are less likely to engage in risk-taking. 
As such, the results extend those by Kammerlander et al., (2015), who has shown 
that CEO prevention focus negatively influences exploration activities which 
imply risk-taking, because the exploration process entails uncertain outcomes 
(March, 1991). Moreover, the results complement prior studies that have found 
that CEO prevention focus negatively influences firms’ numbers of new product 
introduction (Greenbaum, 2015). In particular, the findings show that high levels 
of CEOs’ prevention focus induce firms to be less proactive in introducing new 
products ahead of the competition. Taken together, the findings are not 
surprising given that committing resources to risky initiatives and acting in 
anticipation of future market demands all entail significant uncertainties, as such 
efforts may fail to yield positive outcomes that, in turn, threaten prevention 
focused people’s needs for safety.  
The non-significance of the hypothesised relationship between CEO prevention 
focus and firms’ levels of innovativeness (Hypothesis 14) is also interesting. I 
proposed that CEO prevention focus would negatively impact firms’ levels of 
innovativeness based on the consideration that prevention focused people prefer 
maintaining status quo (Brockner et al., 2004; Liberman et al., 1999).  This is 
likely to hinder innovation because innovation requires change and 
experimenting with new alternatives (Rosenbusch et al., 2011). While this study 
did not find a significant effect on innovativeness, the negative sign in the 
regression result is consistent with the hypothesis. The non-finding might by 
explained as follows. Researchers have highlighted that in the situation of 
experiencing loss, prevention focused people might deviate from their preferred 
practice to regain adequate status (Scholer et al., 2010; Collins, 2016). Following 
the same line, it is also possible that changes in the market environment (e.g., 
threats from competitors) might trigger prevention focused CEOs to deviate from 
their preferred stability and facilitate innovation. For example, in response to 
competitors’ new market offerings, firms that are led by CEOs with high levels of 
prevention focus might shift their focus from maintaining status quo to 
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supporting innovation related activities to remain competitive in the 
marketplace.  
This study also examined how CEOs with different combinations of promotion 
and prevention focus impact firms’ entrepreneurial activities (see the post-hoc 
tests). In line with the assumptions, this study found that among CEOs with 
strong promotion focus, firms that are led by achievers (low prevention focus) 
exhibit higher levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness than firms 
led by rationalists (high prevention focus). This might be because the rationalists 
tend to face the dilemma of balancing their activities to ensure that both 
advancement and safety needs are satisfied. To illustrate, CEOs with high levels 
of promotion focus should induce firms to pursue entrepreneurial activities as 
the potential gains can help to satisfy their needs for advancement. At the same 
time, the accompanying high levels of prevention focus should orient their firms 
to be cautious in their entrepreneurial activities to ensure that CEOs’ needs for 
safety are not endangered (Brockner et al., 2004). As a result, the vigilant 
tendency associated with high levels of prevention focus might safeguard firms 
from pursuing excessive entrepreneurial activities induced by high levels of 
promotion focus. This explains why firms that are led by rationalists pursue 
lower levels of entrepreneurial activities than firms led by achievers. 
Together, the above findings offer important contributions to research on 
regulatory focus and EO. Firstly, this study extends research on regulatory focus 
theory by showing that, in addition to influencing SMEs’ exploration and 
exploitation activities (Kammerlander et al., 2015), CEO regulatory focus also 
impacts SMEs’ entrepreneurial behaviours. This extension is important because 
while studies have shown that CEO regulatory focus impacts the behaviours of 
large firms (Gamache et al., 2015; Greenbaum, 2015), limited attention has been 
devoted to the SME context. This study reveals that CEO regulatory focus shapes 
SMEs’ levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. As such, it 
provides empirical evidence demonstrating the significance of regulatory focus 
for understanding the entrepreneurial behaviours of SMEs. Hence, this study 
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answers calls for more research to explore how CEO regulatory focus impacts 
different types of firm strategic behaviours (Gamache et al., 2015). 
Secondly, this study contributes to research on EO by uncovering the links 
between CEO regulatory focus and the three dimensions of EO. Researchers have 
noted that “the EO phenomenon and linkages that exist between this 
phenomenon and its antecedents and consequences are often poorly explained 
using ‘off-the-shelf’ theories” (Covin and Lumpkin, 2011, p. 859). Additionally, 
Rauch et al., (2009, p. 779) assert that “it may be more appropriate to study 
antecedences and consequences of EO at the level of the dimensions of EO”. By 
drawing insights from regulatory focus theory and examining the impact of CEO 
regulatory focus on firms’ levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness, 
this study addresses calls to better understand how CEO factors influence EO 
(Mousa and Wales, 2012; Pittino et al., 2017). Because the different 
entrepreneurial behaviours are associated with firm performance (Rauch et al., 
2009; Gupta and Wales, 2017), it is imperative to understand the potential 
antecedents that might shape firms’ entrepreneurial behaviours. Nevertheless, 
further study is still needed to understand the link between promotion focus and 
firms’ levels of risk-taking as well as the link between prevention focus and firms’ 
levels of innovativeness. 
Additionally, this study contributes to research in entrepreneurship by showing 
that the effects of CEO regulatory focus and the dimensions of EO are context 
dependent. That is, their performance effects are dependent on the industry 
context in which firms operate. For example, firms that operate in high-tech 
industries tend to face different types of challenges than firms that operate in the 
low-tech industries, implying that firms operating in different industry contexts 
should have distinct needs. As a result, the significance of CEO regulatory focus 
and the dimensions of EO should vary between firms that operate in different 
industry contexts. Prior studies have highlighted the importance of contexts (e.g., 
including business, social, spatial, and institutional context) for our 




As Welter (2011, p. 165) noted, the contexts “provide individuals with 
opportunities and set boundaries for their actions. Context can be an asset and a 
liability for the nature and extent of entrepreneurship, but entrepreneurship can 
also impact contexts”. This study provides empirical evidence demonstrating 
that both the performance effects of CEO regulatory focus and EO dimensions 
are contingent on the industry context (i.e., high-tech industries versus low-tech 
industries) in which firms operate. The results indicate that the nature and/or 
magnitude of the performance effects of CEO regulatory focus and EO 
dimensions differ significantly between firms operating in high-tech industries 
and those in low-tech one. 
Finally, by assessing the performance effects of CEO regulatory focus and the EO 
dimensions, as well as the potential links between them, this study also offers 
contributions to the entrepreneurship literature. While CEO regulatory focus 
and the three dimensions of EO represent constructs at different levels, both of 
them might result in variance in SME performance. The results indicated that 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness together account for 14% of the 
variance in SME performance, whereas promotion and prevention focus account 
for 6% of the variance in similar outcomes. As such, this study provides empirical 
evidence showing that firm-level entrepreneurial behaviours in terms of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness are more robust predictors in 
explaining the variance in SME performance than individual-level CEO 
characteristic in terms of promotion and prevention focus.  
The lower explanatory power associated with regulatory focus might be because 
individual characteristics often influence organisational outcomes through 
influencing people’s interpretations of the situations they face (Hambrick, 2007; 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984). For example, through influencing people’s decision 
making, regulatory focus can thus impact activities at firm-level. As such, the 
performance effects of regulatory focus are realised through other underlying 
mechanisms that are induced by regulatory focus. The empirical results also 
revealed that CEO regulatory focus is related to the three EO dimensions. Hence, 
this study provides empirical evidence showing how individual difference in CEO 
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6.2 Managerial implications 
The findings from this study have several practical implications for the top 
managers of SMEs. Firstly, this study reveals that the positive performance 
effects of promotion focus are context dependent (e.g., whether firms are in high-
tech or low-tech industries). To improve firm-level outcomes, it is imperative for 
firms to align CEO promotion focus with the situations firms face. For example, 
high-levels of promotion focus positively influence the performance of SMEs in 
high-tech industries, but might have negative impacts on the performance of 
SMEs in low-tech industries. As such, promotion focus is beneficial only when it 
fits with the industry environment firms operate within (i.e., high promotion 
focus in high-tech industries). The finding echoes Hmieleski and Baron’s (2008, 
p. 285) suggestion that “a promotion focus will be the most effective self-
regulatory mode for entrepreneurs leading their firms within dynamic industry 
environments, which are characterized by uncertainty”. Also, it is important for 
executives to recognise that promotion focus might have detrimental effects on 
organisations when it misfits with the industry environment (i.e., having overly 
high promotion focus in low-tech industries).  
Secondly, this study uncovers the fact that firms that are led by CEOs with high 
levels of both promotion and prevention focus achieved the best performance, 
suggesting the importance of balancing promotion and prevention focus. 
Because people’s regulatory focus is relatively stable (Higgins et al., 2001; 
Hmieleski and Baron, 2008), it might be unrealistic to ask people to alter such 
characteristics. However, promotion focused CEOs might intentionally involve 
prevention focused people in decision making processes to provide a balance for 
their tendencies to explore and engage in new opportunities that might be risky. 
As Brockner et al., (2004) highlighted, prevention focus might serve as “due 
diligence” in the entrepreneurial process. Similarly, prevention focused CEOs 
might surround themselves with promotion focused people to provide a balance 
for their tendencies to maintain a status quo that might undermine a firm’s 
chances to capitalise on new opportunities. For example, the results indicated 
that firms that are led by prevention focused CEOs exhibited lower levels of 
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proactiveness. Involving promotion focused people in the decision making 
process might help to counter such issue because promotion focus is positively 
associated with firms’ levels of proactiveness.  
Thirdly, the results suggest that it is not necessary or beneficial for SMEs to 
exhibit high levels in all three dimensions of EO to achieve better performance. 
For example, the results suggest that up to a certain point, increasing levels of 
innovativeness will generate benefits for SMEs but beyond the point, further 
increases will likely have detrimental effects on SME performance. It appears 
that SMEs that are moderate in innovativeness will register better performance. 
By contrast, the results suggest that SMEs with moderate levels of risk-taking 
will experience low levels of performance. As Kreiser et al., (2013) pointed out, 
low levels of risk-taking are more desirable for SMEs to achieve better 
performance. Furthermore, the results suggest that proactiveness has 
predominated positive effects on SME performance, suggesting that being 
proactive to introduce products ahead of the competition might provide firms 
with competitive advantages and contribute to better performance.  
Finally, the significance of innovativeness and proactiveness differ between 
SMEs in high-tech and those in low-tech industries. To enhance firm 
performance, SMEs are suggested to manage their levels of entrepreneurial 
activities to fit the industry environment in which they are operating. For 
example, innovativeness has stronger effects for SMEs operating in low-tech 
industries, suggesting that such firms can reap more benefits from increasing 
levels of innovativeness. However, when the levels of innovativeness are high, 
the potential detrimental effects will also be stronger for them. On the other hand, 
proactiveness has a stronger effect on SMEs operating in high-tech areas. As such, 
firms that operate in high-tech industries, which are often associated with high 
rates and magnitudes of changes, are encouraged to be proactive in seeking and 
undertaking new product opportunities. Results from sub-group analysis also 
provide some evidence showing that risk-taking has a higher impact on SMEs in 
high-tech industries. However, this link remains inconclusive as significant 
results were not observed in the full sample.  
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6.3 Limitations and directions for future research 
This study comes along with limitations which present opportunities for future 
research. This study examined the impacts of CEO regulatory focus on SMEs. 
The results found here might not hold true in large firms because they are often 
managed by management teams (Finkelstein et al., 2009). For example, firms’ 
decisions to engage in entrepreneurial activities might be influenced by other 
people within the top management team rather than by CEOs alone. Accordingly, 
it is unclear whether CEO regulatory focus will have a similar influence on the 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness of large firms. Future 
investigations targeting large firms could examine the influence of top 
management teams rather than focusing on a single CEO. For example, a recent 
study has shown that the regulatory focus of CEOs and CFOs can interact and 
influence firms’ growth-oriented initiatives (Chen et al., 2017). In the same vein, 
it would be interesting to examine how the composition of top management 
teams that consist of both promotion and prevention focused people might 
influence firms’ strategic behaviours.  
Since this study uses cross-sectional data, the relationships identified do not 
necessarily establish causality. In other words, the potential issue of reverse 
causality cannot be ruled out. For example, one may argue that it is the good 
performance that drives the three dimensions of EO rather than the opposite. 
That is, good firm performance might provide resources for firms to be proactive 
and to undertake innovative and risky initiatives. As such, future research 
exploring the consequences of the three dimensions of EO are encouraged to 
adopt a longitudinal design to better gauge the implications of the three 
dimensions of EO on firm performance. While the subjective performance data 
reported from CEOs might be prone to reporting bias, it is unlikely to undermine 
the results from this study because prior research has shown that subjective 
performance is highly correlated with the objective measure (Dess and Robinson, 
1984). As Gupta and Wales (2017, p. 59) pointed out, “the majority of EO–
performance findings are based on subjective measurement relative to 
competitors” (Gupta and Wales, 2017, p. 59). 
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Additionally, this study employed the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ) 
scale to measure CEO regulatory focus. Similar to previous empirical work (e.g., 
Kammerlander et al., 2015), I found low internal reliability on the measure of 
promotion focus. In particular, two out of the six items (i.e., Items 1 and 11) were 
removed to achieve satisfactory construct reliability. While the Cronbach’s Alpha 
value of 0.64 is acceptable, it is still lower than the recommended value of 0.7 
(Hair et al., 2014). This issue might merit further examination. Researchers are 
encouraged to further assess and enhance the original RFQ scale to develop 
higher levels of reliability from it.  
Finally, while research in regulatory focus theory suggests that promotion focus 
is associated with a risk-taking tendency, this study did not find a significant 
impact of CEO promotion focus on firms’ levels of risk-taking. Similarly, 
although prevention focus is known to be associated with a tendency to maintain 
status quo, the proposed negative effects of CEO prevention focus on firms’ level 
of innovativeness was not supported. These non-findings raise an important 
question about whether the effects of CEOs’ characteristics on firm-level 
outcomes are dependent on other organisational or environmental factors. For 
example, it is possible that the absence of slack resources might hinder firms’ 
risk-taking, suggesting that the risk-taking tendencies associated with promotion 
focus might not be materialised. Similarly, changes in the market environment 
or threats from competitors might trigger prevention focused people to deviate 
from their preferred status quo and support innovative effects. Accordingly, 
further studies are required to investigate the potential boundary conditions in 









To conclude, this study demonstrates that while regulatory focus and EO refer to 
different natures of phenomenon and represent constructs at different levels (i.e., 
individual-level motivational characteristic versus firm-level entrepreneurial 
behaviour), both factors have profound impacts on SMEs. In particular, this 
study found that CEO regulatory focus is related to the performance of SMEs. 
Additionally, CEO regulatory focus has a substantial influence on SMEs’ levels of 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. As such, this study provides 
empirical evidence demonstrating the importance of regulatory focus in 
understanding the organisational outcomes of SMEs. Furthermore, this study 
reveals that each dimension of EO has unique performance effects on SMEs and 
that their effects, except risk-taking, vary between SMEs in high-tech industries 
and those in low-tech industries. Since the EO dimensions do not generate 
universally positive impacts, and since their salience depends on the industry 
environment in which firms operate, to enhance firm-level outcomes, it is 
paramount for SMEs to match their entrepreneurial behaviours with the 
industry environment they operate within. Together, this study found that 
individual differences in regulatory focus and firms’ entrepreneurial behaviours 
are useful predictors in explaining the variance of organisational outcomes. 
Researchers are encouraged to explore the effects of regulatory focus and EO on 
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Appendix 1: Sample response from pilot testing 
 
From: *** [name removed for anonymity]  
Sent: 26 March 2015 10:52 
To: Huang, Shuangfa 




I have completed the survey. 
The design of the survey appears fine. I have one or two comments. 
In the heading I suggest you consider using the word Organisation or Company rather 
than Firm. This is a personal preference and I think you should ask other people. 
In Section 1 Question 6, I like the separation of High Tech and Knowledge. This 
difference is often missed. 
In section 2 Question 3, you ask about working harder. What about working cleverer? 
Are they the same thing? I believe they are different. 
I looked up the book “Thinking, Fast and Slow”. It looks interesting and I will get a copy. 
Thanks for the suggestion. 
 
Best regards,  







Appendix 2: Questionnaire design 
 
 
A SURVEY ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CEO  
ON THE PRODUCT INNOVATION OF SMES 
 
 
Guidelines to the questionnaire: 
1. The term product refers to both goods and services. 
2. Questions can be answered by simply ticking a number or providing a simple one 
word answer. 
3. Questions are grouped in eight sections and can be completed in 15 minutes. 
4. When you arrive at the final 'thank you' page, you will know that your responses 




SECTION 1: COMPANY BACKGROUND & RESPONDENT PROFILE 
 
1. When was this business founded?  7. What is your current age: 
                                 __________ 
 
                               __________ 
2. What is your industry?  8. What is your gender: 
          Manufacturing     
                                                     
Male 
 
          Service                    
                                              
Female 
 
          Others                     
 
9. Level of education: 
3. Number of employees?        Postgraduate degree                   
          1- 10  
 
      Degree or higher degree                                 
          11-50  
 
      A level  
          51-250  
 
      GCSE  
          More than 250  
 
      Other  
4. Sales revenue? 
 
      No formal qualifications  
          Less than £1.5 million  
 10. What is your main role  
       in the business? 
          Less than £7.5 million          Chairman  
          Less than £37.5 million          Managing Director  
          More than £37.5 million          Executive Director  
5. Percentage change in sales 
     revenues in the past 3 years?  
 
       Non-executive Director  
     (fill one)   
       Owner-Manager      
                                       Growth  _____% 
 
       Partner  
                           OR  Decrease  _____% 
 
       Other (Please specify)      
6. Your primary product is: 
 
                               __________ 
(Please tick one number on each row)  
11. Number of years  
      with this company? 
High Tech 1 2 3 4 5 Low Tech                                 __________ 
Customised 1 2 3 4 5 Standardised  
12. Number of years  












SECTION 2: YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARD EXPLORATION & LEARNING 
This set of questions asks you about specific events in your life. Please indicate your answer 
to each question by ticking the appropriate number below it. 
1. Compared to most people, are you 
typically unable to get what you want 
out of life? 
 
7. Do you often do well at different things 
that you try? 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
never  
or seldom 
 sometimes  very 
often 
 never       
or seldom 
 sometimes  very 
often 
   
2. Growing up, would you ever "cross 
the line'' by doing things that your 
parents would not tolerate? 
 
8. Not being careful enough has gotten you 
into trouble at times. 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
never       
or seldom 
 sometimes  very 
often 
 never       
or seldom 
 sometimes  very 
often 
   
3. How often have you accomplished 
things that got you "psyched'' to work 
even harder? 
 
9. When it comes to achieving things that are 
important to me, I find that I don't perform 
as well as I ideally would like to do. 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
never       
or seldom 








   
4. Did you get on your parents' nerves 
often when you were growing up? 
 
10. I feel like I have made progress toward 
being successful in my life.  
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
never       
or seldom 




   certainly 
true 
   
5. How often did you obey rules and 
regulations that were established by 
your parents? 
 
11. I have found very few hobbies or 
activities in my life that capture my interest 
or motivate me to put effort into them. 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
never       
or seldom 




   certainly 
true 
   
6. Growing up, did you ever act in ways 
that your parents thought were 
objectionable? 
  
1 2 3 4 5   
never       
or seldom 







SECTION 3: STRATEGIC PREFERENCE OF YOUR FIRM 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in 







We favour a strong emphasis on R&D, technological 
leadership, and innovations 
1 2 3 4 5 
My firm has many new lines of products marketed in the 
past 3 years 
1 2 3 4 5 
Changes in our product lines have usually been quite 
dramatic 
1 2 3 4 5 
We have a strong propensity for high-risk projects (with 
chances of very high returns) 
1 2 3 4 5 
We believe, owing to the nature of the environment, that 
bold, wide-ranging acts are necessary to achieve the firm's 
objectives 
1 2 3 4 5 
When there is uncertainty, we typically adopt a bold, 
aggressive posture in order to maximise the probability of 
exploiting potential opportunities 
1 2 3 4 5 
We initiate actions to which competitors then respond 1 2 3 4 5 
We are very often the first business to introduce new 
products, administrative techniques, operating technologies, 
etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 
We typically adopt a very competitive, "undo-the-
competitors" posture 




















SECTION 4: BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in 
relation to your business environment?  
Strongly 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
The technology in our industry is changing rapidly  1 2 3 4 5 
Technological changes provide big opportunities in our 
industry 
1 2 3 4 5 
A large number of new product ideas have been made 
possible through technological breakthroughs in our industry 
1 2 3 4 5 
Customers’ product preferences change quite a bit over time 1 2 3 4 5 
Our customers tend to look for new products all the time  1 2 3 4 5 
We are witnessing demand for our products from customers 
who never bought them before 




SECTION 5: FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
To what extent do you agree that in comparison with your 
major competitors over the past three years:   
Strongly 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
Your company has higher profitability 1 2 3 4 5 
Your company has higher market share 1 2 3 4 5 
Your company has higher return on investments 1 2 3 4 5 









Appendix 3: Letter of invitation 
 
 
Dear xxx (name of respondent), 
 
You are invited to participate in a study from Lancaster University. The study aims to 
assess the impact of individual and firm learning on SMEs’ innovation. The findings can help 
to inform you the influence of different learning behaviours on your organisation. 
 
We recognise the value of your time and shall update you with an Executive Report on the 
findings of the study. Information you provide will remain confidential and individual firms 
will not be identified in any of the study findings. Questions can be completed in 15 minutes. 
 
Please follow this link to complete the survey.  
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Best Regards,   
Shuangfa Huang   
Institute for Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development 















Appendix 4: Descriptive statistics 
 Variable Number of cases Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CEO age 110 25.0 73.0 50.67 10.49 
CEO tenure 110 1.0 42.0 14.41 9.57 
Firm age 110 1.0 193.0 30.400 32.1051 
 






Male 90 81.8 81.8 81.8 
Female 20 18.2 18.2 100.0 
Total 110 100.0 100.0   
Firm size 
1-10 22 20.0 20.0 20.0 
11-50 36 32.7 32.7 52.7 
51-250 52 47.3 47.3 100.0 
Total 110 100.0 100.0   
Industry 
Manufacturing 31 28.2 28.2 28.2 
Service 53 48.2 48.2 76.4 
Others 26 23.6 23.6 100.0 
Total 110 100.0 100.0   
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Appendix 5: Results from normality test 
Construct 
N Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error 
z-value 
(recommended 
value: +/-1.96)  Statistic Std. Error 
z-value 
(recommended 
value: +/-1.96)  
Innovativeness 110 -.107 .230 -.462 -.486 .457 -1.064 
Risk-taking 110 -.053 .230 -.231 -.772 .457 -1.689 
Proactiveness 110 -.069 .230 -.301 -.314 .457 -.688 
Firm performance 110 -.477 .230 -2.069 .223 .457 .488 
Promotion focus 110 -.052 .230 -.227 -.260 .457 -.569 
Prevention focus 110 -.144 .230 -.624 -.422 .457 -.923 
CEO age 110 -.412 .230 -1.786 -.103 .457 -.225 
CEO tenure (square root 
transformation) 
110 -.216 .230 -.939 -.699 .457 -1.528 
Firm age(logarithmic 
transformation) 
110 -.433 .230 -1.880 .711 .457 1.556 
 
Valid N (listwise) 
110             
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Appendix 6: Results from principal component analysis 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 








1 2.939 36.735 36.735 2.939 36.735 36.735 2.769 34.616 34.616 
2 1.821 22.767 59.503 1.821 22.767 59.503 1.991 24.887 59.503 
3 .826 10.323 69.825             
4 .605 7.564 77.390             
5 .567 7.087 84.477             
6 .531 6.634 91.111             
7 .384 4.804 95.915             
8 .327 4.085 100.000             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Component Matrixa  Rotated Component Matrix




Component    
1 2  1 2    
PRO3 .010 .730  PRO3 -.275 .676    
PRO7 .344 .664  PRO7 .058 .746    
PRO9 .484 .510  PRO9 .247 .658    
PRO10 .477 .554  PRO10 .223 .696    
PRE2 .755 -.409  PRE2 .855 -.082    
PRE4 .820 -.226  PRE4 .843 .111    
PRE5 .697 -.104  PRE5 .683 .176    
PRE6 .793 -.227  PRE6 .819 .100    
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 2 components extracted. 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  




Appendix 7: Results from non-response bias test 
Group Statistics N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean      
CEO Age Early 56 50.018 9.977 1.333      
Late 54 51.352 11.053 1.504      
Tenure Early 56 13.027 9.465 1.265      
Late 54 15.852 9.547 1.299      
Firm age Early 56 30.375 31.682 4.234      
Late 54 30.426 32.836 4.468      
           
Independent  
Samples Test 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 











Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CEO Age Equal variances assumed 2.530 .115 -.665 108 .507 -1.334 2.006 -5.311 2.643 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
    -.664 105.968 .508 -1.334 2.010 -5.319 2.651 
Tenure Equal variances assumed .005 .945 -1.558 108 .122 -2.825 1.813 -6.419 .768 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
    -1.558 107.779 .122 -2.825 1.813 -6.419 .769 
Firm age Equal variances assumed 




Equal variances not 
assumed 









Appendix 8: Results from common method bias test 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.339 25.423 25.423 5.339 25.423 25.423 2.913 13.872 13.872 
2 3.042 14.484 39.907 3.042 14.484 39.907 2.808 13.373 27.245 
3 2.326 11.078 50.984 2.326 11.078 50.984 2.585 12.310 39.555 
4 1.513 7.206 58.190 1.513 7.206 58.190 2.300 10.953 50.509 
5 1.362 6.486 64.676 1.362 6.486 64.676 2.074 9.877 60.385 
6 1.117 5.319 69.996 1.117 5.319 69.996 2.018 9.610 69.996 
7 .950 4.524 74.520             
8 .703 3.346 77.865             
9 .632 3.010 80.875             
10 .605 2.882 83.757             
11 .499 2.376 86.133             
12 .454 2.163 88.297             
13 .425 2.024 90.320             
14 .401 1.910 92.230             
15 .319 1.517 93.747             
16 .281 1.340 95.087             
17 .270 1.287 96.374             
18 .249 1.185 97.558             
19 .203 .968 98.526             
20 .163 .777 99.302             
21 .146 .698 100.000             




Appendix 9: Results from reliability and validity test 








Promotion focus  0.644 0.483 
How often have you accomplished things that got you "psyched'' to work even harder? 0.676   
Do you often do well at different things that you try? 0.746   
When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don't perform 
as well as I ideally would like to do. 0.658   
I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life. 0.696   
    
Prevention focus  0.829 0.580 
Growing up, would you ever "cross the line'' by doing things that your parents would 
not tolerate? 0.855   
Did you get on your parents' nerves often when you were growing up? 0.843   
How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents? 0.683   





Entrepreneurial Orientation    
EO – Innovativeness  0.770 0.598 
We favour a strong emphasis on R&D, technological leadership, and innovations. 0.738   
My firm has many new lines of products marketed in the past 3 years. 0.811   
Changes in our product lines have usually been quite dramatic. 0.770   
EO – Proactiveness  0.790 0.619 
We initiate actions to which competitors then respond 0.781   
We are very often the first business to introduce new products, 
administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc. 0.820   
We typically adopt a very competitive, "undo-the-competitors" posture 0.758   
EO – Risk taking  0.840 0.672 
We have a strong propensity for high-risk projects (with chances of very high returns) 0.807   
We believe, owing to the nature of the environment, that bold, wide-ranging acts are 
necessary to achieve the firm's objectives 0.805   
When there is uncertainty, we typically adopt a bold, aggressive posture in order to 
maximise the probability of exploiting potential opportunities 0.846   
    
Firm performance (in comparison with your major competitors over the past three 
years):  0.768 0.598 
Your company has higher profitability 0.841   
Your company has higher market share 0.622   
Your company has higher return on investments 0.850   
Your company has higher sales growth 0.759     
 
